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Abstract 
This thesis explores the class impact of gentrification, contributing to a deeper 
insight into multiple experiences of gentrification. Centring on an ethnographic 
study of gentrification in Dikmen Valley in Ankara, it is concerned with the 
relations among the multiple actors involved in the on-going Dikmen Valley 
Urban Transformation Project. The project aimed to transform an area that 
contained many squatter communities into an area of luxury apartments and 
parkland. Its implementation and the conflicts it prompted were deeply shaped 
by shifts towards a neoliberal urban development regime and by a revision of 
earlier policies towards the squatter settlers. The study approaches 
gentrification as a dynamic process in which urban space is redeveloped in 
ways that complicate class hierarchies. The thesis argues that it is vital to 
examine the processes of inclusion to grasp the class impact of gentrification, 
which is not limited to displacement and stigmatisation. It therefore examines 
the processes in which inclusion is promoted and negotiated by multiple actors 
living through gentrification. To address these questions, the study combines 
historical and ethnographic research. Drawing on documentary research on 
the changing urban policies and citizenship agendas, the research reveals how 
the disciplining effects of gentrification operate through citizenship. It details 
how in Dikmen Valley gentrification was employed to marginalise and punish 
those who made rights-based claims to homes and land, while the state offered 
those who obediently participated in gentrification the reward of legal 
homeownership and recognition as ‘good citizens’. The study also draws on 
participant observation and in-depth interviews with people from a diverse 
variety of backgrounds living in and around the Dikmen Valley Project Area 
during January to October 2015. Through this combination of methods, the 
thesis demonstrates that the ways in which gentrification, promoted by the 
state actors and negotiated by the multiple actors living through it, complicates 
existing class hierarchies.                       
  
Keywords: Gentrification, class hierarchies, citizenship, inclusion, obedience, 
right claims, indebtedness, symbolic struggles.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This study explores the class impact of gentrification. In the existing literature 
that focuses on gentrification from the perspective of its class impact, it is 
addressed as a class remake of the city. While analyses centred on economic 
structure explore capitalist processes of appropriation and redistribution of 
the “rent gap” (Smith, 1979), the studies that focus on ‘human agency’ 
emphasise the cultural processes and practices through which class distinction 
is reproduced. The main goal of reproducing the urban space in a more 
profitable way is argued to lead to devaluation of neighbourhoods occupied by 
low-income, socially unwanted/marginalised groups and their successive 
transformation into middle and upper-class oriented areas. From this 
perspective, displacement and dispossession of the urban poor and 
intensification of spatial and socio-economic segregation are addressed as the 
class impact of gentrification.  
This overlooks the fact that even the groups who are directly targeted by 
gentrification projects are drawn into the gentrification process. It is sourced 
by the economic rationale of profit maximisation that guides most studies, 
which in turn results in their failure to fully explore the political interests 
invested by the state. What are the considerations involved in state-led 
gentrification other than economic and financial goals? In what ways does 
politics influence the ways people are included in the process and the ways 
they negotiate with it? In searching for answers to these questions, this 
research investigates the political processes of inclusion into the state-led 
gentrification projects, with the purpose of revealing the class impact of 
gentrification that is beyond displacement and exclusion.    
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Figure 1: The cover page of the weekly ‘Metropolitan Ankara’ bulletin dated 14-20 
November, 2011, demonstrating two photos of different parts of the Dikmen Valley 
Gentrification Project Area. 
The figure above is the front cover of the weekly ‘Metropolitan Ankara’ 
bulletin, which was distributed by the greater municipality in mid-November, 
2011. The text in yellow title is ‘Here is Dikmen reality’ asking in red bubbles 
whether the valley ‘becomes like this’ (above) or ‘stays like this’ (below). On 
the front cover, there are two contrasting aerial perspective images of different 
parts of the Dikmen Valley: the first depicts the gentrified valley with 
luxurious, high-rise and low-rise gated apartments, parks, ornamental pools 
and cafes, which together form a well-ordered, ostentatious view; the picture 
below depicts the undeveloped valley, with small-scale squatter houses, poplar 
trees and the Dikmen stream, a messier, if unpretentious view.   
Dikmen Valley used to be one of the largest squatter settlement areas in the 
capital city Ankara before the implementation of gentrification project. Such 
squatter neighbourhoods were constructed in the aftermath of the Second 
World War by rural migrants who were exposed to big cities following the 
mechanisation of agriculture. In contrast to the practices of squatting through 
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occupying and settling in abandoned buildings in advanced capitalist countries 
such as the UK, those migrants in Turkey constructed from scratch one-storey 
houses which were called ‘gecekondu’ (gedʒekondo) (literally ‘built overnight’).  
Despite unaccomplished rehabilitative plans, those informal houses were 
overlooked by authorities with political and economic motives. The rural 
migrants offered a submissive group of voters as well as a cheap and 
unorganised labour force for the national industrialisation process. Over time 
this political tolerance took the form of enabling some squatter settlers to 
make profit from the illegally occupied land as governments enacted laws that 
allowed the construction of multi-storey buildings on squatter land in which 
the squatter residents became owners of several flats.  
After the devastating economic crisis in 2001 in Turkey, however, the populist 
urban policies, which had prevented the capitalisation of land and housing 
markets fully, were revised. A policy agenda much more committed to ideas of 
rent extraction and commercialisation of shelter was put into effect in 2002 
onwards by the liberal conservative Justice and Development Party 
governments. The implementation of a strict neoliberal economy program set 
the ground for a state-led urban transformation campaign in the cities all over 
the country.  
Scholars in Turkey interpret this process as a shift in governance of urban land 
and housing markets from a populist to a neoliberal one (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 
2010) due in part to the ways in which political interest in the squatter 
inhabitants had lost sway (Somali, 2013). The erosion of interest in the 
political processes and actors is predicated on assumptions which reduce the 
raison d’état of the state to the rationale of economic profit and analyse the 
politics and political actors involved in the process as subsidiary to economic 
ones. Drawing on the same rationale, some scholars attend to the financial 
inclusion of low-income groups and social aid programmes, which aim to 
compensate the devastating social impacts of neoliberal agenda (Yildirim, 
2009; Akcay, 2015).  
However, as the municipal bulletin above reveals, the active involvement of 
state actors in gentrification projects is concerned with including the squatter 
dwellers not only financially but also politically. The bulletin was distributed 
shortly after the national elections in which the Justice and Development Party 
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won the majority of the votes and became the ruling party for the third time 
(after its victory in the elections in 2002 and 2007). The party had 
consolidated its legitimacy and power also after the 2010 referendum in which 
57% of the voters gave consent to the changes in the constitution towards a 
more authoritarian regime. Within this context of the political atmosphere that 
enabled the enactment of a progressively more authoritarian regime, this 
thesis will investigate the role of state actors in the gentrification process in 
Turkey. 
Throughout the pages of the bulletin, the local state actors embark upon 
informing the ‘good citizens’ of Ankara about the successes of the gentrification 
project in the valley, emphasising the ‘good intentions’ of the municipality vis-
à-vis the struggling squatter residents. While doing that, it condemns those 
involved in the ‘illegitimate’ struggles against the implementation of the 
gentrification project in cooperation with ‘terrorist groups’. Criminalisation 
and stigmatisation as ‘terrorists’ of those imagined to be resisting 
gentrification, is a warning to squatter communities to respond appropriately 
to the ‘benevolent’ efforts of the municipality: in particular, the offer to 
squatters is that in return for giving up land and property in the valley this will 
be given legal ownership of new apartments (located outside the valley). In 
short, in return for their co-operation, the squatter dwellers are promised both 
legal homes and inclusion in ‘good citizenship’ which is defined on the basis of 
obedience to the state authority. It is this desire to be a ‘good citizen’ — 
alongside economic considerations — that, as we shall see, partly explains how 
local residents come to accept the indebted homeownership offered by 
participation in the gentrification projects. In this way, the bulletin reveals the 
complex ways class and citizenship entangle through gentrification.  
In the bulletin, the greater municipality promotes the gentrified parts of the 
valley as a source of pride while the squatter neighbourhood was represented 
in a binary opposition as a source of shame. Replacing the deteriorated and 
informal settlements with luxurious and ‘orderly’ residential areas, 
gentrification project is promoted with the promise of producing the modern 
‘ideal’ spaces where citizens should seek to live. Thus, investing in symbolic 
oppositions between modern/non-modern and obedient/disobedient, the 
state represents participation in the state-led gentrification project as a route 
to being a good and proper citizen.  
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This raises questions regarding the explanations of class impact of 
gentrification solely based on an economic rationale. Thus, drawing on some 
documentary research and ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis draws on the 
idea that processes of inclusion and the political considerations behind must 
be considered when analysing the class impact of gentrification. Addressing 
also the ways in which inclusion is negotiated by and benefitting some actors, 
including those most directly stigmatised and expelled by the gentrification 
process, I intend to demonstrate that the processes of refashioning class 
hierarchies through gentrification are contested.  
This thesis will focus on the Dikmen Valley gentrification project area. There 
gated apartments occupied by middle class groups and much more prestigious 
gated communities hosting upper class people were located side by side with 
high-rise apartments in which the former squatter dwellers were resettled. As 
the product of neoliberal logic which reproduces the urban space for the 
progressively more affluent user (Hackworth, 2002), almost all of those gated 
communities was vertically expanded. They were protected by walls, security 
cameras and guards, and had privatised infrastructure and services. On the 
other hand, the squatter neighbourhood that stood in the northern part of the 
valley was suffering from enduring disinvestment while the squatter dwellers 
living there have been engaged in political activism since the unilateral 
announcement of the project in 2006. This framework made the valley 
appropriate for investigating the class impact of gentrification as it offered 
simultaneous access to different class groups who were drawn into and 
negotiated with the state-led project in different ways.  
Within this context, the main question of this study is how the project has 
impacted on class dynamics in the valley. To do that, I will investigate the ways 
gentrification is promoted by state actors and the processes through which the 
struggling squatter communities who are stigmatised are also drawn into the 
project. To connect gentrification to the political processes, I will use 
citizenship as a critical lens. I will focus on the ways citizenship is officially 
configured and promoted throughout the process state actors draw people into 
the gentrification project in the valley, and the different ways it is enacted and 
mobilised by the different groups living there.  
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Through exploring the symbolic struggles through which shared 
understandings regarding who can properly live in places that are officially 
promoted as ‘ideal’ homes, this thesis aims to show that the class conflicts that 
are taking place throughout gentrification are not limited to material struggles 
over rent extraction and appropriation. To do that, I will explore the process of 
changing access to material resources such as land and housing throughout the 
gentrification process in relation to the struggles over access to symbolic 
resources like ‘citizenship’. Thus, the focus on political processes using the lens 
of citizenship will enable me to move beyond the emphases on material 
processes of property transfer and displacement as class impact of 
gentrification.        
1.1. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce the research 
questions of this study after introducing the field, and touching upon briefly 
what was not fully explored in the relevant research. 
In chapter 2, I introduce the key concepts of this study, namely class, 
citizenship, gentrification and neoliberalism. I offer a critical examination of 
the key approaches in gentrification research. Then, I explain how I use 
citizenship to explore changing class dynamics in relation to gentrification and 
how that helps me shed light upon the under-investigated aspects of inclusion 
and develop the existing analyses in gentrification research.  
In Chapter 3, I present the two types of research that I conducted, namely the 
documentary and ethnographic research. I first present the relational 
ethnographic method, discussing how it enables an analysis of the complex 
ways gentrification deals with the multiplicity of space focusing on the 
different but interconnected actors involved in the process. I also explain the 
limitations of ‘relationality’ in my thesis attending to the reasons for 
prioritisation of the former and current squatter dwellers. Then, I explain how 
I combined the data collected through documentary research, and my analysis 
of these secondary sources, with the ethnographic data. I then elaborate on 
how this provided temporal depth to the spatial analysis I offer in my study 
through revealing the interconnectedness between processes of urbanisation 
and neoliberal urban redevelopment, the ways state citizenship agendas were 
refashioned and changing class dynamics.  
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Chapter 4 is about how class inequalities were managed through the processes 
of formation and evolution of state citizenship agendas and reproduction of 
urban space in Turkey throughout the 20th century. Drawing on the historical 
data about the processes of urbanisation and squatting, and the changes in the 
citizenship agendas in Turkey, this chapter examines the interconnected 
processes of formation of citizenship regime and urbanisation from the 
perspective of class hierarchies. The last part of this chapter analyses how the 
squatter settlements in the Dikmen Valley were formed and how they evolved 
within the context of the changing citizenship agendas and class dynamics 
within the context of the neoliberalisation process. 
Chapter 5 expands the historical analyses provided in Chapter 4 to the period 
from 2002 onwards during which neoliberalism took a gradually more 
authoritarian form in Turkey. I analyse the contemporary gentrification 
process in relation to the consolidation of duty-based citizenship agenda 
within the context of authoritarian neoliberalism. The main focus of this 
chapter is how gentrification was promoted to the squatter communities, that 
is, how and to what extent they were included in the process. Drawing on the 
speeches of key political figures about the country-wide urban transformation 
campaign, I explore how the practices of governing through communities as a 
result of devolution in the advanced capitalist contexts took the form of 
promotion of obedient citizenship in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, 
I examine how participation in the gentrification project was promoted to the 
struggling squatter communities in Dikmen Valley through simultaneously 
associating the rights-based claims and struggle with terror and promoting the 
promises of ‘obedient’ participation.    
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 focus on how the remaking of the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion was understood by multiple actors involved in the 
process. Chapter 6 focuses on the interpretations of the changing class 
hierarchies. I explore how the symbolic boundaries of ‘who can properly live in 
the city’ were reformed in relation to the changing physical boundaries on 
urban space. Drawing on the interviews with the current and former squatter 
dwellers, the new middle classes and more affluent residents of prestigious 
gated communities, this chapter explores how middle and upper class 
residents responded to the state-led gentrification. Drawing on the symbolic 
power lens developed by Bourdieu, I will explore in what ways the normative 
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construction of shared understandings regarding who can properly live in the 
city impacts on the class dynamics. 
Chapter 7 is about the ’Right to Shelter Struggle’ in the Dikmen Valley. Drawing 
on interviews with squatter dwellers, who still lived in the valley and those 
who had moved elsewhere, participants and former participants of the 
struggle, observation of weekly meetings, and previous scholarly studies of 
squatter activism in the valley, the chapter examines how the squatter 
communities enacted an activist citizenship while struggling against forced 
upheaval and giving away their land to the rich.  Based on the differences 
between the former studies on the struggle and my data from the later stages 
thereof I explore how the strength derived from collective resistance eroded 
over time and led to multiple and opposing views.   
Finally, in Chapter 8, I sum up the analyses derived from the data presented 
throughout the study. I argue that an analysis of gentrification from the 
perspective of class and citizenship in the Dikmen Valley area illustrated that 
the authoritarian citizenship regime is promoted and established through 
neoliberal urban redevelopment in Turkey and it is actively negotiated in a 
dynamic process by the different actors involved in the process. I suggest that 
within the context of the consolidation of authoritarian neoliberalism in the 
2000s onwards, the local and national state actors communicated the 
citizenship agenda based on obedience to the benevolent state through 
gentrification projects in such a way that criminalises the rights-based claims 
and struggles. Promoting obedience is done through making promises to 
different actors, which complicates the class dynamics. As a result, the 
boundaries of profiting from and being victimised by gentrification are 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches 
 
This research aims at understanding how contemporary gentrification has 
impacted upon class dynamics in Turkey. Inspired by the limitations of the 
analyses of the class impact of gentrification in research due to a prioritisation 
of economic processes and actors, I aim at extending this research through the 
use of the citizenship lens, which will enable me to focus on the politics 
involved. In so doing, I bring together economic and symbolic processes and 
actors in my analysis. Within this context the questions of this study are: 
How does the gentrification project impact class dynamics in the valley?  
In what ways is gentrification promoted and implemented by state actors in 
the valley?  
How are the different groups living in the valley drawn into the gentrification 
process?  
How do the different actors refashion the boundaries regarding who can 
properly live in the city?  
The key concepts in this research are class, gentrification, and citizenship 
while neoliberalisation provides the framework of the study. The focus of this 
chapter is to introduce these concepts and demonstrate how a framework of 
citizenship is useful for understanding the dynamic ways class operated 
throughout contemporary processes of gentrification in Turkey.  
2.1. Introducing the Framework and Key Themes 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism, which was introduced in response to the crises of the 
accumulation regime based on Keynesian welfarism in the late 1970s, 
significantly influenced existing class dynamics through refashioning the 
responsibilities of the state towards the individuals. Although neoliberalism is 
‘contextually embedded’ (Peck et al., 2009), which resulted in varying levels of 
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ideological and political adherence to neoliberal economic policies in different 
places (Jessop, 2010; Hall, 2011), it mainly targeted creating more profit 
through controlling labour costs. Thus, its key features are privatisation of 
public assets, flexibilisation of labour markets to reduce ‘impediments’ to 
business, liberalisation of trade, monetarism, and the marketisation of society 
through public–private partnerships and other forms of commodification 
(Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010). To extend market discipline, competition and 
commodification throughout society, neoliberal doctrines were deployed to 
justify, inter alia, the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on 
organised labour, the reduction of corporate taxes, the downsizing and/or 
privatisation of public services and assets, the dismantling of welfare programs 
(Peck et al., 2009, p. 50). As the state has largely abandoned its responsibility 
to make policies of social welfare which are grounded in equality, existing class 
inequalities intensified. The dissolution of the social welfare understanding 
and Keynesian institutions generated the concentration of wealth in fewer 
hands, massive job losses and increased levels of unemployment.      
Urban space has received a central place in the neoliberalism research as one 
of the most strategically important arenas in which neoliberalism has rolled 
back the Keynesian institutions and policies and rolled out new ones as urban 
redevelopment has promised profitable forms of capital accumulation. Within 
this context, Peck et al. (2009) refers to the urbanisation of neoliberalism. They 
argue that city space was targeted to be mobilised as an arena for market-
oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices while at the 
same time securing order and control amongst marginalised populations (p. 
58). Through adoption of the principle of ‘highest and best use’ as the basis for 
major land use planning decisions working class neighbourhoods were 
destructed and spaces of elite consumption as well as mega-projects were 
constructed to make way for speculative redevelopment (p. 61).           
They explain the role of the state in neoliberal urbanisation with reference to 
‘dismantling the basic institutional components of the post-war settlement and 
mobilising a range of policies intended to extend market discipline, 
competition and commodification throughout society’ (p. 50). Transforming 
members of welfare state into atomistic, competitive individuals was a 
contested process, which required the state to be more involved. Therefore, 
even though neoliberal ideology favours self-regulating markets and does not 
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tolerate state interference in the markets, there emerged ‘serious disjunctures 
between the ideology and everyday political operations of neoliberalism’ 
(Harvey, 2005). Within this framework, Peck et al. (2009) write that: 
While neoliberalism aspires to create a utopia of free markets, liberated from 
all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic 
intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to 
impose versions of market rule and, subsequently, to manage the 
consequences and contradictions of such marketization initiatives (p. 51).  
Similarly in his article titled “New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as 
Global Urban Strategy”, Neil Smith (2002) analyses the historical phases 
during which gentrification has become a systematised urban policy in North 
America and Europe. There he argues that the national states are reframing 
themselves within the context of the globalising network of production as 
‘purer, territorially rooted economic actors in and of the market’, rather than 
external compliments to it (p. 434). He argues that the dismantling of state 
responsibilities over production is matched by heightened levels of repression 
and state activism in terms of social control. Echoing the abovementioned 
argument of Peck et al. about the role of the state in terms of tackling the crises 
led by neoliberal policies, Smith writes that these authoritarian policies are 
justified on the basis of ‘quashing opposition and making the streets safe for 
gentrification’ (p. 442).   
In line with this, Eric Swyngedouw et al. (2002) examine the emergence of 
large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) from the late 1980s onwards. 
Focusing on multiple projects in 13 different cities in Europe they explore the 
leading role of the local state authorities in the implementation and financing 
of the large-scale urban transformation projects from the perspective of 
shifting geometry of power in urban governance in Europe. They argue that 
with an eclectic planning style, poor integration to the wider urban scale, and 
less democratic and elite-driven priorities these projects accentuated socio-
economic polarisation by leading to price rises and displacement of social and 
low-income housing and shifts in priorities of public budgets. Indeed, they add, 
these projects have been used as a vehicle to establish measures of 
exceptionality in planning and policy procedures whenever there is political 
opposition (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, pp. 546-547).    
The emphasis on the disjuncture between the inherent target of a liberated 
market and intensified state interventions suggests that in these analyses the 
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role of the state is reduced to the realisation and maintenance of secure 
conditions for neoliberal markets. The focus on economic processes and actors, 
in turn, leads to the neglect of the political considerations involved in the 
process of neoliberal urbanisation, which are different and beyond the 
concerns of extending the market discipline through redeveloping the urban 
space and dealing with the crises generated by these efforts.    
There are arguments that the scope of active state intervention is not limited to 
managing the social and political crises caused by neoliberal policies. William 
Davies (2014) argues that neoliberalism is an inventive, constructivist force, 
which aims to produce a new social and political model, and not to recover an 
old one. Secondly, neoliberal policy targets institutions and activities which lie 
outside of the market, such as universities, households, public administrations 
and trade unions so as to bring them inside the market through acts of 
privatisation, or to reinvent them in a ‘market-like’ way, or simply to neutralise 
or disband them. Thirdly, the state must be an active force to achieve this. 
Neoliberal states produce and reproduce the rules of institutions and 
individual conduct, in ways that accord with a certain ethical and political 
vision, which is dominated by an idea of competitive activity. Thus, the state is 
enrolled as a facilitator in re-regulating markets and fostering new 
individualistic subjects for market rule (Hall, 2003 cited in Birch and 
Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 7).  
Related to Davies’ arguments some set of studies focus on the emerging 
necessity of more actively creating a shift towards the transformation of the 
people from a common society with shared responsibility, into self-seeking 
consumers, who would act and think in ways that fit market rationality (Sayer, 
2014). There were emphases on the cultural changes this provoked. For 
example, in his analysis of the development of neoliberal program in the UK, 
Stuart Hall (2011) emphasises the cultural policies of promotion of ‘the 
taxpayer’ and ‘the customer’, and demonisation of working class as shifty, 
feckless, and irresponsible (p. 721) at the same time as the shift of power and 
wealth back to the already rich and powerful and the stagnant or falling 
incomes of the already less powerful groups. In a similar vein, MacLeavy 
(2010) also addresses the fact that alongside a free market ideology, an anti-
welfare rhetoric warned of the danger of ‘welfare’ dependency. As a result, 
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poverty started to be perceived as a personal failure and is removed from the 
political agenda as wealth and consumption are incentivised in society.  
To emphasise the active role of the state, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) argue 
that through these processes what they called ‘market state’ fosters new 
individualistic subjects for market rule. The same approach guided by an 
economic rationale is also used by Peck (2001, cited in Birch and Mykhnenko, 
2010, p. 7) who asserts that the emerging global economy recasts national 
political economies as problematic and leads to a shift in responsibility to 
deliver political priorities downwards. Thus, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) 
argue that it is too simplistic to assume that neoliberalism leads to the 
hollowing out of the state. Rather, they emphasise that it involves the shifting 
of state intervention to new forms of governance underpinned by its logic of 
competitiveness resulting in a new model of citizenship in which societal rights 
and responsibilities transform deficiencies into the failure of the individual 
rather than society (p. 7).      
Moving from this point, Christopher Payne (2012) asserts that the difference 
between classical liberalism and neoliberalism is not related to the question of 
free markets per se but to the question of how the citizens are expected and 
incentivised to exercise newly bestowed market freedoms as citizen-
consumers. Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko (2010) investigate how neoliberal 
economic order has managed to maintain its prominence in the face of its 
failed raison d’etre — to ensure wealth for all through market efficiency. They 
attend to the centralising role of finance, which became the new bedrock of 
competitive profit making under neoliberalism especially in the 1990s 
onwards, in terms of promoting ‘a new neoliberal common sense’ (Hall, 2003, 
p. 10 cited in Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010, p. 3).   
Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) focus on financialisation of the global economy 
arguing that it has gone hand in hand with housing and stock market booms in 
the 1990s and 2000s in terms of effectively enrolling citizens in the Global 
North in the expansion of neoliberalism. Through expansion of consumer 
credits, and in particular residential mortgage loans, hence indebtedness, they 
argue, that the everyday resources of low- and moderate-income groups were 
incorporated and that people were remade as ‘monetary conservatives’ 
(Watson, 2008) who are more concerned with inflation than welfare spending. 
As a result, in line with the neoliberal ideology which individualises 
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responsibility for social justice, wellbeing and health outcomes and promotes 
the inefficiency of the state intervention in economy, individuals were enacted 
as rational subjects responsible from their well-being and welfare. 
In these analyses of neoliberalism in relation to changing class dynamics, 
individuals are referred to mainly as potential consumers, in such a way that 
puts the main emphasis on consumption and economy. These emphases on 
economic and financial processes — like the analyses of state actors as agents 
of economy acting mainly with motives of profit-maximisation to promote and 
extend the free market rule and control and suppress opposition — misses 
something important: the nature of individuals as political — as well as 
economic — actors and thus the politics and political struggles involved in 
neoliberal urbanisation processes. On the other hand, the emphasis on 
construction of a neoliberal common sense by the state through the promotion 
of anti-welfare rhetoric and individual responsibility overlooks the ways it is 
responded by the people, which might be take the form of voluntary 
participation as well as opposition. As a result, these accounts turn a blind eye 
to the agency of political actors and the mundane processes of making sense of, 
negotiating with and also resisting the neoliberal agenda.   
In this thesis, I offer an analysis of neoliberal urbanisation in Turkey from a 
political as well as economic perspective addressing the agency of multiple 
actors involved in the process. I draw on Doreen Massey’s emphasis on ‘space 
as the dimension of multiplicity’ (2013) in contrast to the 'extended power of 
economy', which crystallised in conceptualisations such as ‘the market state’, 
so as to reveal the multiple ways neoliberal principles were negotiated by 
different actors.   
Social Class under Neoliberalism 
Within the context provided above, neoliberalism is argued to be a project 
intent on restoring class power (Harvey, 2005), shifting wealth and power 
upwards to the already rich and powerful (Hall, 2011; Sayer, 2014). 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the social and political emphasis on social 
injustice and inequalities decreased, discussions of the death of class (Bauman, 
1992; Pakulski and Waters, 1996) became popular in research especially in the 
advanced capitalist countries like the UK.  
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Class started to be seen as an ‘image of the past’ in examinations of 
contemporary society as both highly unequal and classlessly individualised 
(Beck, 1986). It is argued by the defenders of the death of class thesis that 
widening material inequalities no longer gives rise to class conscious 
communities, and increasing individualisation has destroyed any relationship 
that existed between economic position and cultural identity (Bottero, 2004, p. 
988). In making these claims, these studies rested on a narrow understanding 
of class based on individuals’ subjective understandings about their objective 
position within the social structure. This prevented them from critically 
examining the erosion of association with class identity and solidarity despite 
sharpening class inequalities and increasing class injuries led by neoliberal 
policies.        
As opposed to arguments about the decreasing explanatory power of class, 
there were attempts to assert its enduring relevance as an analytical concept 
for understanding social identities. In contrast to the death of class arguments, 
the so-called culturalist class theorists (Skeggs, 1997, 2010; Reay, 1998; 
Savage, 2000; Devine and Savage, 2000) attempted to establish the continuity 
of class and the importance thereof. To do this they focused on the ways 
neoliberal individualisation formed particular kinds of class subjects. They 
analysed cultural practices and identities, as these were conceived as 
expressions of ‘individualised’ forms of class struggle as opposed to the former 
understandings of class based on collective consciousness and solidarity. A 
prominent advocate, Mike Savage (2000) argues that class processes operate 
through individualised distinctions rather than in social groupings. Even 
though people do not explicitly recognise class issues, or identify with discrete 
class groupings, class processes still operate so long as the specific cultural 
practices are bound up with the reproduction of hierarchy; therefore, the 
emphasis is put on the classed nature of particular social and cultural practices 
rather than formation of political class consciousness.  
The ‘culturalist class theorists’ were successful in demonstrating the 
continuing importance of class in post-industrial society with a 
conceptualisation of class inequalities based on culture, rather than economy. 
In so doing, they were able to shed light on more mundane processes class 
operates and thus move beyond economic analyses centred on a polarised, 
abstract conceptualisation of class as a relationship between capital and 
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labour. However, by putting too much emphasis on culture isolated from the 
economic processes they disregarded the role of changing material inequalities 
in terms of fostering inequalities in access to valued goods and ways of life. As 
Andrew Sayer argues, low income people are not disadvantaged primarily 
because others fail to value their identity and their cultural goods but because 
they lack the means to live in ways which they, as well as others, value (2005, 
pp. 947-948). Moving from this point, these studies which emphasise the 
continuing importance of class inequalities attempted to analyse the subjective 
understandings of inequality by the working classes in isolation from the 
underlying material conditions. By disconnecting the subjective experiences of 
working class feelings from the material processes of redistribution of valued 
resources, the new class theory has implicitly taken for granted the 
devaluation of the working class culture and identity. Moreover, within the 
context of the neoliberal reconfiguration of poverty as a personal failure, 
rather than a political issue, this disconnection risks naturalising middle class 
forms of distinction.  
In Turkey, research in gender studies examines the operations of class in more 
mundane interactions and cultural processes focusing on the relations 
between middle class and working class women as they encounter each other 
in the provision of household cleaning services. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Helga 
Rittersberger-Tılıç (2000), Aksu Bora (2005), Gül Özyeğin (2005) analyse the 
specific form household cleaning services have taken in Turkey within the 
framework of the complexity of the on-going modernisation process.  
Accordingly, they interpret the household cleaning service as a buffer zone 
between modernity and tradition, which leads to class conflict between the 
two groups of women, a conflict expressed in cultural terms. The middle-class 
employer women invest their labour and time in ‘clean’ areas of domestic work 
such as cooking and childcare, while the dirty work based on brute force is left 
to the charwomen. However, cleaner women resist the stigma of this kind of 
polarization through demanding to be seen as ‘family’ rather than a traditional 
servant or proletarianised cleaning worker for example by calling the 
employer women ‘sister’, saying that they clean as if cleaning their own house. 
Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, p. 12) argue that by doing so the working-class 
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These studies provide important insights into the complex nature of class 
relations within the context of Turkey as a lately modernised country whereby 
class hierarchies are expressed and experienced in the form of symbolic 
struggles over cultural values. Unlike the aforementioned accounts that 
focused on individualised feelings and experiences, these studies draw on 
interviews with both middle class and working class women and focus on the 
relational as well as individualised processes of constitution of class 
distinctions and injuries. On the other hand, their analyses of working-class 
women are not limited to the ways class injuries are felt. Through addressing 
mundane ways class inequalities are ‘resisted’ by them, these studies also 
avoid taking middle-class value for granted and emphasise the 'power' of the 
weak to defy the legitimacy of class distinctions through insisting on a pseudo-
kinship relationship.         
Moving from there, Necmi Erdoğan (2000) links the analysis of class injuries 
within the context of the neoliberalisation in Turkey, putting the resistance of 
the cleaner women to neoliberal hegemony into an historical context. He 
argues that the egalitarian culture embedded in the heterodox forms of Islam 
in Turkey led to those kinds of pseudo-kinship relationships insisted on by 
working class women in service roles. Elsewhere, Erdogan (2007) argues that 
neo-liberal orthodoxy, which has gradually dominated Turkish politics, 
produced new forms of social exclusion and marginalization processes leading 
to the dissolution of egalitarian elements of the heterodox forms of Islamic 
cultural heritage. Nevertheless, he insists that although neoliberal transition 
has increased the symbolic violence of social hierarchies, the poor subalterns 
still refer to ‘morality’ and good manners to protect their self-esteem vis-à-vis 
the economic and cultural capital of ‘the rich’ in their narratives. He concludes 
that the neoliberal hegemony has not yet captured the minds of poor 
subalterns.        
Emphasising the symbolic violence of neoliberalism and hidden injuries of 
sharpening class inequalities from the perspective of everyday resistance to it, 
Erdoğan succeeds in addressing the power from below. Although his attempt 
to bring together the sharpening class inequalities during the neoliberalisation 
process with changing subjective experiences of class is important, Erdoğan’s 
focus is also limited to the ‘tactics’ (de Certeau, 1984) employed by subaltern 
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groups, like the working class cleaner women referred above, in terms of 
resisting class injuries. 
Elsewhere, Erdoğan (2012) examines the youth groups who are stigmatised as 
‘apaches’. Apaches signify the low-income young adults, who thicken their hair 
using hair gel, wear fake brand sports clothes, use fake accessories like 
watches, and dance to techno music next to overpasses in metropolitan cities. 
He argues that these low-income groups sought to become part of the ‘society 
of the spectacle’ and for that they accepted the symbolic power of material 
possession and consumption as opposed to their moral weapons based on 
inner beauty. However, this acceptance only increases the symbolic violence of 
their class injury. Thus, Erdoğan analyses their voluntary participation in the 
consumption-based culture from the perspective of the injuries it produces 
and overlooks the promises and pleasures of participation in consumerism. 
Why young adults want to be part of the consumption culture that stigmatises 
them and what promises are involved in the process and how these are 
negotiated remains unexplored.  
In Hidden Injuries of Class Sennett and Cobb (1993) analyse the everyday lives 
of working class people and argue that ‘class society takes away from all the 
people within it the feeling of secure dignity in the eyes of others and of 
themselves’ (p. 170). Accordingly, class sets up a contest for dignity. The 
workers experience social hierarchies as a matter of self-respect since class 
relations cause symbolic violence in workers' self-perception (pp. 147-148). 
This is enlightening in terms of moving beyond the emphasis on 
‘individualised’ feelings of disassociation as injury suggests a critical 
attentiveness to the material inequalities that generate those feelings. 
Nevertheless, this kind of analysis on hidden injuries overlooks the ways 
working class individuals are encouraged today to participate and even benefit 
from the neoliberal policies, and thus their capacity to negotiate with the 
promises of neoliberalisation.       
Class is established by the objective inequalities but it functions autonomously 
from those factors in cultural and political areas. I refuse a reductionist 
approach which underestimates the ‘superstructure’ or a culturalist approach, 
which emphasises the autonomy of culture but overlooks material inequalities, 
which are still effective in shaping people’s evaluations and relations. My aim is 
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to analyse the normative character of class as a concern over ‘value’ in relation 
to changes in the class inequalities in terms of access to the ‘valued’ resources.  
In this thesis, I draw on a Bourdieusian understanding of power to extend 
these theoretical debates. Bourdieu extends the idea of power so as to include 
cultural, social and symbolic as well as economic power. By doing so, he 
enables the analysis of struggle over various sources of wealth-generating 
resources or assets which involve non-material sources of power. All of these 
resources can function as a ‘social relation of power’ through becoming objects 
of struggle as valued resources that are accumulated and invested by 
individuals and groups in order to maintain or enhance their positions in the 
social order (Swartz, 1997, pp. 73-74). Thus, his extension of the definition of 
power so as to include non-material forms of power provides a useful ground 
to apprehend the more mundane and immaterial forms in which class operates 
in social and political processes, for example, in relation to the changes in 
material inequalities.       
More specifically, Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power is useful for the 
purposes of my study when analysing the struggles over symbolic resources 
such as ‘good citizenship’ that are taking place at the same time as valuable 
urban land is redistributed throughout gentrification. His analysis of symbolic 
power is centred on the role of symbolic systems and power in terms of 
maintaining social inequalities. Accordingly, symbolic systems have three 
interrelated functions: cognitive, communicative and legitimising. While they 
enable apprehending the world and also communication through shared 
meanings, he shows how they are also instruments of domination integrating 
dominant groups and encouraging the dominated to accept existing 
hierarchies (Swartz, 1997, p. 83). Within this context, Bourdieu defines 
symbolic power as the ‘world-making power’ meaning the ‘capability to 
impose the legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions’ (Bourdieu, 
1987, p. 13).  
I will explore the simultaneous processes of redistribution of valued resources 
(both material and symbolic), and the struggles over the changing access of 
valued resources. The symbolic power of different actors involved in 
gentrification will be important to analyse how the material redevelopment of 
the urban space for the more affluent users interacts with struggles over ’who 
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can properly live in and make claims to the city‘. Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic power enables me to explore the dynamic struggles over class 
boundaries which are not clear-cut, but depend on the relative symbolic power 
of particular groups to impose a ‘legitimate’ vision. Thus, I will analyse how the 
shared symbolic meanings about state-led gentrification and political activism 
against it are produced and in what ways these have an impact on class 
dynamics.        
Gentrification   
Ruth Glass first used the term in 1964 referring to the accelerating 
rehabilitation of Victorian lodging houses. The term gentrification indicated 
tenurial transformation from renting to owning, property price increases, and 
the displacement of working-class occupiers by middle-class incomers in the 
UK (Slater, 2011, p. 571). Thus, since the term was invented and came under 
scholarly attention, class has been central in the analysis. It was explored from 
the perspective of either class constitutive practices of middle classes or class 
injuries driven by displacement of the working classes. Within this context, 
two powerful explanations emerged in the literature; the first one prioritised 
the economic factors and processes while the other focused on the cultural 
side of the story and focused on the consumption side. Below, I will first show 
the contributions both approaches have made in terms of understanding and 
exploring the class impact of gentrification, and then argue that they have 
fallen short in terms of exposing how gentrification complicates class relations 
because they have overlooked the politics involved in the processes of 
gentrification.   
Analysing residential rehabilitation within the context of the broader social, 
economic and spatial restructuring, economic explanations focus on the 
question why and how gentrification emerged now and referred to capital 
movements for explanation (Smith, 1996, 2002; Smith and Williams, 1986). 
Neil Smith (2002) describes gentrification as a global urban strategy pointing 
to a new global urbanism, which emerged from the 1970s onwards.  
He argues that gentrification commonly occurs in urban areas where uneven 
investment of capital in certain land uses and its devaluation through use and 
systematic disinvestment creates opportunities for profitable redevelopment. 
Gentrification is most probable to emerge when the ‘rent gap’, i. e. the 
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difference between the potential and actual ground rent (Smith, 1979), is large 
enough to create conditions for profitable re-investment.  
Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith (2001) explore the evolution of gentrification 
in North America and Western Europe arguing that during the 1970s and 
1980s, gentrification anchored and was articulated to broader economic and 
cultural processes in national and global contexts. From the 1990s onwards, it 
has become generalised from the inner city to more distant, mixed, complex 
places following the involvement of corporate actors and the growth of scale of 
investment due to higher rates of rent. With the active involvement of the 
state, the remaining Keynesian institutions with redistributive, demand-led 
mentality and the community opposition were destroyed and land-use 
obstacles were overcome (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).  
Another set of studies focused on the retrenchment of state welfare and 
devolution of social provision to local scales in relation to the symbolic 
processes with which these changes were legitimised. These accounts 
emphasised that contemporary marginality is symbolically reproduced by the 
state through territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant et al., 
2014).   
Wacquant forged the concept of territorial stigmatisation by combining 
Goffman’s view of stigma as ‘discrediting differentness’ flowing from the 
ordinary gaze of others in face-to-face interaction and Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic power as ‘performative nomination’ by an authority capable of 
making its representations stick and come true (Wacquant et al., 2014, p. 
1272): 
Bourdieu works from above, following the flow of efficient representations 
from symbolic authorities such as state, science, church, the law, and 
journalism, down to their repercussions upon institutional operations, social 
practices, and the self; Goffman works from below, tracing the effects of 
procedures of sense making and techniques of ‘management of spoiled 
identity’ across encounters and their aggregations into organizations. They 
can thus be wedded to advance our grasp of the ways in which noxious 
representations of space are produced, diffused, and harnessed in the field of 
power, by bureaucratic and commercial agencies, as well as in everyday life 
in ways that alter social identity, strategy, and structure (pp. 1272-1273).  
From this perspective, Wacquant et al. (2014) argue that territorial stigma is a 
new and distinctive phenomenon that crystallized at century’s end, along with 
the sudden breakdown or gradual dissolution of the districts of relegation 
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emblematic of the Fordist–Keynesian phase of industrial capitalism. 
Accordingly, it differs from a traditional topography of disrepute in the 
industrial city where the state was the provider of social support for lower-
income populations. Firstly, territorial stigma has become partially 
autonomised from the stain of poverty, subaltern ethnicity, degraded housing, 
imputed immorality, and street crime. Secondly, it prevails not just among 
social and cultural elites — as with their predecessors of a century ago — but 
among those who dwell in these districts and those entirely removed from 
them. Thirdly, the stigmatised neighbourhoods are pictured as fundamentally 
dissolute and irretrievably disorganised and the residents living there as 
‘intrinsically deviant and violent’. Thus, last but not least, the stigmatised 
districts provoke overwhelmingly negative emotions and demand corrective 
reactions, which in turn foster the growth and glorification of punitive 
measures against urban marginality (Wacquant et al., 2014, pp. 1273-1275).  
Kallin and Slater (2014) explain the ways territorial stigma justifies 
gentrification: 
When a place becomes tainted by derogatory terms, images and discursive 
formations, there are not only everyday consequences for people living 
within it. Symbolic defamation provides the groundwork and ideological 
justification for a thorough class transformation, usually involving 
demolition, land clearance, and then the construction of housing and services 
aimed at a more affluent class of resident (pp. 1353-1354).  
They also attend to the fact that the role of the state is multisided as it both 
constructs the stigma and then proposes to remedy it. Territorial 
stigmatisation thus plays a critical role both in widening the rent gap and in 
facilitating its attempted closure (p. 1354). Addressing the correlation between 
the material processes of displacement/eviction and symbolic devaluation of 
working class neighbourhoods, arguments of territorial stigmatisation reveal 
an under-investigated aspect of class impact of gentrification, which is the 
symbolic politics involved in the state interference. 
Nevertheless, theorists shed light on the role of the state in their accounts in 
such a way that remains limited to the act of initiating and securing the process 
of rent extraction. Prioritising the economic logic of profit-maximisation, the 
political motives of the active state involvement in gentrification are 
overlooked. This echoes the accounts on neoliberal urbanisation referred 
above and the absence of attention to the political motives of promoting 
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appropriate citizen behaviour, which are different from economic profit-
oriented goals. This has prevented these studies from analysing the ways state 
involvement might contradict the economic rationale and target the 
participation of the marginalised, low-income groups in gentrification. For the 
same reason, these studies also fail to grasp the complex ways the stigmatised 
and marginalised groups negotiate the processes of inclusion and exclusion.     
The economic explanations of the process in Turkey, as a recently 
industrialised and modernised country have developed on the basis of a 
stronger emphasis on the increasing centralisation of urban governance in the 
2000s onwards (Kuyucu, 2014; Penbecioğlu, 2011; Bartu-Candan and 
Kolluoğlu, 2008; Lovering and Turkmen, 2011; Çavuşoğlu and Strutz, 2014).  
The studies highlight that as opposed to the emphases on devolution to the 
local scale in advanced capitalist countries, the urban governance is 
increasingly centralised and state actors at local and national level are actively 
involved in appropriating and redistributing the incompletely commoditised 
urban lands (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Kuyucu, 2014; Bartu-Candan and 
Kolluoğlu, 2008).    
Historically the absence of welfare state in full sense in Turkey was filled by 
informal provision of welfare by the people. This is best exemplified by the 
expansion of the squatter housing in especially the big cities all over Turkey in 
the 1950s onwards due to the incapacity of the state to provide affordable 
housing to the rural-to-urban migrants. This led to the presence of vast lands 
with ambiguous tenancy and property ownership structures offering huge 
potential rent in the process of neoliberal urbanisation from the 1980s 
onwards. The incomplete commodification of urban land is argued to be the 
main reason why the squatter neighbourhoods are primarily targeted by the 
state-led urban transformation projects in the 2000s onwards in Turkey. The 
non-participatory and urgency-based decision-making and implementation 
processes of large-scale urban transformation projects, on the other hand, led 
to an alarming process of ‘state-led property transfer’ (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 
2010).    
Inspired by analyses on neoliberal urbanisation referred to earlier in this 
chapter, many scholars in Turkey analysed gentrification as a capital 
accumulation process, during which property of the urban land was 
transferred from the poor to the more affluent groups by the active role of the 
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state institutions, thus, as a class-based process. In the absence of social 
policies enforced by the state and/or other forms of non-state welfare 
distribution, marketization was forced from above through a relatively more 
active involvement of the state leading to displacement and dispossession of 
the urban poor, seizure of public wealth in a few hands, and heightened levels 
of spatial and socio-economic segregation.  
An important focus in these studies is the different examples of resistances to 
urban transformation projects in different parts of Turkey (Dündar, 2001; 
Uzun, 2003; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Erman, 2009; Poyraz, 2011; 
Tok and Oğuz, 2011; Karaman, 2012). These are examined usually in 
comparative perspective with respect to the success and failure of collective 
mobilisation vis-à-vis the implementation of the projects. The focus on 
‘collective resistance’ to gentrification projects, on the other hand, draws 
selective attention to the agency of these groups limited to ‘collective 
mobilisation’ against gentrification. Although it attends to the power of the 
communities against state-led processes, the analysis of resistance movements 
in terms of effectiveness of the collective mobilisation is indifferent to the 
agency of those who are fearful of political action while sometimes even 
interpreting lack of effective mobilisation as an anomaly from a structuralist 
viewpoint. This also paves the way for overlooking the inner tensions within 
the struggling communities who were either regarded as homogenous in class 
terms or received selective attention to their agency to resist gentrification.  
Cultural explanations emerged as a reaction to these structuralist explanations, 
which were claimed to overemphasise the role of capital accumulation and 
neglect human agency. The advocates of this approach (Ley, 1996, 2003; Jager, 
1986; Hamnett, 1991; Butler, 1997; Podmore, 1998) focus on the interrelation 
between the dynamic constitution of class and conservation of built 
environment and explore how the reorganisation of capitalism on urban space 
has led to the changes in the occupational structure producing a new 
managerial and professional group of people with different consumption 
preferences. Gentrification occurs in those societies where a loss of 
manufacturing employment and an increase in service employment has led to 
expansion in the amount of middle-class professionals with a disposition 
towards central city living and an associated rejection of suburbia for the 
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blandness and monotony it symbolised (Jager, 1986). Thus, gentrification is 
analysed as a ‘back-to-the-city movement’ by the middle class.   
The cultural analysis successfully shows the interconnectedness between 
everyday practices of class constitution and the changes in the occupational 
and housing markets. The changing cultural preferences of the new middle 
classes with a metropolitan habitus are examined as practices of reconstitution 
of class distinction. This is in contrast to the conceptualisation of class as an 
exploitative relationship between capital and labour at the abstract level 
(Bridge, 1994, p. 31) in the economic analyses, which overlooks the complex 
ways class operates in everyday experience of gentrification. The cultural 
analysis is thus powerful in emphasising middle class agency and explaining 
the relationship between simultaneous changes in labour and housing 
markets.  
However, through analysing the new middle classes as an isolated, distinct 
group, and emphasis on their changing residential preferences and particularly 
metropolitan habitus, these analysts avoid from a critical examination of 
changes in class dynamics throughout gentrification, and thus their analyses 
risk ‘naturalising gentrification’ (Slater, 2011). In so doing, they fail to explore 
how gentrification is negotiated and contested on the ground by different 
actors including the non-gentrifying groups, despite the theory’s efforts to 
emphasise human agency. The analysis of middle class take-back of the city 
leaves the dynamism of the process not fully explored as it overlooks the fact 
that gentrification is an enduring process experienced by different actors 
simultaneously.  
The lack of a critical examination of gentrification and its impacts on the 
ground, rather than on abstract level as explored by economic approaches, has 
led to criticisms within the theory, and some studies began to focus on its 
social costs in order to bring the displaced populations back into the theory 
(LeGates and Hartman, 1986; Hartman et al., 1982; Marcuse, 1985; Slater, 
2009; Atkinson, 2015). Peter Marcuse (1986) argues that gentrification creates 
a vicious circle in which the poor are continuously under pressure of 
displacement and the well-to-do continuously seek to wall themselves in 
gentrified neighbourhoods. He explains this dramatic increase as a spatial 
polarisation on the basis of economic polarisation of population. The shift from 
manufacturing to services sector and the increasing professionalisation of 
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management and technical functions have spatial consequences: blue-collar 
workers are no longer demanded in the downtown whereas an additional 
higher-income demand for housing on the side of professional and technical 
workers is created there.  
In his book chapter titled “Gentrification in the City”, Tom Slater (2011) 
critically reflects upon the growing account on gentrification and the ways it 
has been analysed attending to the lack of sufficient attention to the social 
costs it has generated. There he made a call in 2011 for a critical analysis of 
gentrification through which the arguments of the economic and cultural 
analyses would be linked to the approaches from below. This was a call for 
focusing on social costs of gentrification while analysing the links between the 
changing class dynamics and urban space. However, the promises of 
gentrification are overlooked by this focus on ‘social costs’ which was regarded 
as the most important experience of gentrification. Despite the call for an 
approach from below, the people who were addressed were regarded to be 
victimised by exclusion and thus, how they are affected by the promise of 
inclusion in gentrification still needs unpacking.       
From the same perspective, some studies centred on spatial segregation and 
the themes of security and ‘gatedness’ focusing on the socially polarising 
impact of gated residential settlements (Pérouse and Danış, 2005; Bartu-
Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Akpınar, 2008; Güzey, 2014; Erdi-Lelandais, 
2015; Ataç, 2016). The shared focus on exclusion (by the excluder and the 
excluded) is important in terms of revealing the social impacts of the global 
processes of capital accumulation. However, these accounts are reductionist in 
the sense that they overlook the social costs of inclusion of people in 
gentrification, which are no less important than those of exclusion.    
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielson (2013) propose an approach to exclusion 
which can capture what is overlooked in those accounts. They argue that ‘the 
image of the border as a wall, or as a device that serves first and foremost to 
exclude is misleading’ saying that:   
Isolating a single function of the border does not allow us to grasp the 
flexibility of this institution… Borders are equally devices of inclusion that 
select and filter people and different forms of circulation in ways no less 
violent than those deployed in exclusionary measures. Our argument thus 
takes a critical approach to inclusion, which in most accounts is treated as an 
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unalloyed social good… We see inclusion existing in a continuum with 
exclusion, rather than in opposition to it (p. 7) (Emphasis added).    
Refusing the emphases of displacement as the only experience of the working 
class, Kirsteen Paton (2014) develops a more nuanced and richer analysis of 
the class impact of gentrification. In Gentrification: A Working Class Perspective, 
she focuses on the impacts of luxury residential development in Glasgow 
Harbour on the adjacent working class neighbourhood, Partick, which used to 
be one of the key ship production areas in the world. Her study details that the 
working classes are not merely victims of gentrification, who are subjected to 
displacement and devaluation. On the contrary, their participation is carefully 
induced by local authorities and developers, who invite those groups into the 
gentrification process as potential consumers. Elsewhere, Paton et al. (2012) 
asserts that the processes of housing renewal, gentrification, sporting events 
etc., coalesce around the same goal: creating the more active consumer citizen 
in a moral and economic sense. Contrasted with the popular discussions on the 
’death of the class’ as well as the culturalist emphasis on ‘disassociation from 
class’ in the post-industrial society, Paton (2014) demonstrates that the 
traditional working class identities are not disappearing but realigned. This is 
through cultivating aspiration so as to make them more congruent with 
neoliberal forms of flexible accumulation (p. 7).   
Demonstrating the simultaneity of exclusion and inclusion, she conceptualises 
this as the ‘hidden rewards’ (Paton, 2014, p. 53) alongside the ‘hidden injuries’ 
of gentrification, the most apparent expression of which is displacement. She 
argues that the working class people are invited to take part in the process of 
gentrification through market incentives, i. e. promoting a more consumer-
based form of citizenship. Taking a critical approach to inclusion itself, she 
emphasises that the process of inclusion is paradoxical, as working class 
people are simultaneously included in and excluded from gentrification 
through encouraging them to participate without giving them the means to do 
so (p. 53). Consumer-citizenship thus reveals the classed aspect of 
gentrification as it ‘paradoxically extends participation to citizens but, because 
this is based on consumption and ergo people’s material propensity to 
consume, it simultaneously denies participation and disadvantages those who 
cannot afford to consume’ (Paton et al., 2012, p. 1471).  
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Thus, her study extended the boundaries of the analysis of class impact of 
gentrification through critically exploring the ways working class people are 
included as well as excluded. By doing so, Paton moved beyond the abstract 
analyses of state-led realignment of existing class inequalities, beyond a focus 
on inclusion of working classes purely in financial terms, and beyond analyses 
of middle class cultural practices taken in isolation. Drawing on the argument 
about the simultaneity of inclusion and exclusion and the flexibility of the 
border between the two, this study attempts to analyse how inclusion and 
exclusion is promoted, negotiated and contested through gentrification in 
Dikmen Valley. Taking the argument that gentrification realigns traditional 
class identities and behaviours (Paton, 2014) as the point of departure; I 
explore the impact of gentrification on class dynamics in Dikmen Valley.  
I aim to develop this argument by focusing on the context of Turkey where 
authoritarian forms of neoliberalism have created different forms and 
trajectories of inclusion and exclusion. To explore the politics involved in 
gentrification, my study will explore how the authoritarian state actors in 
Turkey reconfigure and promote appropriate citizen behaviour (as was done 
in the municipal bulletin referred in the Introduction) as they draw different 
actors on the gentrification projects and how these are negotiated and 
contested by those actors.  
Citizenship  
In order to bring the symbolic processes into the analysis of the impacts of 
processes of inclusion throughout gentrification on class dynamics, I will 
consider the role of citizenship as the state is actively involved in both 
promoting and implementing gentrification projects in Turkey. I will draw on 
Engin Isin’s conceptualisation of citizenship. Isin (2009) takes a relational 
approach to citizenship arguing that:    
Citizenship governs who citizens (insiders), subjects (strangers, outsiders) 
and abjects (aliens) are and how these actors are to govern themselves and 
each other in a given body politic. Differing from mere membership, it is a 
relation that governs the conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it… 
Being a citizen almost always means being more than an insider – it also 
means to be one who has mastered modes and forms of conduct that are 
appropriate to being an insider (pp. 371-372).  
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Thus, Isin conceptualises citizenship as a struggle zone in which the normative 
framings of being an insider are constantly remade. Citizenship is centred on 
normative notions of inclusion of a political community through defining the 
‘other’, that can be within as well as outside of the political community. Thus 
inclusion in citizenship is always premised upon clear definition and exclusion 
of non-citizens.  
While analysing citizenship as a struggle zone, I will focus on the symbolic 
struggles over normative constructions of ‘shared understandings regarding 
what sorts of individuals and groupings can properly live in the city’ (Painter 
and Philo, 1995, p. 108). This will enable me to connect gentrification to 
political processes and critically examine the class conflict and struggles taking 
place in Dikmen Valley. It will also allow emphasising the agency of different 
actors living through gentrification through examining how they negotiate and 
contest those shared understandings regarding who can be included, while 
they are materially displaced and resettled in the city space. Relating the focus 
on symbolic struggles over citizenship to class conflict, I will analyse how 
citizenship is configured by multiple actors involved in gentrification and 
attend to the political functions thereof. By doing so, I aim to examine different 
class groups in relation to each other rather than in isolation.      
In exploring the struggles over normative construction of citizenship, I will 
focus on the efforts of the nation-state to promote an official definition of 
citizenship. Engin Işın (2009) analyses changes in the ‘modern figure of the 
citizen with singular loyalty, identity and belonging’ in relation to the 
contemporary challenges nation-states have faced. He argues that ‘the question 
is not so much “what is citizenship?”, but rather that we need to explore “what 
is called citizenship?”’ to develop a dynamic conceptualisation thereof as this 
would reveal all the interests that are invested in its normative construction 
(2009, p. 369). In line with that, I will draw on the concept of ‘citizenship 
agenda’ introduced by de Koning et al. (2015) to explore the governmental 
aspect inherent in the normative construction of citizenship:      
We define citizenship agendas as normative framings of citizenship that 
prescribe what norms, values, and behaviour are appropriate for those 
claiming membership of a political community. These agendas are concerned 
with defining the meaning of membership in explicitly normative ways that go 
beyond conventional, legal– formal citizenship status… Such citizenship 
agendas invariably imply models of virtuous and deviant citizens, favouring 
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particular subject-citizens over others, and suggesting ways to transform the 
latter into the former (de Koning et al., 2015, p. 121, emphasis added).   
Thus, in addition to the symbolic exclusion from ‘virtuous’ citizenry, 
citizenship agendas involve concrete interventions into the ‘deviant’ subjects’ 
behaviour to transform them. This reveals that citizenship has a direct impact 
on mundane operations and struggles of class, influencing class dynamics.   
Within this context, connecting gentrification to the changes in state 
citizenship agendas will enable me to critically examine how changes in 
citizenship regimes and urban policies together transform class dynamics.    
I will refer to the notion of ‘spaces of citizenship’ (Painter and Philo, 1995; 
Desforges et al., 2005) which sheds light on ‘the ways the material spaces are 
related to the varying constructions of citizenship present in the shared 
understandings of who can properly live and work in those spaces’ (p. 108). 
The concept explores the spatially differentiated nature of de facto citizenship 
as experienced by ‘othered’ groups who are subjected to social and spatial 
marginalisation (Desforges et al., 2005, p. 439). This will enable me to uncover 
the ‘differentiated rights that citizens enjoy in these spaces and the obligations 
that they have towards the other occupants and possessions of these spaces’ 
(Painter and Philo, 1995, p. 108), thus examine the struggles among different 
configurations and practices of citizenship.  
This will also help me uncover the dynamic ways the single logic of rent 
extraction and economic motives involved in the process of gentrification 
interact with the political and social processes on the ground. This is not fully 
explored in the economic and cultural analyses of gentrification due to the lack 
of attention to the political actors and motives in gentrification research. I will 
draw on the notion of ‘citizenship as critique’ proposed by Susan Smith (1989, 
p. 148). It uncovers the spatially uneven relationship between state and civil 
society through exploring the interface between political arrangements and 
social structures (Painter and Philo, 1995). This will enable me to reveal the 
ways the state citizenship agenda impacts the promotion and implementation 
of gentrification projects and thus to move beyond reducing of the role of the 
state to the expansion of neoliberal ideology.  
In so doing, I aim to shed light on the ways the nation-state deals with the 
challenges of rescaling driven by the neoliberal globalisation process. Purcell 
  
 
Page | 31 
emphasises that globalisation in the post-1980 period led the traditional ties 
between citizenship and the national scale to be destabilised, so the scale of 
citizenship was rescaled both upwards and downwards (Purcell, 2003, p. 564). 
Within this context, it is argued that neoliberalism has brought the new mode 
of ‘governing through communities’ which refers to a shift towards an 
emphasis on the practice of responsibilities by ’active citizens’ in sub-national 
communities (Rose, 1996; Dean, 1999 cited in Desforges et al., 2005, p. 440). 
This contrasted to the prioritisation of ’national citizen’ in most post-war 
advanced liberal democracies through emphasis on the security of social, 
political and economic rights at the national scale. As noted above, the 
promotion of active, consumer citizens targeting the working class 
participation to gentrification (Paton, 2014; Paton et al., 2012) reflects this 
new mode of governing through communities.  
Within the same context, I will focus on the groups who are drawn into the 
projects not only as potential consumers and investors to be incorporated into 
the neoliberal market but also as citizens whose loyalty was targeted by the 
state. I will explore collective resistances against state-led gentrification 
projects as struggles over changing access to valued resources and recognition 
as ‘valued’ actors. In line with my attempt to analyse material and symbolic 
processes together, I will approach the struggles led by the socially and 
spatially marginalised groups from the perspective of resistance to eviction 
from the decision-making processes as well as the inner-city land. I will pay 
attention to their claim to participate in the process of redistribution of urban 
land, which involves also the claim to be equally valued citizens.  
In so doing, I will draw on Engin Isin’s argument that domination and 
empowerment aspects are simultaneously integral to citizenship as it involves 
‘ruling class strategies via the state and it is an expression of social movements’ 
(2009, p. 369). Emphasising the latter aspect, he constitutes acts of citizenship 
as the object of analysis, as he focuses on rupture that focuses on the actor (or 
the act she creates) rather than the persistence of order. Analysing on a group 
of irregular migrants (the Sans Papiers) who occupied a church in Paris in the 
1990s to demand the right to stay in France and thus the right to regularised 
status, he explains the importance of the act of those migrants: 
…Without papers and thus without ascribed identities, and their defenders, is 
not that they simply pointed to the injustice of their situation and sought 
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their ‘human rights’. Rather, they enacted themselves as citizens by usurping 
the right to claim rights (p. 381). (Emphasis added)      
From this perspective, I will analyse the right to shelter struggle as a process 
through which the stigmatised and marginalised citizens exercise and nurture 
their ‘right to claim rights’ and enact themselves as claim makers. This will 
enable me to explore these claims in relation to the context of the state 
citizenship agenda and the symbolic power of the more affluent groups in 
making more ‘legitimate’ claims to the city. In so doing, it will also help me 
emphasise the agency of those marginalised groups in terms of negotiating 
with and contesting the dominant configurations of citizenship.    
In the light of the discussion provided above, integrating citizenship to analysis 
of class impact of gentrification will be very useful in terms of my attempt to 
explore how class inequalities are transformed, managed and contested. I will 
examine;  
- the specific form of neoliberalisation in Turkey and how the current 
restructuring of the ‘welfare state’ differs from the experiences in advanced 
countries like the UK  
- the social costs of inclusion as well as exclusion from gentrification  
- the negotiations and struggles over inclusion into the inner-city and the urban 
decision-making processes  
Thus I aim at bringing together the material and normative processes of 
boundary drawing. Within this context, this study attempts to analyse 
gentrification as part of a broader process whereby the material and symbolic 
borders of inclusion and exclusion from city space as well as citizenship are 
redrawn and negotiated among the multiple actors involved in it. I aim at 
revealing the class impact of gentrification through focusing on the social 
impacts of inclusion as well as exclusion.   
I draw on Paton’s definition of gentrification as a process in which people as 
well as urban space are targeted so as to make them more congruent with 
neoliberalism through promoting individualism and entrepreneurialism. 
Unlike advanced capitalist contexts like the UK, Turkey, as a lately 
industrialised and modernised country, imposed modernisation as a political 
project from above and the citizenship regime was state-centric and duty-
based. Citizenship was gradually configured on the basis of passivity and 
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obedience vis-à-vis the strong and benevolent state. Because of this, in the 
political agenda of mainstream politicians, the attempts to maintain and 
nurture the citizens’ desire to be obedient to state authority (and the fear of 
not being) had been central. From this perspective, I explore how these 
concerns regarding the promotion of state citizenship agenda were effective in 
the neoliberal urbanisation process, which was carried out state-led 
gentrification projects in Turkey particularly in the 2000s onwards.  
I focus on the gradually more centralised and authoritarian urban governance, 
wherein both local and national state actors were actively involved in the 
redistribution of urban land with profit-seeking motives in Turkey. From this 
perspective, I explore the processes of redistribution of urban land and rental 
gains, the changing citizenship regime and the subsequent changes in the 
normative boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. While doing that, I analyse 
the ways inclusion to gentrification is promoted in Turkey in order to reveal 
the differences in a context wherein neoliberalism has taken an authoritarian 
form. Through taking a historical perspective to urban processes in Turkey and 
in Dikmen Valley, I detail the political and social processes that have led the 
way for authoritarian gentrification.  
I explore the complex and contradictory ways people negotiated with these 
entangled processes of inclusion and exclusion. I unfold the different ways 
squatter communities respond to forced eviction and displacement as well as 
inner tensions and contradictions within these groups as opposed to the 
homogenising attitudes towards collective mobilisation against gentrification. 
Drawing on Engin Isin’s concept of the ‘right to claim rights’, I examine the 
Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle in relation to the state citizenship 
agenda promoted through gentrification and explore the transformative and 
unique features of the struggle from this perspective.  
Last but not least, I explore how affluent groups who wanted to live in the 
inner city negotiated the promises and costs of gentrification. I examine the 
negotiations about the symbolic boundaries regarding ‘who can properly live 
in the city’ in relation to the changing physical boundaries through property 
transfer. I also show how the transfer of squatter communities to the 
peripheries of the city and the criminalisation of their rights-based struggles 
affected the way in which the affluent groups reconstituted their class worth.    
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Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the research questions and the key concepts in this 
study. I aim at examining the class impact of gentrification, which was not fully 
explored in research because of the under-investigation of the processes of 
inclusion. I first offered a critical examination of the research on neoliberalism 
with a focus on neoliberal urbanism, class and gentrification attending to the 
limitations in terms of attending to the politics involved in the process and 
explaining the role of the state and the political actors. . Then, I explained how I 
intend to overcome these limitations using the lens of citizenship. I 
demonstrated how the analysis of spaces, agendas and acts of citizenship in 
relation to one another allows the politics and political actors into the analysis 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the methods and approach used in 
this study. I combine two sets of data collected through ethnographic research 
and use of secondary sources and some historical material. I first detail the 
relational ethnography by Matthew Desmond (2014) and then explain how I 
bring it together with the secondary sources about the processes of 
urbanisation in Turkey and Ankara and the formation of the official 
understanding of citizenship in Turkey. Then, I discuss how combining a 
spatial relational perspective with temporal analysis has enabled me to 
critically examine the complex ways gentrification operates in multiple yet 
interconnected places.   
I am taking a broad definition of methodology to include not only research 
methods but approaches to my subject matter, particularly ways of 
conceptualising and framing it. As regards the latter I shall defend my 
approach through a brief review of past research in Turkey on the Dikmen 
Valley and other cases of gentrification. Since methods should be appropriate 
to the specificities of the subject matter I will explain the former by reference 
to the latter. 
3.1. Bringing Multiplicity of Space into the Research   
As Doreen Massey explained in an interview dated 2013, space is the 
dimension of multiplicity, in which many things — some of them 
interconnected — are going on at the same time in different places. Thus space 
presents us with the existence of the other. Gentrification, as the current policy 
of neoliberal urban agenda, is a process led by the single logic of profit-
maximisation. It reduces urban space to a commodity that is a story-less, flat 
surface and the citizens into consumers. Although profit-seeking is the 
dominant force, the way profit is pursued and realised has always to deal with 
the multiplicity of processes going on in interconnected spaces if it is to be 
successful. Thus, it needs to detect which kind of housing and resident for 
which kind of location will maximise profits. As a result, it generates new kinds 
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of differentiation that fit with the profit logic as well as reproducing the 
existing ones.  
To examine the multiple ways the single logic of profit operates, I attempt to 
bring into view the stories of different actors who have been living through 
gentrification, giving different meanings to it and expecting different things 
from it. To do that this study focuses on the Dikmen Valley gentrification 
project area in Ankara where different actors have lived through an on-going 
process of urban change.  
As the next chapter reveals, the history of the valley is one of competitions and 
struggles between several different groups, of different classes and ethnicities, 
and various corporate and state agents. The valley used to be one of the largest 
squatter neighbourhoods in the capital Ankara. The urban transformation 
project started to be implemented by the greater municipality in 1989 in a way 
that progressed phase by phase. This led to a complex demographic structure 
as the middle class and more affluent groups moved to the newly constructed 
gated apartments and prestigious gated communities in the northern phases 
while the rural-based migrant groups continued to live in the northern parts of 
the valley. In the latter in particular, from the 1980s onwards, the amnesty 
laws legalised the squatter houses and led to their transformation into 4/5-
storey apartment buildings. On the other hand, some squatter dwellers, who 
could not afford and/or did not want to pay for the title deed certificates, 
continued to stay in their squatter houses without holding legal documents, 
while new squatter houses were also being constructed by newcomers. The 
squatter neighbourhood was occupied predominantly by religious and ethnic 
minority groups, but after the 1980 migrants from more diverse backgrounds 
also moved in the area.      
It is this heterogeneity that makes the Dikmen Valley a good study site for 
observing the processes of inclusion and exclusion. Due to this demographic 
heterogeneity, Dikmen Valley promised to be a useful field to explore the 
dynamic negotiations about the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. As the 
implementation of the project extended over the process of neoliberalisation, it 
also reflected the changes and continuities in the on-going process of urban 
redevelopment regime, including important changes in terms of the initial 
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rehabilitative purposes, environmental concerns, and participatory methods of 
the project. 
I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Dikmen Valley Urban 
Transformation Project area during January to mid-October 2015. It involved 
room-based interviews and walks with individuals and groups, participant 
observation of the struggling squatter communities, and photo elicitation. I 
conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with a total of 56 participants 
who lived in and/or close to the Dikmen Valley project area. These include:   
 25 squatter dwellers lacking legal title-deeds (6 of them were former residents 
in the valley),  
 16 people (6 tenants, 9 owner-occupiers, 1 young adult living with parents) 
living in non-gated high-rise apartments and gated communities,  
 13 people (3 tenants, 9 owner-occupiers, 1 young adult living with parents) 
living in prestigious gated communities,  
 1 former squatter dweller, who was resettled in high-rise apartment blocks in 
Dikmen Valley as part of the redevelopment project 
 1 doorkeeper living in one of the apartment blocks in which the former 
squatter dwellers were resettled (See Appendix).    
I preferred to conduct one-to-one interviews to get in-depth data, although I 
did interviews with couples living in gated apartments or neighbours living in 
the squatter neighbourhood when it was the preference of the participants as 
my main priority was to provide a comfortable place to the participants. In 
total, 8 of the participants were joined by their neighbours, spouse, child or 
cousin. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 82 years old. All of the interviews 
were conducted in person and 54 of them were recorded whereas in 2 of them 
I did not use voice recorder. The transcriptions of 12 interviews were done by 
the author and those of the remaining 44 interviews were done by a 
professional after I had deleted the participants’ names and any other 
information like birthplace that could reveal their identity, from the voice 
recording. The interviews were translated into English (when necessary) by 
the author. 
All of the middle and upper class participants were residents in gated 
apartments or prestigious gated communities within and/or close to Dikmen 
Valley Urban transformation Project area. Only 2 middle class participants, 
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Bora and Oktay, had moved from the high-rise apartments in the valley to 
apartments elsewhere by the time I interviewed them. On the other hand, 19 of 
the participants were living in the squatter neighbourhood when I interviewed 
them for the study while 7 of them were former squatter dwellers, who were 
living in apartment buildings at the time of the study. Seher was a university 
student, who lived in a shared house in a different city during term time. Ibo 
was working in an industrial company and staying in the place provided by his 
employer.  
To recruit participants, I directly contacted individuals in my social networks 
who knew people living in the project area, and then through snowball 
sampling, I included more respondents. To start with a diverse set of 
participants, I chose individuals from different age groups, gender and class in 
my social network. While I was conducting the fieldwork, I also contacted a 
director, who made a documentary about urban transformation in Turkey 
based on the case of Dikmen Valley. Although she lost contact with the upper 
class resident involved in her documentary, I was able to interview four of the 
director’s own friends, who resided in gated communities that were adjacent 
to the project area.  
Aiming to reveal the negotiations over who can properly live in the city, in the 
interviews, I asked middle and upper class participants questions about 
themselves, their story of education and employment, the story of the places 
they lived and how they felt about living in those places, their reflections on 
the on-going gentrification project in the valley and Turkey and the promises 
of the country-wide urban transformation campaign, the active role of the state 
in the process, the demolition of squatter houses, the newly constructed 
peripheral social housing estates, and struggles over the right to dwelling and 
land, To the former and current squatter dwellers, I asked more detailed 
questions about the process of the right to shelter struggle, how they 
mobilised, what they achieved and lost throughout the process, what things 
have changed, and the challenges they faced over time.  
In addition to the interviews, I attended the weekly meetings organised in the 
Right to Shelter Bureau in the squatter neighbourhood where there had been a 
collective struggle against the gentrification-led displacement, and did some 
participant observation there. The right to shelter bureau included a squatter 
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house, which is used as the place for meeting and other collective activities in 
winter times, and a container, which is used as the office where activists spend 
time, give consultation or information about the process, and also the 
documents about the project were kept. It was opened in 2006 when the 
people refused to leave their houses and looked for a place to inform people 
about the process and discuss together what they could do against the 
implementation of the project. Alongside the squatter people living in the 
neighbourhood, members of the radical leftist organisation People’s Houses 
were also actively involved in the process of the struggle when I did my 
fieldwork.    
In addition to interviews and chats in the bureau, I took a walk in the 
neighbourhood with 5 participants taking photos. In two of them, I asked my 
participants to take me to the places that had a meaning for them in whatever 
order they wanted. As we walked we also talked about the stories of the places 
they took me, about which I took notes. I took photos of the places they took 
me such as their houses, their gardens, and the streets they used to play as 
children. In one of them, I walked with a participant and her 9-year old 
daughter, and as we walked and chatted, the daughter took her own photos 
with my phone. I also took more spontaneous and shorter walks with 7 other 
participants, I walked together to their houses for the interview after the 
weekly meeting; and with a group of participants I went to two different 
houses in the neighbourhood to celebrate a wedding and a circumcision 
ceremony which were taking place. As we walked, I listened to their stories 
about the places we passed by such as their memories about clashing with the 
police forces in particular streets and corners, or the demolished shop that 
used to sell bread. These walks enabled me to get a deeper insight about the 
participants’ sense of belonging to their neighbourhood, which helped me 
better contextualise their claims to their land and house.   
To gain access to the squatter neighbourhood, I used two gatekeepers who 
were members of that organisation. Although the organisation helped me gain 
entrée, over time I realised that it was also preventing me from getting access 
to those people who were fearful of becoming part of, or who were against the 
political activism, as they thought I was affiliated with the People’s Houses 
organisation. Nevertheless, attending the weekly meetings I tried to observe 
how different groups of people approached each other, reacted to the 
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discussion and comments, discussed the issues on the agenda and approached 
each other helped me detect the inner tensions as well as gave clues about 
what the non-activists thought. I also used a group of my friends from 
university who had lived in the neighbourhood for some time in the past, to 
help me get access to a family, who used to be active members of the struggle 
but at later stages withdrew their support because of conflicting views on the 
changing content of the struggle due to increasing power of the People’s 
Houses organisation. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 7.   
In order to deepen my insights of inner tensions and to bring the voice of the 
people who were hesitant about political activism, I stayed in the 
neighbourhood after the meetings also, and spent time with the people; had 
lunch and played rummy king with them; listened to their conversations and 
comments about the meetings; and had random chats with many of them. 
Group interviews and unstructured chats with former and current squatter 
dwellers while they were waiting for the weekly meeting and/or reflecting on 
the discussions after the meeting were enlightening in terms of revealing 
different and opposing views about the on-going process of struggle in the 
valley. In those chats and interviews, some people expressed opposing views 
about staying in or leaving the neighbourhood. Especially those who had left 
their houses but came to the neighbourhood to attend some meetings were 
witnessing sentiments of resentment from the people who had stayed in their 
houses and ‘been paying the price of political activism’. Within that context, 
these interviews and chats gave the former an opportunity to explain the 
reasons of their abandonment and express their maintaining support for the 
struggle. Listening to those conversations between the former and the current 
squatter dwellers whose support for the struggle differed and attending to the 
silence of some people as well as expressions of opposing views, I was able to 
develop insights about the internal contradictions, which are usually 
overlooked and underrepresented in research and leftist-oriented news media. 
I will address these in more detail when I analyse the right to shelter struggle 
in Chapter 7.         
I initially used the bureau to get access to the people, but because I became 
involved in random chats before and after the weekly meetings, after a while I 
managed to build independent relations with the people who participated in 
the meetings. I started my fieldwork in January and after a few months, the 
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residents in the valley seemed to get used to my presence in the weekly 
meetings. Internal tensions encouraged some former squatter dwellers, on the 
other hand, in cases where they were no longer actively supporting the 
struggle but attending the meetings to be informed about the negotiations with 
the municipality. They tried to get in with me as they expected me to give them 
information without any intention to blame them for their decision to leave the 
neighbourhood.  
Throughout the process when the valley had become one of the leading 
examples of activism against state-led gentrification in Turkey, there had been 
many researchers and journalists who visited the area and talked to the 
people. However, the time I spent in the field was longer than what the people 
living in the squatter neighbourhood were used to. Some of them expressed 
their disturbance at me seeing ‘their many faces’, as I will explain in detail in 
Chapter 7. Owing to the absence of time pressure, I met some locals in the 
earlier stages of my fieldwork but waited until they had the time to interview 
with them. More importantly, I had a chance to keep observing the people after 
I interviewed with them. I sometimes realised that they were saying different 
things when the voice recorder was on and off, or when they were alone with 
me and there were others around us. Being attentive to these also enabled me 
to include different and conflicting opinions (including those of the same 
person) regarding the project and the struggle. Participants gave me their 
consent about using any material they shared with me, but I exclude any 
material that they requested be kept confidential, whether during or after the 
recording. 
Yet, one of the hardest parts of conducting a relational ethnographic fieldwork 
in Dikmen Valley was to ‘gain access to and get in with an interconnected web 
of people, many of whom are bound in relationships of antagonism’ (Desmond, 
2014, p. 569). In the eyes of most of the squatter dwellers, I was a researcher 
who was interested in their struggle and wanted to make their voice heard. 
The women especially were very enthusiastic to talk to me about their 
experiences and feelings regarding the struggling process. Men, on the other 
hand, were much more distant to me as the patriarchal and traditional social 
codes in the neighbourhood prevented them from approaching women outside 
their family. Thus, initially I kept interviewing women and young male adults, 
while I observed men during the weekly meetings. To provide a more 
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comfortable place for the men to approach me, I tried to chat to the 
participants I already knew in the bureau when there were other men sitting 
and chatting there. I allowed and encouraged them to make comments and 
interrupt as we spoke. Over time, men started to feel less worried about talking 
to me. The activist figures, who were affiliated with the People’s Houses, on the 
other hand remained more suspicious about my intentions as I will discuss in 
more detail in Chapter 7. I remained attentive to these differences between the 
activists affiliated with the People’s Houses and the others in order to uncover 
the inner tensions within the struggling group. 
The people living in gated apartments and the prestigious gated communities, 
on the other hand, did not accept doing walking interviews saying that they did 
not have the time. For the same reason, they usually invited me to their 
workplaces in their lunch breaks for the interviews. That was the greatest 
difficulty as sometimes I had to finish the interview in half an hour, which was 
not appropriate for an in-depth interview.  I used a photo elicitation method 
during the interviews with the middle and upper class participants to initiate 
more lively conversations about their evaluations about the gentrification 
process in the valley and Turkey. These photos were usually useful in terms of 
motivating the participants to speak and enabling me to use the limited time I 
was provided by some participants more efficiently. I showed them photos of 
the apartment buildings in which the former squatter dwellers were resettled 
and the view of the squatter neighbourhood from the edge of the gentrified 
part of the Dikmen Valley, and asked them how they felt about living closer to 
the former and current squatter dwellers, and the delay in the implementation 
of the project. This triggered a discussion about their feelings and opinions 
about the inclusion of the squatter residents in gentrification projects as well 
as the processes that led to the delay in the implementation of the 
gentrification project in the valley and in Turkey such as the squatter dwellers’ 
resistance, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.    
To get a better sense and deeper insight of the practices of drawing symbolic 
boundaries, I also asked the participants, who live in gated apartments and 
prestigious gated communities, to take photos of the things and places that 
they liked and did not like about where they lived, and to send them to me on 
Whatsapp. Many did not send me their photos, even though they told me that 
they would do and I reminded them a few times. Nevertheless, 11 participants 
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texted me some photos, and the similarities in the photos still gave me a sense 
of their relations to the space. I analysed the photos my participants sent me in 
relation to the whole context of their narratives in the interviews, as I will 
show in Chapter 6.   
3.2. Relational Ethnography 
In this study, I use relational ethnography as recommended by Matthew 
Desmond (2014) to emphasise the negotiations and struggles over the 
reproduction of space through gentrification. This broadens and expands the 
horizons of ethnographic study beyond understanding delimited groups or 
boundaries (Desmond, 2014, p. 548).   
For a relational approach, he attributes a higher importance to the choice of 
the object of analysis. Despite the fact that the field of ethnographic research 
covers all corners of the world, the object of analysis remains limited to 
particular bounded groups or places analysed individually or comparatively (p. 
550). He argues that studying people and places in relative isolation interferes 
with our ability to understand their mutual encounter and confrontation (p. 
551).      
The object of analysis of relational ethnography is not a particular group or a 
delimited location but processes involving configurations of relations among 
different actors or institutions (Desmond, 2014, p. 547). Desmond asserts that 
relational ethnography involves studying various actors. More specifically, it 
includes at least two types of actors or agencies occupying different positions 
within the social space and bound together in a relationship of mutual 
dependence or struggle (p. 554).  
Desmond proposes four objects of analysis that can be drawn upon in a 
relational ethnographic research: processes rather than processed people, 
fields rather than places, boundaries rather than bounded groups, and cultural 
conflict rather than group culture (p. 562). He gives the example from his 
ethnographic study about the process of eviction in Milwaukee’s low-income 
housing market. He wrote that taking this process as his scientific object 
enabled him to explore the interactions and transactions between various 
actors involved in the process including the tenants experiencing eviction and 
the landlords conducting eviction as well as many other people in their 
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network. By focusing on the process of eviction itself rather than evicted 
tenants or evicting landlords, he argues that he could explore the social 
relations and interactions which extended the confines of a single 
neighbourhood (p. 563).     
Inspired by his approach, my object of analysis is not as a particular 
neighbourhood or a particular culture within a particular boundary. Although I 
did the research in a particular place, the locus of my research is not the same 
as the object of analysis. My object of analysis is not the displaced and excluded 
squatter dwellers or the displacing gentrifier groups in isolation from each 
other. Taking excluded groups as my object of analysis contradicts with my 
purposes to explore the complex ways gentrification impacts on class 
dynamics. As I attempt to explore the conflicting processes of inclusion and 
exclusion at the same time, the focus of this study is not the squatter 
neighbourhood nor the gated residential areas but the processes of inclusion 
and exclusion through gentrification. 
Thus this study involves a focus on ‘boundaries’ rather than bounded groups. I 
draw upon a critical approach to inclusion and its inseparability from 
exclusion within the context of gentrification, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Desmond argues that thinking critically about boundaries and revealing the 
processes that cause and constitute boundary change requires thinking 
relationally (2014, p. 565). He proposes to study the boundaries such as 
classification process of dividing slum from non-slum, the defining bounds of 
‘slumness’ rather than studying the slum itself. Therefore, studying boundaries 
from a relational perspective suits my purposes to explore how people are 
included as well as excluded. Also it enables me to explore how these 
boundaries are negotiated, and thus, emphasise the human agency of various 
actors.    
My relational approach does not involve group interviews or focus groups that 
bring together middle and upper class residents with former and current 
squatter dwellers. Despite the lack of real interaction among these different 
actors, however, all the one-to-one interviews, walking and visual methods 
enabled me to reveal that middle and upper class residents and the former and 
current squatter dwellers actively participate in the symbolic struggles 
regarding ‘who can properly live in the city’ and enacted and mobilised 
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citizenship in different ways. Equally important, with this focus on boundaries, 
I was able to become much more attentive to the inner boundaries within the 
struggling squatter communities. As a result, I managed to move beyond the 
‘romanticising’ analyses of collective action based on shared class interests 
that overlook the complexity and dynamism of mobilisation, as I will point out 
in Chapter 7.      
Last but not least, Desmond proposes studying cultural conflict rather than 
group culture as the latter attributes stable and shared beliefs and practices to 
a bounded, homogenous group. Rather than harmony, he focuses on 
competition between people structurally dissimilar to one another (2014, p. 
568). He writes that studying eviction allowed him to explore the dynamics of 
meaning making through relations between landlords and tenants. From this 
perspective, I will focus on the process of redrawing the symbolic boundaries 
of inclusion and exclusion through exploring the differing claims to the city and 
citizenship in relation to the broader processes of gentrification.    
Despite including different groups in my research, my relational ethnography 
has limitations. I spent much more time with the former and current squatter 
settlers than the middle and upper class residents. Hence, while my study 
involves different actors at the same time, the perspectives and experiences of 
the former and current squatter dwellers are central in my study. This is 
related to my intention to focus on the politics behind the processes of 
inclusion in gentrification. In prioritising their experiences, I was able to reveal 
the ways even the socially and spatially marginalised groups who are targeted 
by gentrification might benefit from participating in it and secondly the 
disciplining effects driven by the state’s political considerations. Thirdly, the 
focus on the squatter communities enabled me to critically examine how the 
disciplining efforts of gentrification simultaneously paved the way for 
transforming the squatter settlers’ individualised troubles of housing into 
public issues mobilised around the right to claim rights, in contrast to the 
official citizenship agenda, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 7.  
The prioritised status of the squatter settlers in my study was also related to 
my wish to use ethnography to bring the voice of the people who have fewer 
channels to speak. Nevertheless, despite my attempts to focus on the voices 
from below, the squatter dwellers, who were not active parts of the struggling 
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process, are underrepresented as they were more difficult to gain access to and 
much more reluctant to speak, even if I tried. What is more, there were other 
actors in the field of whom I became aware only during the fieldwork, namely 
the Syrians and waste recyclers, who recently moved in the project area. 
Although I thought about talking to the Syrians in the later stages of my 
research, of central impediment in terms of talking to them was the language 
barrier. On the other hand, I could not use my participants as gate keepers as I 
was informed by (and also observed) that the two groups did not interact very 
much with one another. I heard from the leading activist figures that the 
Syrians sometimes visited the right to shelter bureau to be informed about the 
implementation of the project. Their ambiguous legal status put them in a 
more fragile position vis-à-vis the state-led processes of urban redevelopment 
and because of this I thought they would be extremely suspicious of speaking 
to strangers. Due to my primary interest in moving beyond the emphases on 
displacement and territorial stigmatisation as well as class reproduction in the 
analyses of the class impact of gentrification, I limited my analyses by focusing 
on the groups benefitting as well as targeted by these agendas. Thus, these 
groups are seen through the eyes of the squatter dwellers in the thesis. 
Nevertheless, in future research, I aim to explore to what extent an 
understanding of citizenship as claims and acts can be empowering for Syrian 
asylum seekers in Turkey.   
3.2.1. Absence of Relational Approach in Previous Research  
Within the context of the arguments made above, this study departs from 
ethnographic studies which favour an economic approach to gentrification and 
aim to analyse the macro processes through focusing on micro settings 
(Mühürdaroğlu, 2005; Karaman, 2012; Somalı, 2013). Although they reveal the 
connections between micro settings and macro processes and policies, they 
tend to view groups and places as receptacles of large-scale processes and aim 
to ‘see the big through the small’ (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 387 cited in Desmond, 
2014, p. 553).     
The multi-sited ethnographic studies that explore processes of urban 
redevelopment and impacts thereof in multiple places by comparing two or 
more case studies affected by the broader process of gentrification (Uzun, 
2003; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; İslam and Sakızlıoğlu, 2015), also 
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tend to assume clear boundaries between those places that are investigated. 
The contradictions within the assumed homogenous groups are mostly 
overlooked.  
Drawing upon the flexibility of boundaries, I focus on the interactions between 
the different groups living in the gated places and address differences as well 
as shared social attributes and practices among them. I also aim to question 
the territorial boundedness of the squatter dwellers. Thus, I focus on the 
conflicting practices and tensions among different groups of people living (or 
who used to live) in the squatter neighbourhood.  
My study therefore differs from the studies focusing on collective resistance 
against gentrification from the perspective of their achievements and failures 
in terms of stopping the steady wave of forced displacement, and reflecting 
upon more effective forms of mobilisation. Dikmen Valley constitutes a popular 
example of collective mobilisation for the right to shelter in academia and the 
radical leftist printed media. It is emphasised that the struggle of the squatter 
residents in Dikmen Valley has succeeded in delaying the implementation of 
the gentrification project since 2006. However, existing studies examining 
Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter movement (Karagüney, 2009; Aykan, 2011; 
Aksoy, 2012; Deniz, 2016) mostly overlook the dynamic relations between the 
broader urban change and contested claims to participate in the gentrification 
processes.  
Fuat Karagüney (2009), for instance, approaches the title deed owners as the 
true right holders on the land and argues that the demands of the collective 
struggle are not legitimate as it was led predominantly by those people 
without title deeds. He argues that the latter group victimises the legal rights of 
the former through refusing to leave the neighbourhood and delaying the 
implementation of the project. By approaching urban transformation as an 
issue of formalisation of informal settlements, Karagüney overlooks the 
historical processes that generated the ‘illegal’ presence of the squatter 
dwellers without title deeds on public land.     
In 1972, Laura Nader called for reinventing anthropology through a renewed 
emphasis on studying ‘up’ and ‘down’ together to demonstrate the connections 
between the powerful actors and institutions and relatively less powerful 
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individuals and groups. She explains the promises of this approach in terms of 
developing adequate theory giving the example of slums: 
The ghetto may be viewed as being without law, lawless. The courts are not 
geared to the complaints of the poor; furthermore, they are not geared for 
cheap and quick resolution of conflict — crucial features for the poor. From 
this perspective, ghetto communities may be said to be shut out of the legal 
system except as defendants, and indeed they are often shut off from other 
municipal services ranging from garbage-collection to police protection 
(Nader, 1972, p. 290).  
Thus, Karagüney’s analysis lacks studying ‘up’ and overlooks the fact that the 
difference between squatter dwellers with and without title deeds resulted 
from the inefficient housing policies followed by populist attempts of inclusion 
of the squatter dwellers. By focusing on the ‘illegal’ status of the squatter 
communities, his approach criminalises the rights-based struggle of the 
squatter communities lacking legal title deeds and thus approves, if not 
legitimises, the punitive measures against it.   
The studies focusing on the achievements of the struggle in the valley focus on 
the process of organising collective mobilisation. Begum Aykan (2011) 
explores the right to shelter struggle from the perspective of framing of 
individual claims to the city and politicisation of the squatter communities. She 
emphasises how the right to shelter movement was successful in framing 
diverse claims - due to important ethnic and (religious) sectarian differences - 
on the basis of a claim to ‘the right to the city’ and encouraging the squatter 
dwellers to become involved in political activism. She argued that an important 
reason for this effective mobilisation was its non-hierarchical form without 
leadership. Evin Deniz (2016) agrees with Aykan in terms of the success of the 
movement and highlights the importance of encounters with the police and 
other politically active groups as well as the rights discourse in terms of 
generating effective mobilisation.  
These arguments were shared also by the leftist-oriented news media and the 
members of the radical leftist People’s Houses1 organisation, who have been 
actively involved in the struggle in the valley. The organisation’s activism 
concentrates mainly on struggling for the right to housing as well as education 
and health. The right to shelter struggles in Dikmen Valley as well as elsewhere 
                                                          
1 Hereafter – PH 
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in Turkey was represented in the narratives of the PH members living in the 
valley as well as in the radical leftist-oriented newspapers as a struggle of the 
poor proletariat against oppression and capitalist exploitation. Thus, the 
struggle was imagined as a successful mobilisation of a heterogeneous group 
on the basis of class interest, thus devoid of contradictions and inner conflicts.     
Because of such ‘romanticising’ approaches to the collective mobilisation in the 
Dikmen Valley in the leftist-oriented news media, I was very surprised when I 
first went into the field. What I saw was a highly deteriorated neighbourhood 
in a physical sense; the houses, the gardens, the roads, the signboards, and 
even the trees were left without maintenance. Most of the squatter dwellers, 
who were said to be brought together by an admirable struggle to defend their 
homes against forced eviction in such a way that overcame internal divisions, 
had already moved out from the neighbourhood. There were less than 500 
households, living in the neighbourhood when I started my fieldwork in 
February 2015. Of these households, approximately 200 had refused to 
become part of the political activism against the state.  
The dominant mood of the people in the valley was anxious, a suspense which 
also impacted on their activism. During the long process of waiting in anxiety, 
even the most prominent figures in the struggle with a few exceptions had 
purchased ‘formal’ apartment houses elsewhere thanks to cheap housing 
credits as precaution against forced eviction. The poor, landless people 
struggling for their right to shelter had, in the process, transformed into 
property owners and to some extent partners in urban regeneration. Thus, the 
academic and popular representations of the struggle in Dikmen Valley no 
longer represented the truth of the situation when I did my fieldwork.  
3.3. Bringing Time and Space Together  
The differences between the written material and the field revealed the need 
to focus on the complex ways people are included in the process of 
gentrification as well as analysing the ‘richly heterogeneous complexities of the 
lived experience of marginality’ (Auyero and Jensen, 2015, p. 360). To do that, I 
integrate the aspect of ‘temporality’ into the analysis of the right to shelter 
struggle in the valley. Bahar Sakızlıoğlu (2013) mentions this need through an 
ethnographic analysis of displacement led by the urban transformation project 
in Tarlabaşı, Istanbul. She argues that the local state expanded the process of 
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implementation of the project after declaring it, and this impeded effective 
mobilisation against displacement as people’s expectations from the project 
were constantly lowered and stirred. Indeed, one of the problems of previous 
explorations of the housing activism in the valley was the limits of approaching 
the struggle as static, and the people living there as immobilised.    
The struggle had lasted since 2006 and was still continuing when I left the field 
in October, 2015. Throughout these years, the dynamics in the neighbourhood 
had changed radically. The collective action started with almost 3000 people 
whereas there were approximately 600 people left in the neighbourhood when 
I started my fieldwork in January, 2015. The houses in the fourth phase of the 
project area were almost completely demolished and started to be occupied by 
newcomer migrants, namely the Syrians and waste collectors. Many luxurious 
high-rise residential and commercial buildings had been constructed around 
the remaining squatter neighbourhood in the fifth phase of the project area. 
Moreover, the resistance in the valley seemed to lose its popularity in the news 
media and academia.  
Within this context, rather than trying to find heroes and emphasise class 
solidarity in such a way that overlooks the complexities and contradictions 
within struggling communities, I intended to explore the inner tensions 
generated over the course of its 9-year history alongside the already existing 
differences.  With an analysis of the struggle as a process, I was able to attend 
to the limitations of those claims while emphasising the ways rights claims 
have empowered oppressed groups.  
I focus on the ‘interactions in a changing field’ (Desmond, 2014, p. 555) ‘from 
multiple and even opposing perspectives’ (p. 559) to reveal the struggles over 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, in order to avoid freezing my 
participants in an ‘ethnographic present’ (Burton, 1988 cited in Desmond, 
2014, p. 552), I use the past tense throughout the thesis, as the field has 
continued to change since I left in mid-October 2015. Taking a temporal 
perspective, I focus on struggle and tension as well as cooperation and 
coherence in the asymmetrical interactions within the squatter communities.   
Alongside ethnographic study, I undertook documentary research about the 
historical progression of urbanisation in Ankara with regard to the 
relationship between the formation and reworking of the citizenship agenda 
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and the construction of the built environment. I researched secondary 
materials such as books, journal articles in the National Library and the library 
of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and also online reports of 
chambers about urbanisation processes, the development of squatting, and the 
popular representation of the squatter communities in the mainstream printed 
media and scholarly works.  
I also scanned online archives of mainstream newspapers to investigate the 
newspapers articles about the squatter settlers. I analysed some weekly 
municipal bulletins in Ankara to uncover the popular representation of the 
squatter settlers in the Dikmen Valley. To get access to the former volumes of 
the bulletins, I contacted the Head Office of the Chamber of Environmental 
Engineers in Ankara and consulted their archive. In addition to these, I 
analysed the speeches of key actors of the urban transformation campaign that 
I accessed through scanning websites of some online and printed newspapers 
to uncover the ways in which gentrification was promoted and the people 
were drawn into it. Last, I collected photographs showing how the squatter 
dwellers were represented in the local and national mainstream newspapers 
based on these sources and other types of visual data including maps, graphics, 
and statistics from scholarly works about the urbanisation and urban 
transformation processes in the valley and in Ankara.  
By bringing time and space together through an analysis of the ethnographic 
data together with the historical research on the urbanisation and formation of 
spaces of citizenship and the official definition of (good) citizens, I aim to 
examine the dynamic relationship between conflict among the multiple 
meanings and practices that are simultaneously at play and the specific ‘mode 
of integration’ (Mills, 1959, p. 47) (at that particular time) of the urban regime.  
Conclusion 
This chapter explained how using relational ethnography and historical 
analysis is enabling in terms of moving beyond the cultural and economic 
analyses of class impact of gentrification and attending to the complexities and 
dynamism thereof. It outlined how taking boundaries, rather than bounded 
groups/places, and processes as the objects of inquiry equipped me with better 
tools to uncover the dynamic ways the disciplining efforts of  gentrification 
operates are contested in multiple yet interconnected spaces. Alongside 
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bringing different experiences and perspectives into view, I also critically 
reflected upon the limitations of my ‘relational’ ethnographic approach in 
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Chapter 4: Formations of Citizenship Regime 
and Class Inequalities throughout 
Urbanisation in Ankara (1923-2015) 
 
In the contemporary studies on nation-state rescaling within the context of the 
increasingly global economy, the subsequent ‘unsettling of national citizenship’ 
(Holston and Appadurai, 1996) is frequently emphasised (Purcell, 2003; 
Fenster, 2005; Işın, 2008; 2009). Işın (2009, p. 369) mentions contemporary 
debates in citizenship studies which focus on the emergence of new scales, 
sites and actors of citizenship that complicate the ways in which citizenship is 
imagined and performed, not only as membership but also as claims (Sassen, 
1996; Soysal, 1997; Scholtz, 2006). He continues that new actors articulate 
claims for justice through new sites that involve multiple and overlapping 
scales of rights and obligations (Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans et al., 2006). 
Among them are the squatter dwellers in the peripheries of the cities in the 
Global South, who conduct protests for their ‘rights to the city’.        
To understand how class inequalities and relations have been affected by the 
contemporary processes of gentrification in Turkey – which is the main object 
of this dissertation, this chapter analyses the processes of urbanisation and 
official configuration of citizenship in Turkey in relation to one another. 
Drawing on the conceptual framework provided by ‘the citizenship agenda’ (de 
Koning et. al., 2015) and ‘the spaces of citizenship’ (Painter and Philo, 1995; 
Desforges, 2005) and the historical data provided by the secondary sources on 
these processes in Turkey, I will explore the changes in the normative 
boundaries regarding who has been configured as proper to live in the city in 
relation to the material changes in the city space. In doing so, I aim to shed 
light on the political as well as economic processes through which the ground 
for contemporary gentrification and rights-based activism against it was paved 
in Turkey.        
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In the first part of this chapter, I explore how the state citizenship agenda was 
formed in Turkey focusing on how ‘good’ citizenship was officially configured 
and promoted. In the second part, I analyse the formation of squatter 
neighbourhoods by rural migrants from the 1940s onwards as a manifest 
challenge to the state authority. I examine how they evolved over time in 
relation to the changing state citizenship agenda as well as the changing 
dynamics of class conflict. With this historical analysis drawing on secondary 
resources and visual material such as maps and photos collected through 
documentary research, I aim to shed light upon how the ground for the 
contemporary urban transformation campaign based on zero tolerance to 
informal housing was prepared in Turkey. The last part of the chapter explores 
how the local state’s approach to the gentrification project in Dikmen Valley 
has evolved through demonstrating the changes as well as continuities in the 
process in line with the broader context provided in the first part.                                     
4.1. Constitution of State Citizenship Agenda and Its Landscapes 
(1850s-1930s)     
As referred earlier in Chapter 2, citizenship is a normative concept as well as a 
legal one to the extent that it refers to the ’ideal’ norms of conduct and the 
forms state-citizen relations should take. In principle, formal-legal 
membership of a political community attributes each subject living within that 
territory certain rights and duties aiming at counterweighting the existing 
class, ethnic, religious and gender inequalities. Through the normative 
definition of (ideal) citizenship, however, particular individuals and groups are 
valued over others, while at the same time existing material inequalities limit 
the access of the subordinate groups to valued practices and goods. These two 
interrelated processes lead to the formation of differentiated rights, 
responsibilities and senses of citizenship (Desforges et al., 2005, pp. 439-440).     
The process of urbanisation in Turkey throughout the modernisation process 
bore witness to the continuous struggles over normative construction of 
citizenship. The formation of citizenship agenda by the state in Turkey dates 
back to the early 19th century when the modernisation attempts in the 
Ottoman Empire started. The rise of nationalism and demands of 
independence threatened the territoriality of the empire. The Ottoman elites 
sought to save the empire from collapse through granting constitutional rights 
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to the ethnically and religiously heterogeneous subjects living in the empire. In 
her book, In Search of the Ideal Citizen, the most detailed source in Turkish on 
the changing citizenship agendas in Turkey, Füsun Üstel (2014) explores the 
historical process of how modern citizenship was normatively constructed and 
promoted by the state authorities since the modernisation of the Ottoman 
Empire. She analyses the changes in the civics curricula to understand how the 
national citizenship education in primary and secondary schools evolved in 
relation to the changing configuration of ideal citizenship in Turkey. The 
process of formation of modern citizenship in Turkey has taken place on a 
fragile ground, as she argues, since the Ottoman intellectuals intended it to 
save the empire and transform its population from passive subjects of the 
Sultan into modern citizens simultaneously (p. 30).                        
The first steps in establishing a modern constitutional order which involved 
reforming the sharia law, were the declarations of edicts of Tanzimat 
(Reorganisation) in 1836 and Islahat (Reformation) in 1856. In these edicts, 
the contradictory goals of the modernisation project were immediately 
apparent. In the former, the right to security of life and property, equitable tax, 
and right to a fair trial of the Muslim people and other religious groups living 
under the imperial territory was recognised. The motive behind recognition of 
such civil rights, however, was the promise of allegiance of the subject-citizens. 
It was specified that a man would willingly serve his state and nation if he was 
assured about the security of his life, his honour, and property.  
The scope of the latter edict was broader as the threat of nationalist ideas 
strengthened at the time. The edict proclaimed ‘Ottoman citizenship’ — in 
contrast to the superior status of Muslim population before then — stating that 
‘every individual, who is a subject of the Ottoman State, is called Ottoman 
without exception regardless of which religion or sect he is a member’ (Üstel, 
2014, p. 27). 
In 1876, the first Ottoman constitution was promulgated. The authorities of the 
Sultan were restricted with the establishment of the executive assembly of the 
notables, whose members were elected by the Sultan, and the legislative 
Assembly of the Deputy, whose members were elected by the people. Yet, the 
final decision was to be made by the Sultan, and in February 1878 Sultan 
Abdulhamid closed the Assembly. After thirty years of despotic rule, 
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constitutionalism was declared again in 1908 because of the increasing 
pressure of the Turkish nationalist groups. To the former constitution new 
clauses were added that promoted civil and political participation of the 
citizens, such as restricting the authorities of the Sultan’s powers to set up and 
close the assembly and recognising the right to association.                   
New political associations and parties were formed, and those, which had 
continued their activities secretly, manifested themselves publicly. However, 
the rapid process of civilisation of politics stimulated citizen participation in 
politics, which contradicted with the primary goal of preserving social unity for 
the sake of state security. As a result, restrictions regarding the purpose and 
qualities of the associations followed. With the Law on Associations and The 
Strike Law enacted in 1909, the associations ‘aiming to change the form of 
government and/or dissociate the Ottoman society’ were claimed to violate the 
security and integrity of the country. Furthermore, the Ottoman counter coup 
against the declaration of Constitutional monarchy, known as the 31 March 
Incident2, led to the demonization of alternative political opinions and 
approaches (Üstel, 2014, p. 28).  
Within this framework, the pedagogues of the Ottoman modernisation 
configured the public sphere in terms of order as the source of security. They 
emphasised the perfection of the existing order established by the constitution 
as well as the moral qualities of the public servants as opposed to the arbitrary 
rule of the Sultan. The public sphere was not a place where ideas, decisions and 
demands were circulated and negotiated like the bourgeois public sphere in 
Western Europe. On the contrary, it was an ordered space providing the 
citizens with an atmosphere of trust by the order of law. What is of importance 
was to ensure political stability and social integrity. Accordingly, the citizen, 
who would become the main actor in the public space, was expected to fulfil 
her duties and comply with the desired codes of conduct to contribute to the 
persistence of order and stability. This imposed an understanding of 
citizenship as a granted privilege more than a right that is to be exercised and 
claimed.            
                                                          
2 The parliament and the 1876 Constitution had been suspended by the Sultan AbdulHamid in 
1878. The revolutionary Young Turks forced the Sultan to declare constitutional monarchy and 
restore the constitution in 1908 reopening the General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire. The 
conservative reactions and discontent about constitutionalism were materialised in a counter-
coup attempt in 31 March 1909 demanding Sharia rule. It was put down after 9 days and then 
the constitution was restored and the Sultan Abdulhamid was deposed from the country.          
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The emphasis on order and the tension between civil and political 
participation and the security of the state continued also after the Republican 
state was established. After the devastating world war and the War of 
Liberation3, the military cadres declared the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923 and immediately embarked on the formation of a modern 
and secular citizenry. The contradictions led by simultaneous attempts to 
transform the passive subjects of the Sultan into modern, enlightened citizens 
and secure their allegiance to the new regime continued also after 1923.      
In studies on citizenship in Turkey a shared emphasis is the explicit state-
centrism involved in the citizenship agenda. In her article titled “The Anatomy 
of Citizenship in Turkey” Ayşe Kadıoğlu analyses the formation of citizenship 
in relation to the development of nationalism and argues that in the French 
experience formation of the nation and the state was simultaneous, and in 
Germany nationalism preceded the formation of the state. She continues that 
in Turkey the establishment of the state preceded the formation of the nation 
without a preceding Enlightenment thought (2012, p. 179). She argues that the 
concept of citizenship was drawn upon the assumption of an unenlightened, 
inexperienced, and passive society rather than claim-making, free and active 
individuals; citizens were expected to internalise the modernisation project of 
the Republican cadres and follow the routes that are already shown to them 
instead of self-reasoning (2012, p. 178).  
Because of the absence of an Enlightenment movement during which the 
individual becomes autonomous from divine rule through the capacity to 
reason, the main mechanism to show the citizens those routes was the 
education system (Caymaz, 2007, p. 5; Üstel, 2014, p. 155). Various studies on 
citizenship agendas examine how states use citizenship agendas in order to 
manage populations (Bhandar, 2010) through for instance inculcating 
responsible and virtuous behaviour in citizens through citizenship education 
(Brooks and Holford, 2009; Kennelly and Llewellyn, 2011 cited in Koning et al., 
                                                          
3 After the defeat of the Central Powers during the WWI, the territory of the Ottoman Empire 
was occupied by the Allied Powers. As opposed to the quisling Sultan and the Ottoman 
government in Istanbul, a war of liberation (1919-1922) was started under the leadership of a 
group of soldiers led by Mustafa Kemal. The soldiers refused to recognize the authority of the 
Ottoman government and established another government in Ankara. In April, 1920 they 
declared the Republic of Turkey and established the Grand National Assembly. Following the 
victories in all the fronts of the war, the assembly declared that it abolished Sultanate in 1922, 
which meant the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. With the Lausanne peace treaty (April, 1923), 
the sovereignty of the new state was internationally recognised. In October, the assembly 
declared Turkey to be a republic.  
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2015. p. 122). The main aim of state-controlled citizenship education in Turkey 
was to inculcate patriotism and civility (Üstel, 2014, p. 175) to secure the 
allegiance of the citizens to the new regime and instil modern and secular 
values and behaviours in the ’unenlightened’ citizens. Within this framework, 
in 1928, a national campaign of literacy was introduced with the establishment 
of the Schools of the Nation for men and women aged between 16 and 45. 
Information on Country lessons in these schools aimed at equipping the 
illiterate citizens with Republican values, which they were expected to 
internalise and transmit.       
In his contribution to the book on societal peace and citizenship in Turkey, R. 
Özgür Dönmez (2011) defines what he calls the formation of citizenship 
regime in Turkey as ‘traumatic’ in agreement with Kadıoğlu. He argues that, on 
the one hand, it aimed at transforming the subjects of the Sultan into modern 
citizens in the name of bringing about radical modernity; but on the other, it 
borrowed monist and social engineering features of the empire, which 
prevented the civil society from engaging in politics (Dönmez, 2011, p. 5). The 
Republican elites tried to overcome the contradiction between creating 
modern, right-holder citizens and securing their allegiance through a duty-
based configuration of citizenship. This is revealed in a school textbook 
published in 1926 that stated that ‘Citizens have rights in order to fulfil the 
duties that they are responsible for’ (Üstel, 2014, p. 181, my translation). As 
Caymaz (2007) argues while analysing the evolution of citizenship education 
in Turkey, citizens were expected to fulfil their duties defined by the state 
within the space delineated and bestowed by the state. Accordingly, if they 
were doing their duty completely, they would not need to claim anything from 
the state (p. 46).           
In this duty-based configuration, the class aspect of citizenship was hidden. 
The working class mobilisation was already weak compared to the Western 
European countries where citizenship developed as a class compromise given 
to the working classes by the liberal welfare state. Moreover, throughout 
1930s, the new regime was consolidated under the single Republican People’s 
Party rule, gradually replacing the emphases on constitutional citizenship and 
Republican values of equality with an increased emphasis on patriotism as an 
antidote to the enduring tension between civil and political participation and 
the integrity of the state. The citizenry was configured as an ‘integrated and 
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unprivileged mass’ (Şenol-Cantek, 2016, p. 172) without class conflicts, and 
ethnic and religious differences (Bali, 2000 cited in Özyurek, 2002, p. 18). This 
way the newly established nation-state attempted to form national integrity 
and cohesion among a diverse population.    
The differences between the painting “In the Wake of the Revolution” (1933), 
by Zeki Faik İzer, and the “Liberty Leading the People” (1830) by Eugène 
Delacroix, that İzer was inspired by, reflect this understanding (See Figures 2 
and 3). Delacroix painted a half-naked woman holding the French flag leading 
the people composed of bourgeoisie, workers, and students with the ideal of 
liberty. Similarly, the woman in white dress in İzer’s painting represents the 
Republican ideal yet she is exempt from leading the people as she follows the 
directive of the leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who points at the future. People 
followed then not an ideal of liberty but the Republican ideology (Poyraz, 
2013).  
Unlike Delacroix, İzer does not represent class differences in line with the 
Republican idea, as the main contradiction was between the modern-looking 
young men and women in the crowd, and the reactionary represented by the 
bearded, old men on their knees. Abandoning class inequalities and 
suppressing the acting and claim-making capacity of citizens with a passive, 
duty-based configuration of citizenship manifested that the newly found 
republic was owned by the state not by the citizens.                           
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Figure 2: “In the Wake of the Revolution” by Zeki Faik Izer, 1933 (Source: Poyraz, 2013) 
 
Figure 3: "Liberty Leading the People" by Eugène Delacroix, 1830 (Source: Poyraz: 2013). 
The Republican elites created their ‘formal, fixed landscapes of citizenship that 
communicated their understanding of citizenship through the built 
environment’ (Desforges et al., 2005, p. 441). They constructed homogenous 
and ordered spaces such as squares and boulevards, as well as ballrooms and 
leisure parks, which would reflect the alleged social unity and the power of the 
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state. The first civic urban space of Ankara was Ulus Square (See Figure 4) 
where public announcements, ceremonies and celebrations such as the 
opening ceremony of first National Assembly or the abolition of monarchy, 
were held and carefully policed by the state with mass participation of jubilant 
crowds (Sargın, 2004, pp. 664-665). With its sterility, Ulus Square is argued to 
represent the ideal of a non-antagonistic public as rallying of the masses was 
not allowed except for the official ceremonies (Toker and Tekin, 2002, p. 102 
cited in Şenol-Cantek, 2016, p. 46).  
 
Figure 4: The official ceremony of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the 
Republic (Source: Hür, 2015). 
The presence of ‘ideal’ citizens on public space, on the other hand, was reduced 
to the duty of representing the secular ideology of the new regime and thus 
reproducing state power. Ankara was declared the capital city in 1923, and the 
municipality of Ankara was formed in 1924. In 1925, the municipality was 
given the authority to expropriate, and according to the first city plan of 
Ankara, 4.000.000 m2 of land between the administrative centre Ulus in the 
Old Town and the emerging residential and administrative centre that is the 
New Town (See Figure 5) was expropriated to construct the capital (Kaynar, 
2016, p. 67). In the 1930s, the New Town, which included the new Kızılay 
Square (See Figure 6), became the residency for the military bureaucrats and 
politicians, who migrated from big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, as well as 
the notables of the Old Town, who were compliant with the new regime (Şenol-
Cantek, 2016, p. 47).     
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Figure 5: Ankara Master Plan, Hermann Jansen, 1932 (Source: Güngör, 2012). 
 
Figure 6: Kızılay Square in the 1930s comprising Güvenpark, the houses of the 
bureaucratic elites, Güven Monument (two soldiers), and the ministries on the right in the 
distance. 
 Despite the emphases on citizenry as a united, homogenous mass the 
normative construction of citizenship favoured educated and modern-looking 
citizens, who are devoted to the ideal of modernisation and thus representing 
the ideal Republic. The middle and high-income bureaucrats, most of whom 
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migrated from big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, constituted role models 
not only for the poor but also the notables in Ankara.  
On the other hand, the native, rural-based populations of Ankara, who 
subsisted on agriculture and stockbreeding and living according to religious 
codes, were expected to modernise through the inculcation of the Republican 
values before becoming visible on the public spaces in Ankara. In line with this, 
the entrance of the pedestrians wearing rural/traditional clothes to the 
Kizilay-Cankaya line of the boulevard was blocked by government officials as 
the New Town was protected from the visual and noise pollution (Senol-
Cantek, 2016, pp. 110-111). Senol-Cantek also mentions that with the Hat Law 
(1925), those whose appearance was not neat were not allowed to enter the 
boulevard of the New City (p. 147). The Mayor Nevzat Tandogan, who was in 
charge between 1929 and 1946, is famous for his authoritarian measures to 
promote the desired codes of conduct through declaring very detailed 
instructions about how to and not to behave in public places (Kocabaşoğlu, 
1990 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 52).   
The apparent absence of antagonism was, thus, based on the exclusion of class, 
ethnic and religious subjectivities from the normative construction of 
citizenship and its landscapes. The state citizenship agenda and the 
subsequent construction of a segregated capital city thus contrasted with the 
emancipation offered by the equality promised by formal citizenship.  
4.2. Formation of Spaces of Citizenship (1930s-2000s) 
Squatter houses were developed in Ankara in the 1920s by low-income groups, 
who were excluded from wider urban development plans. These rural 
migrants to the city came to work in the constructions and in the absence of 
housing supply constructed the first shanty houses on lands excluded from the 
city plans due to topographical disadvantages such as valleys and hills, yet 
close to the developed areas of the city (Senyapili, 1985, pp. 42-46 cited in 
Kaynar, 2016, p. 81). These were called gecekondu (literally meaning landed in 
one night/overnight), which fittingly describes the speed and stealth of the 
construction process (Tas and Lightfood, 2005, p. 4).  
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the founders 
immediately started to construct a modern capital city from scratch on the 
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lands of Ankara that had been neglected under the Ottoman rule. The primary 
concern of the urban plans was the needs of the middle- and high-income 
groups who migrated from big cities in the Western part of the country. The 
first squatter houses were made of old cheese and oil tins and where largely all 
demolished by the Government in 1933. The Ministry of Interior, on the other 
hand, called them ‘the third Ankara’ in a speech he made in 1934 about the 
implementation of their demolition (Senyapili, 1985, p. 57 cited in Kaynar, 
2016: 81).    
The decision to invade a vacant lot was often made after it had been surveyed 
in advance. Then, thousands of people moved onto the lot overnight, divided 
and named it. Then they began to build dwellings with the assistance of friends 
and relatives using paperboard, sheets of tin, planks of wood, and other useful 
makeshift materials. They erected the houses in a matter of hours. By morning, 
previously empty land appeared dotted with one room shacks. Later, if 
successfully defended against the police, the shacks may gradually have been 
expanded to become permanent houses by replacing the original construction 
materials with brick and cement (Karpat, 1976 cited in Tas and Lightfood, 
2005, p. 7). If, after many years, the owner of a shack received the legal title to 
the land, they often built a better house with a small garden and a variety of 
flowers, offering an appearance that is quite different than the slums in 
western cities (Tas and Lightfood, 2005, p. 7).          
In the post-WWII period, the mass introduction of machinery in agricultural 
sector due to the Marshall Aid4 from the US ‘pushed off’ the extra labour force, 
and as a consequence 1950-60 was the decade when migration to urban areas 
reached a peak (Şenyapılı, 2004, p. 3). An estimated three million people 
migrated to cities from rural areas in this period (İçduygu and Ünalan, 1998). 
The rural migrants, who were mostly young men, first built shanties in and 
around the city at geographically undesirable sites, preferably close to their 
jobs available to them.  
The presence of gecekondu neighbourhoods on urban space was tolerated as 
the duty-based citizenship agenda was becoming more flexible under the 
                                                          
4 The Marshall Plan was targeted to prevent the south-eastern Balkan countries such as Turkey 
and Greece from joining the communist bloc through a strategy of development. It was welcome 
by the Turkish authorities because with the limited sources taken over from the Ottoman 
Empire, the new Republic could not provide the support necessary to initiate changes in the 
cultivation and ownership patterns to rural areas.  
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populist urban policies of the right-wing Democratic Party. The rural migrants 
preferred pre-election times for constructing their gecekondu houses. The 
Democratic Party officials did not want to be embroiled in the controversy of 
confronting migrants, who would constitute an important source of votes as 
well as cheap and unorganised labour force during the import-substituting 
industrialisation period in the post-war era. de Albuquerque (2010, para. 23 
cited in Davy and Pellissery, 2013, p. 76) argues that people in slums know that 
they cannot assert their rights, since they live in an ‘illegal settlement’, and that 
this makes them reliant on the charity of the local authorities to tolerate their 
continued presence. In this regard, improvements to infrastructure in informal 
settlements frequently coincide with pre-election periods. Similarly, the 
occupation of vacant land and construction of gecekondu house in the cities in 
Turkey usually took place before the election times. As a result, the population 
living in the gecekondu houses — working in marginal jobs as porter, cleaner, 
shoe black and peddler in Ankara — was estimated to be close to 60,000 in 
1948 (Senyapili, 1985, pp. 81-83 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 83).   
      
The volume of rural migrants was so high and continuous that the native 
urbanites had to integrate with the newcomers, rather than the reverse. 
Gecekondu areas transferred ‘their rural ambiance to the cities by building 
structures resembling their previous dwellings in the villages’ (Özüekren, 
1997, p. 34 cited in Erisen, 2003, p. 87). On the other hand, the urbanised face 
of Ankara also transformed signiﬁcantly during the 1950s. Akcura (1971) 
explains the shift of the city core from the old centre Ulus to the New Town:   
In 1952, Kızılay, the central hub of New Town, was formally accepted as the 
Central Business District. Landowners were permitted to build apartment 
blocks along the boulevard, with shopping arcades on the ground and 
basement ﬂoors. Consistent with the conventional ‘international’ image of 
the CBD, the ﬁrst sky-scraper of Turkey was also built in Kızılay. Bank 
branches, upper-class hotels and restaurants, advertising, real estate, foreign 
and domestic travel agencies and insurance ofﬁces were opened. On the 
upper ﬂoors of apartment buildings, luxury services such as fashion houses, 
photographers, and hairdressers replaced residences (Akçura, 1971, p. 123 
cited in Batuman, 2013).  
The outcome was the consolidation of class-based segregation in Ankara from 
the 1950s onwards: The upper- and middle-income groups lived in the 
centrally built-up residential districts of multi-storey apartment buildings with 
better and legal infrastructure facilities, whereas the rural-based working 
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classes mostly lived in the single-storey gecekondu houses on the peripheries 
with inadequate infrastructure facilities and on the land they did not legally 
possess. In 1950, the population living in gecekondu neighbourhoods was 
about 100,000 whereas the number of the higher income groups living in the 
multi-storey apartment houses5 in the New Town was 45,395 (Yavuz, 1952, pp. 
72-73 cited in Kaynar, 2016, p. 84).   
Thus, in the 1950s the inadequate housing supply for the low-income citizens 
as well as the ambiguity of the citizenship status of the rural migrants due to 
the informality of their work and housing still persisted. To win their votes in 
election times, the state tried to outline its relationship with these rural 
migrant citizens through tolerance of informality and maintenance of rural 
culture in gecekondu neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the state tolerance of 
informality and maintenance of rural culture implicitly led the gecekondu 
dwellers to continue forming informal ways of social solidarity based on ethnic 
or religious identities, kinship and fellow citizenship while blocking their 
membership to modern citizenship (Dönmez, 2011, p. 7).   
On the other hand, simultaneity of tolerance of membership to local, identity-
based communities and promotion of formal, constitutional citizenship 
revealed the modernisation process in Turkey to be contradictory rather than 
linear. The contradictions between the promotion of formal membership to the 
nation-state and the localness of actually existing forms of membership 
persisted. Despite being formal members of the nation-state, the gecekondu 
communities were mobilised on the basis of locality or identity and maintained 
a strong sense of belonging to the village and to their ethnic and religious 
identity.    
I argue that by tolerating the maintenance of these informal and local networks 
instead of providing welfare services the potential of mobilisation of 
reflections and deliberations of the gecekondu settlers regarding the resolution 
of their access to the right to housing and infrastructure was mainstreamed. 
Within the same context, Karpat (1975) argues that the provision of informal 
housing and employment opportunities generated attribution of a positive 
meaning to clientelist relations and perception of the state by gecekondu 
                                                          
5 During the second period, the traditional fabric, which consisted of one-to-three-storey houses, 
was replaced by multi-storey apartment buildings that were owned jointly. Apartment living, 
praised as a prestigious type of accommodation, was preferred by prosperous dwellers and 
aspired by the lower-income groups (Erisen, 2003, p. 101). 
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dwellers as a ‘father’, who will protect them (pp. 93-94 cited in Muhurdaroglu, 
2005, p. 70).  
Within this context, although these communities struggled on a daily basis for 
the right to reside with dignity and security in the absence of welfare services, 
the gap between the fact that they are formal members of the state and that 
their right to dwelling was denied was not challenged. The state officials 
implicitly encouraged the rural migrants to resolve their housing problem in 
their own ways disregarding the societal disturbance led by the illegal 
presence of gecekondu settlers in the cities. Within this context, knowing that 
they owed their ‘illegal’ presence in the city to the state’s tolerance, the 
gecekondu dwellers responded to their acceptance in the labour market, to 
services received and to achievement of legality in space over time, by political 
support of the authorities. This, in turn, further mainstreamed their potential 
to ‘disturb the established practices and configurations of citizenship’, which 
James Holston (1998) called insurgent citizenship, up until 1970s during which 
the gecekondu settlements became a strategic centre for leftist political 
activism.    
The contradiction between formal and substantive citizenship consolidated 
after the commencement of multi-party regime in 1946. The slow transition to 
a multi-party regime from the 1930s onwards provoked insecurity about the 
presence of oppositional political thought within the context of the enduring 
suspicion towards citizen participation. As a solution, the emphasis on 
citizenship was replaced with that on the nation state. Üstel (2014, p. 247) 
explores the 1948 Primary School Syllabus, which was used until 1968, arguing 
that this school program defined the nation, not the citizen, as the holder of the 
rights, and this prevented the individual from emerging as the main actor of 
democracy.  
However, this did not prevent citizens from engaging in politics. Polarisation 
between the opposition Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Party 
increased political censorship. The intensification of economic problems in the 
late 1950s led to mass demonstrations, which turned into violent 
confrontations between the government, the army and the public. In May 1960, 
the bureaucrats and army leaders, representing the industrial capitalists and 
secular, Republican values, who felt threatened by the petty bourgeoisie 
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gaining power due to Democratic Party’s economic policies, conducted a 
military coup.   
The subsequent 1961 Constitution prepared by the junta differed from its 
predecessor 1924 Constitution in the sense of granting extensive rights to civil 
society, and made possible political association around ideologies (Erman, 
2001, pp. 985-986). It attempted to bring the citizen back into the state 
citizenship agenda. ‘Each person who is tied to the Turkish state with the bond 
of citizenship’ was defined as citizen and the references to language, ethnicity, 
and religion — which were suppressed by the Republican promotion of the 
citizenry as a homogenous mass — were omitted. The 1968 Primary School 
Syllabus, within this framework, reflected an attempt to develop a rights-based 
understanding of citizenship with its universal dimensions (Üstel, 2014, p. 
254). The 1969 Secondary School Syllabus also promoted political awareness of 
national and universal problems, and thus, turned towards creating 
‘enlightened citizens’ (p. 262), with the capability to live and work together, 
respect the concept of rights, and at the same time apprehend their duties as 
citizen, and comply with the laws (p. 263). Özyürek (2002, p. 20) argues that 
the coup also ensured the already existing idea that only the state was 
responsible for bringing progress and modernisation to the country. This 
implicitly reproduced the long-lasting suspicion towards the political 
participation of citizens.     
In the mid-1960s onwards, the spontaneous processes of housing production 
that is the construction of apartments by small contractors and informal 
gecekondus, were regulated by the state (Tekeli, 1993, pp. 6-7 cited in 
Batuman, 2013, p. 586). The 1965 Flat Ownership Act enabled multiple 
households to own apartment flats in a multi-storey building. This law enabled 
the urban middle classes to become home owners in the inner city areas where 
the land prices were very high. The following year, the Gecekondu Law (Law 
No. 775) was enacted with the purpose of spatially organising the gecekondu 
houses in contrast to the vote-seeking approach of the preceding governments.  
The solution it brought was threefold: to improve those gecekondu settlements 
which were considered to be in relatively good condition (that is to bring 
infrastructure and services to these settlements), to demolish those which 
were not, and to prevent further gecekondu formation. Displaced residents 
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were to be relocated in social housing, which was to be constructed through 
expropriation of public land by the municipalities. However, in practice, 
demolition and prevention of further construction was limited. While the 
number of gecekondu houses in Ankara was estimated at 70,000 in 1960, the 
number reached 240,000 in 1980, and the gecekondu population rose from 
250,000 to 5,750,000 between 1955 and 1980. These numbers corresponded 
respectively to 4.7 % and 26.1 % of the urban population nationally (Batuman, 
2013, p. 586).  
Senyapili (2004) explains the legal recognition of the presence of gecekondu 
with the transformation to import substituting industrialisation model with a 
planned economy and an internal market protected by the government in the 
1960s. She argues that this brought a new economic function to the gecekondu 
population as consumers in the domestic market at a moment when the 
national private sector (producing especially white goods) needed consumers 
in order to survive. The gecekondu population now obtained permanency both 
in economic and physical urban spaces (p. 7). What is more, by bargaining with 
local authorities for infrastructure and services and contributing with their 
collective labour, gecekondu residents were able to obtain roads, electricity 
and running water in their homes, albeit at a much lower quality than in the 
formal apartment buildings in the city (Erman, 2012, p. 296). As a result, many 
better-off gecekondu settlements turned into established low-density 
residential neighbourhoods while new gecekondu houses were constructed 
with expectations of amnesty laws in the future.    
On the other hand, gecekondu people and neighbourhoods were culturally 
stigmatised by the urban elites living in the higher-rise, formal apartment 
buildings. The presence of the rural masses in the cities was initially tolerated 
with the expectation that they would become modernised and urbanised over 
time as they became accustomed to city culture. With the impact of the 
dominance of the modernist ideal of a single and linear progress, the 
gecekondu people were looked down upon as the ‘rural/uncivilised other’ and 
portrayed as ‘ignorant, culturally backward, and lacking manners’ by the urban 
elites throughout the 1950s (Erman, 2001, p. 991). Analysing the changing 
representations of the gecekondu people in mainstream newspapers and 
academic works, Erman (2001) argues that:        
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In their imagination, the peasants were not only ruralising the city and 
undermining the urban and modern way of life, but, by means of the 
gecekondus mushrooming on the city’s outskirts, they were also disturbing 
the dream of planned cities as beacons of modernity (p. 299).  
As they were violating private property rights — defined as a cornerstone of 
Western democracies — they were seen as enemies of law and order (Erman, 
2012, p. 299).     
In the 1960s and 1970s, the negative reaction and arrogance of the urban elites 
to the gecekondu phenomenon persisted although in some cases softened 
under the influence of Marxism as well as within the context of the promotion 
of ‘enlightened’ citizens. Throughout these two decades, the society became 
more inclined to participate in the political decision-making processes in 
Turkey due to the comparatively liberating characteristic of the 1961 
Constitution. As a result, the rural migrants started to be seen as humble 
people from Anatolia exploited by the system that is the ‘disadvantaged other’ 
(Erman, 2001, p. 987) which acknowledged the underlying socio-economic 
processes behind the rural-to-urban migration rather than the migrants 
themselves.        
In the 1970s, however, gecekondu houses grew in number and changed 
character. The existing gecekondu settlements turned into established low-
density residential neighbourhoods with municipal services and the number of 
gecekondu settlements continued to increase due to the ineffectiveness of 
rehabilitation attempts. People started to construct additional floors to their 
gecekondus, and as it started to be sold and bought in the housing market, 
gecekondu houses started to be a source of rent. The public land stock had 
already shrunk since the 1950s, and it became impossible for newcomer 
migrants to invade public land and build their own gecekondu. Therefore, some 
of them became tenants of the existing gecekondu owners, who had 
constructed second/third gecekondu in order to get rental income. The 
tolerance of the political authorities towards this subletting further 
encouraged the commercialisation of gecekondu housing. On the other hand, 
the legal status of the gecekondu house remained ambiguous, which continued 
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In contrast to commercialisation, the gecekondu neighbourhoods also became 
part of the political polarisation in the country in the 1970s. They became the 
'rescued regions’ of radical leftist activists, who were organised mainly among 
the workers in the gecekondu neighbourhoods and students in the universities 
(Erman, 2001, p. 986) using their strong social networks in labour unions. Due 
to the loose control of public land by the state at the time, socialist groups 
became important actors in appropriation of the land, planning process, 
construction and distribution of the gecekondus, as well as prevention of 
development of private property culture (Şen, 2013, pp. 5-6).  
These activists also constituted a counter-force against land brokers and 
speculators, with whom they clashed, took the land by force and distributed it 
to the rural migrants. The speculators were informal yet organised interest 
groups in the gecekondu market who enclosed peripheral land and parcelled it 
into plots to sell even placing ads in newspapers to reach prospective 
gecekondu owners (Payne, 1982 cited in Erman, 2001). Şen (2013, p. 6) argues 
that the gecekondu houses were the only economic gain these groups could 
attain in the absence of social housing. The activists resided in those same 
neighbourhoods protecting them against the police (demolition) as well as 
fighting against right-wing extremists in street battles.   
Within the same context, following the 1973 local elections, 5 mayors of big 
cities including Istanbul and Ankara, who were members of the mainstream 
Republican People’s Party, initiated ‘municipal socialism’. Vedat Dalokay, the 
Ankara mayor, started to discuss the gecekondu phenomenon with references 
to class problems at the time, challenging the long-standing exclusion of class-
based political struggle, which had been considered harmful to national 
integrity. A leftist municipal program was developed, which advocated 
working class participation in decision-making processes and introduced 
measures reducing the cost of reproduction of urban labour power (Batuman, 
2013, p. 584). Principles of productive, autonomous and active municipality 
were adopted. As part of this, the municipalities initiated the establishment of 
housing cooperatives among labour unions and professional associations, and 
expropriated urban lands to transfer to the cooperatives for the construction 
of houses (Karasu, 2009, p. 251).    
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This alarmed the central state and at the same times as leftist agendas 
developed in particular places, the allegiant citizenship agenda regained 
prominence at national level. The military intervention in 1971 tried to 
suppress the accelerating political activism and widening legitimacy of 
constitutional citizenship through abolishing labour unions, imprisoning 
intellectuals such as writers and journalists as well as radical activists from 
revolutionary organisations.  
In line with this, the 1973 Law on National Education reversed the preceding 
goal of the state to train enlightened, politically conscious, and active citizens, 
and re-emphasised the national unity vis-à-vis emphases on universal 
humanitarian values and the ideal of solidarity (Ustel, 2014, pp. 264-265). The 
consolidation of the polarisation of the society between radical right- and left-
wing activism, weak coalition governments and political instability in addition 
to the economic deterioration following the oil crises came to an end with a 
military coup in 1980. The 1982 Constitution was prepared and put into 
practice by the junta. The Junta then dissolved in 1983.          
During this period, Üstel (2014) argues that ‘state-of-emergency patriotism’ (p. 
308) was introduced against the radical alien ideologies like socialism. The 
1982 Constitution restricted the rights of individual-citizens and put more 
emphasis on the duties toward the state. The books of Information on 
Citizenship in post-1985 involve increased emphases on national unity, 
defined with respect to common language, religion (Sunni Islam) and ethnic 
identity (Turkish), and lesser emphasis on constitutional citizenship. With this, 
individuals and groups from multiple identities and class backgrounds were 
subjected to the homogenous community’ and expected to conform to the state 
authority rather than becoming subjects (p. 293). The earlier emphases on 
multi-party system as a necessity of democracy were withdrawn as 
representations of alternative political thoughts became associated with the 
idea of internal and external threats to state security (pp. 298-299).   
It was within the context of the martial law in the 1980s, which secured a 
social and political atmosphere free from opposition, a neoliberal economic 
programme was introduced and it was sustained by the succeeding civil 
authorities. A consumerist, individualistic culture was being promoted by the 
printed and visual media as a virtue, while the demands for political activism 
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were strictly controlled by suppressing particularly leftist activists through 
imprisonment, torture, and exile (Gürbilek, 2011, p. 13). According to the 
report of Human Rights Association in Turkey, 650,000 people were taken 
under custody and tortured for as long as 90-day periods; 171 people were 
documented to have died because of torture; 49 people were executed; police 
opened a file on 1,683,000 people for being communist, Alevi, Kurdish, 
religionist or follower of sharia; 98,404 people were judged because of ‘being a 
member of political organisations’, and 14,000 people were deprived of 
citizenship. 39 tons of newspapers were destroyed, 300 journalists were 
attacked; and 3,854 teachers, 120 academicians and 47 court judges were 
dismissed (HRA 12 September Criminal Complaint, pp. 1-2).  
In the absence of social and political opposition, development programs 
targeting infrastructure of telecommunications, motorway and airports in 
order to attract foreign capital into the domestic market and by this way be 
attached to the global economy were initiated. Importantly, then, neoliberalism 
from the outset emerged in the context of authoritarian rule – which as we 
shall see marks a significant difference from the emergence of, for example, 
Reaganite or Thatcherite forms of neoliberal reform in the same period in the 
US and Europe.  
The attempts to develop a fully liberal market economy shook society deeply, 
increasing migration to large cities, unemployment rates and hence social 
discontent. While  54.7% of Ankara’s population still lived in gecekondu 
settlements in 1985 (Uzun, 2005, p. 186), industry gradually left the urban 
core throughout the 1980s and large-scale factories around the gecekondu 
districts moved to peripheral areas (Keyder and Öncü, 1993; Erkip, 2000; 
Keyder, 2005 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 582), and employment opportunities 
of the previous period decreased. Increasing layoffs in the private sector and 
the shrinking of the public sector led to high unemployment rates and acute 
poverty among the low-income population (Erman, 2001, p. 987).    
In the 1980s, the local governments and the modes of the production of urban 
space were also reorganised, which led to what Batuman calls the 
‘neoliberalisation of the urban realm’ (2013, p. 584). With the 1984 
Metropolitan Act, a two-tier metropolitan system was developed by formation 
of the Greater City Municipality and district municipalities (Dündar, 1997; 
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Leitmann and Baharoglu, 1999 cited in Türker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 214). Greater 
Municipalities were granted extended revenues as well as planning powers 
within metropolitan areas that included a number of district municipalities.  
Contrary to the legacy of ‘productive municipality’ of the social democrat 
experiments of the 1970s, the municipalities now emphasised ‘distribution’ of 
municipal services to the ‘consumers’ who would have to pay for that service 
rather than ‘citizens’ who demand municipal services (Karasu, 2009, p. 253). 
Accordingly, municipal services such as garbage removal, street cleaning, 
maintenance of parks and public spaces, and so on were privatised; municipal 
funds were allocated to private investors via outsourcing while unprecedented 
amounts of loans from national and foreign institutions were used (Dogan, 
2008, pp. 72–73 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 584).     
Gecekondu neighbourhoods became one of the focal points in terms of 
neoliberalisation of the urban regime. The right-wing Motherland Party 
government enacted a series of amnesty laws between the years 1983 and 
1987, which allowed the construction of apartment buildings of up to four-
storeys on gecekondu land. The gecekondu dwellers were made rights-holders 
of the area that would be redeveloped by improvement plans (Türker-
Devecigil, 2005, p. 215). This legalised the commercialisation of gecekondu 
house as the gecekondu residents in advantageous locations that were 
profitable for the developers, had an opportunity to make economic gains. 
Erman (2001) interprets the promotion of making of easy money out of 
gecekondu houses as the government bribing the most suffering people to keep 
them from political activism against the state — by giving them the hope of 
becoming rich (pp. 986-987). The goal was to diminish the potential of radical 
activism due to increasing impoverishment by making the gecekondu people 
part of the rent-sharing process and cultivating the habit of treating their 
homes as investments.       
Reduced mobility in the labour market, increase in family incomes through 
more family members entering the labour market and through benefits 
acquired by the family during the time spent in the city coupled with the rent-
acquisition opportunity provided with amnesty laws (Senyapili, 2004, p. 11). 
As a result, in 1984 around 1.5 - 2 million people applied to benefit from the 
amnesty laws. Once owner-occupied and/or owner-built gecekondu houses 
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were transformed into 4/5-storey apartment buildings in which the owner of 
the gecekondu land owned several apartment flats. This led to the rapid 
erosion of the notion of ‘innocent gecekondu people’ within the context of the 
‘state-of-emergency-patriotism’. The popular image shifted to the ‘undeserving 
rich other’ (Erman, 2012, p. 300), which refers to the ‘illegal’ wealth obtained 
when the illegal gecekondus were transformed into multi-layered apartment 
buildings.  
Only the gecekondu houses that had location advantages and were attractive to 
private developers were transformed into apartment buildings yet people 
continued to construct new gecekondu houses with an expectation of upcoming 
amnesty laws (Köktürk, 2003 in Uzun, Cete and Palancioglu, 2010, pp. 205-
206). Thus, individual expectation of rental gains impeded the formation of 
collective rights-based claims for both affordable housing and wider public 
infrastructure and services. The potential of developing class-consciousness, 
social solidarity and/or organising collective claims to equal citizenship was 
thus fatally undermined.  
While some gecekondu dwellers became better-off, a new factor was added to 
the impoverishment conditions of the newcomer migrants in the mid-1980s 
onwards when the Kurdish6 population in the south eastern region was forced 
to leave their villages and migrate due to rising terrorism within the context of 
the civil war between the army and the Kurdish guerrilla forces, which fought 
for independence. Some of these migrant groups, who now had no support 
from the rural area and who have had no chance for making material and 
psychological preparations prior to migration, settled in abandoned buildings 
in or around commercial centres, creating transition areas in desolate 
condition, or entered peripheral, untransformed gecekondu housing areas, 
mostly as tenants (Şenyapılı, 2004, pp. 11-12).   
In addition, the rise of Islamism as a political force in Turkey from the 1990s 
onwards further stigmatised the Alevi7 migrants living in the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods. This rise was not only tolerated by the state as an antidote to 
inheritance of the leftist activism but also supported by the state’s increasing 
emphasis on its Turkish–Sunni character. Batuman (2013) argues that the 
                                                          
6 Kurdish people are the biggest ethnic minority group in Turkey.  
7 Alevi people are the main minority group in Islam in Turkey.   
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development of political Islam had important consequences in terms of the 
welfare system in Turkey saying that:  
In the early 1990s, the neoliberal restructuring characterised by 
privatisations, the precarisation of labour, as well as the chronically high 
level of inflation all resulted in increasing impoverishment, especially in the 
big cities. While mainstream political parties remained impervious to urban 
poverty, the Islamist cadres actively worked within the squatter areas and 
established a network of aid and solidarity in the early 1990s (Tugal, 2006; 
White, 2003). While this strategy allowed them to gain control of local 
administrations in the major cities, they utilised this power to further 
improve their aid network as an original ‘‘welfare system’’ in the second 
phase (1994–2002). Municipalities under the Welfare Party began to 
systematically distribute coal, food, bread and clothing to low-income 
households during the 1990s. Especially in the early years, the economy 
created by these aids was disorganised and shady. The control of aid 
distribution was handled together with Islamist associations and through the 
municipalities’ charity funds, which blurred the flow of municipal funds and 
obscured their monitoring (Batuman, 2013, p. 585).       
The social aids were meaningful within the context of the progress of 
neoliberal urbanisation, as throughout the 1990s industrial production was 
transferred to the new industrial zones on the periphery.8 Simultaneously, a 
process of ‘suburban sprawl along the Western axis’ (Batuman, 2013, p. 582) 
was taking place. According to the plan proposed in 1965 by the Ankara Master 
Plan Bureau, the city started to develop to the west, which was the only 
direction where the city fringe was not surrounded with gecekondu areas 
(Batuman, 2013, p. 581) (See figure 7). Based on the Bureau’s proposal, the 
authorities initiated the suburban sprawl along the Western axis and the 
moving of industry out of the city centre during the 1970s. Low-income 
housing was targeted to be built through public investments in the northwest, 
while private sector middle-class housing projects were encouraged in the 
southwest throughout the 1980s (Batuman, 2013, p. 582).        
                                                          
8 While 86 % of industrial businesses were within a 10 km. radius in 1988, by 2007 only 17 % 
were within the 6 km. radius in Ankara. Between 1988 and 2007, 58 % of the industrial 
workforce moved out of the centre to peripheral residential areas (Bostan, Erdoganaras and 
Tamer, 2010, pp. 88–89 cited in Batuman, 2013, p. 582). 
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Figure 7: The expansion of Ankara and the growth of gecekondu areas. The red 
boundaries show the limits of the Jansen plan, which was approved in 1932. The dark 
areas display the gecekondu areas in 1965 and the light shaded ones show their extent in 
1990 (Source: Batuman, 2013: 582).  
From the 1980s onwards, the middle and high-income groups, who were now 
in the process of integrating into the global economy, left the core and started 
to move to the gated residential places in the suburbs that were promoted as 
the ‘ideal home’ now (Erman, 2001). The tendency of spatial segregation also 
resulted from the fact that the rural migrants were able to make themselves 
visible in cultural production (arabesk music9) and became better-off as a 
result of amnesty laws, which made them right holder on urban land. The 
gecekondu residents, who had experienced rapid upward mobility, came to be 
seen by the urban elites as a ‘cultural problem’, polluting the city with their 
‘tasteless over-consumption’ (Oncu, 1999 cited in Erman, 2012, p. 300).  
These reveal that while the material boundaries between the places resided by 
more affluent groups and the squatter communities were changing, the former 
actively invested in cultural binaries between modern/’varosh’ which, in turn, 
became ‘instruments of domination’ (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 79) that ‘legitimised’ 
their ‘propriety’ to live in the city and the ‘impropriety’ of the gecekondu 
settlers who lacked urban values. Moreover, the increasing emphasis on 
                                                          
9 Arabesk is the name of the specific music type born out of gecekondu settlements that 
expressed the pain of disappointment and pessimism in view of harsh and cruel aspects of urban 
life (Senyapili, 2004, p. 10).  
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deservingness through fulfilling citizen duties set the ground for more 
exclusionary images that would follow. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, the gecekondu people started to be represented 
as ‘varosh’ (the dangerous other) in the mainstream newspapers. Following 
the 1 May (May Day) demonstrations in 1996, the term ‘varosh’ was first used 
in the mainstream newspapers and TV news. In the demonstrations, two young 
adults were killed even before the march started, and radical leftist groups 
engaged in vandalism, destroying buildings and cars. The mainstream 
newspapers focused not on the bloody violence or very high level of 
participation to the demonstrations but on two ‘varosh’ girls who were 
inappropriately plucking ‘municipal’ flowers in the square – revealing their 
incivility, as well as on the protestors’ attacks on ATMs. The following day, one 
of the headlines in a mainstream newspaper was ‘Varoshes came down to the 
city’.  
 
The term ‘varosh’ is Hungarian in origin and denotes the neighbourhoods 
outside the city walls (Erman, 2001, p. 996). It represented the low-income 
people living in the outskirts of the cities as unruly masses threatening the city 
with their radically different political views, conflicting social values and 
‘inferior’ culture (or ‘lack of culture’) and confronting it with vandalism and 
violence. Unlike its predecessor, the gecekondu people, ’varosh’ implies an 
inability to modernise or indeed urbanise (Akçay, 2005 cited in Yonucu, 2008, 
p. 57). A particular culture productive of ‘degeneracy’ and ‘criminality’ became 
associated with the gecekondu neighbourhoods (Yonucu and Gonen, 2011, p. 
87).  
In line with such criminalisation the state citizenship agenda also gained a 
stronger emphasis on internal threats referring particularly to leftist activism. 
In the late 1990s, Turkey was pulled in two contradictory directions by the 
attempts to develop human rights education due to the criteria of EU 
membership on the one hand and the embedded state-centrism, which viewed 
the former with scepticism, on the other. The emphasis on state security and 
national unity consolidated what Üstel (2014) calls ‘national security 
patriotism’ (p. 309). In the 1990s, Education on National Security chapter was 
added to outline of the Information on Citizenship and Human Rights course at 
secondary schools. There, the state authorities introduced a de-politicised 
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conceptualisation of the problem of protection of human rights emphasising 
the malpractice and intolerance of the individuals holding a public office like 
policemen rather than the state’s responsibility to protect the rights of 
minority groups, and promote equality (pp. 310-314).   
The state also denied its responsibility in terms of provision of the housing 
right and maintained the social-aid based ‘municipal welfare system’ in the 
1990s (Batuman, 2013, p. 585). This consolidated the contract between the 
state authorities and the gecekondu people based on the latter’s political 
support in return for the former’s tolerance, and further marginalised the 
rights-based claims. On the other hand, middle- and high-income groups also 
released themselves from any responsibility for the deteriorating situation of 
the gecekondu population as ‘varosh’ legitimised and supported politically the 
objective of gecekondu demolition (Etöz, 1999 cited in Erman, 2001, p. 997).  
These symbolic struggles, thus, prepared the ground for the country-wide 
neoliberal urban transformation campaign based on zero gecekondu policy 
(Erman, 2012). From 2004 onwards, it has been implemented without much 
effective resistance — except for those led by the groups directly targeted. One 
of the most effective resistance movements was mobilised in Dikmen Valley, 
which will be analysed in the next part. 
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4.3. The Story of Dikmen Valley (1960s-2000s)        
 
Figure 8: The location of Dikmen District in Ankara (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006, p. 
169). 
This study focuses on the gentrification project in Dikmen Valley area. The 
Dikmen district is one of the oldest rural migrant settlements in Ankara (See 
Figure 8). Dikmen Valley is located between two densely populated housing 
quarters, Cankaya and Dikmen, which are in Ankara’s southern urban 
development zones. Cankaya has been the most prestigious district of Ankara 
(See Figure 9), with the foreign embassies, universities, cultural centres and 
shopping malls, and an upper middle- and upper-income urban population and 
the Presidential House10, the residence and office of the Prime Minister, the 
Supreme Court. The National Assembly Palace is also situated at 800 m 
distance from the gecekondu houses. The area stretches south along bottom of 
the valley for approximately 6 km and has a width of 300 m. It starts almost 
from the city centre, Kızılay, and reaches the forested areas in the south (See 
Figure 10).  
                                                          
10 It has not been occupied by the President since the construction of the new White Palace for 
R. T. Erdogan in 2014. Yet, Cankaya as a whole is the oldest among the recently emerging 
prestigious districts of Ankara.   
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Figure 9: The Cankaya District. 
 
Figure 10: The location of Dikmen Valley within Cankaya District. 
The valley has been designated as a natural conservation area in all urban 
development plans because it is one of the most important air circulation 
corridors and the water basins of Ankara. The gecekondu development process 
in the valley started after the 1960s with the rural to urban migration. The 
migrants came from smaller towns close to Ankara such as Tokat, Yozgat, 
Corum, and Sivas. Once the first comer migrants settled in they brought their 
families and sometimes relatives and neighbours. By the 1980s, the number of 
gecekondu houses had risen to about 4,000 in the project area (Gunay, 1994 
cited in Uzun, 2005, p. 187) (See Figure 11). Before the gentrification process, 
approximately 10,000 people lived in 2,000 gecekondu dwellings (Egercioglu 
and Özdemir, 2006, p. 8).   
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Figure 11: The one-storey gecekondu houses surrounded by higher-rise traditional 
apartment buildings in both sides of the Dikmen Valley before the implementation of the 
first phase of the project (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006). 
The process of transformation of the gecekondu houses in Dikmen Valley 
started in the early 1980s. Most of the gecekondu owners in Turkey had been 
given temporary title-deeds, and then provided with right-holder status by the 
Redevelopment Law, which was enacted in 1984. Because of the central 
location of Dikmen Valley in Ankara, land speculation was also leading to 
opportunities for higher rent. Thus, some of the gecekondu owners sold their 
gecekondu houses and lands to developers, and were given flats from the 
newly built four/five-storey apartments in exchange.  
The increase in the rent gap alarmed also the municipality and in 1984, the 
Greater Municipality of Ankara introduced the Dikmen Valley Green Area 
Project. The project aimed to relocate the gecekondu owners to another part of 
the city and transform the valley into an urban park to preserve it as a green 
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area. The expropriation decision was taken but it could not be implemented 
because of high expropriation costs and oppositions of the gecekondu 
inhabitants, who individually took the project to court (Turker-Devecigil, 2006, 
p. 169).  
In 1986, Cankaya District Municipality together with the greater municipality 
revised the project, and the new version known as the Dikmen Valley Housing 
and Environmental Development Project was approved in 1989 (Ciftci and 
Karakayaci, 2002 cited in Uzun, 2003, pp. 187-188). It was one of the largest-
scale gecekondu transformation projects in Turkey, designed to be 
implemented in five phases (See figure 12).  
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Figure 12: The implementation phases of Dikmen Valley Project (Source: Turker-
Devecigil, 2005). 
In contrast to the decentralisation attempts in advanced capitalist countries, in 
Turkey public actors at local and national level started to become actively 
involved in the neoliberal urbanisation processes from the late 1980s onwards 
to control redistribution of the urban rents created. Thus, local governments 
maintained their role as ‘administrative tools to execute the duties of the 
central government’ (Heper, 1988 cited in Göymen, 2007, p. 246). So, one of 
their primary roles within the context of the changing urban governance in the 
1980s onwards was to control the redistribution of rental gains. 
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Nevertheless, the profit-seeking motives of the local state were not manifest, 
initially. A major objective of the project was to transform the valley into a 
recreation area serving the whole city while helping preserve the nature it 
enclosed as well as to create a commercial, cultural, and social urban node that 
would integrate with and serve the whole city. The project also addressed the 
housing problem of the gecekondu dwellers in the area with a relocation model 
based on self-financing and participation (Uzun, 2005, p. 188).  
Along with the apartment buildings constructed for the gecekondu residents, 
luxury housing for high-income groups and cultural and commercial facilities 
were also constructed in the area, to provide the necessary financial resources 
for the project (see figure 13). A significant proportion of the total project cost 
was financed by the marketing of the apartments located in luxurious 
residential towers in the project area (Turker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 218).     
 
Figure 13: The apartment houses constructed for the former gecekondu dwellers (above) 
and higher income groups (below) in the first phase of Dikmen Valley Housing and 
Environmental Project. (Source: Uzun, 2003). 
As the project started, the representatives of the project management company 
(Metropol Imar) and the municipality organised face-to-face meetings with the 
right-holder gecekondu dwellers in order to ‘inform’ them about the project. 
They tried to reach a consensus about their rights and expropriation costs. 
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Apart from representatives from the local state and ministries, academics, 
members of chambers, and housing cooperatives, in which gecekondu dwellers 
were represented, were present in the meetings. The target of the greater 
municipality, which was the main decision-maker, was to convince the 
gecekondu dwellers to support the project as their opposition had stopped the 
implementation of the earlier version of the project.   
Turker-Devecigil (2006) explores the Dikmen Valley Project focusing on the 
participation mechanism it engaged. She writes that: 
As stated by the project designers, the media for communication and 
participation was provided, but the participants were not interested in 
project details since they were concerned with increasing their economic 
gains. The negotiations took place around who would get what, revolving 
around the floor space of the flat, the number of rooms. As stated by the 
participants, they were always informed about the project, but they did not 
take part in decision-making. According to their perception, their demands 
were not taken into account. Some of the interviewees stated that they were 
afraid of voicing their needs (pp. 176-177).  
How the participation principle was implemented represents the ‘top-down, 
hierarchical, and expert-driven structure of the urban decision-making process 
in Turkey in which citizen participation is allowed after the plans are prepared’ 
(Gunay, 1992 cited in Turker-Devecigil, 2006, p. 172). The lack of collective 
organisation among gecekondu dwellers independent of the state-led 
cooperatives, alongside their hesitance to voice their demands reveals the 
absence of a sense of citizenship that includes making rights-based claims.    
The earlier project aimed to provide integration between the upper-income 
groups in the west (in Hosdere district) and lower-income groups in the east 
(Dikmen district), which were physically separated by geography of the 
Dikmen Valley. A ‘Culture Bridge’ (see figure 14) was proposed as a structure 
that would enable cultural and shopping activities, and designed as a public 
space where people could meet and mingle. This bridge was planned as a two-
story bridge, which would connect the sides of the valley for pedestrians; 
lower floor was planned to have social and commercial facilities such as a 
cinema, retailers, cafes etc., while the upper floor would be a pedestrian walk 
that connects two sides of the Valley (Eren, 2016, p . 67). Similarly, ‘Culture 
Park’ (See Figure 15), located at the valley bottom, was composed of open 
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green areas integrated with some social, cultural, recreational and sports 
facilities (Türker-Devecigil, 2005, p. 219).   
 
Figure 14: The Culture Bridge and the twin towers (Source: Malusardi and Occhipinti, 
2003). 
 
Figure 15: A photo of the Dikmen Valley in 2003: the culture park surrounded by the 
social apartment blocks constructed for the former gecekondu owners and higher rise 
blocks for higher-income groups (Source: Turker-Devecigil, 2006). 
However, in 1994, the social democrat mayor Murat Karayalcin was replaced 
by the right-wing Islamist Melih Gokcek in the local elections. The initial goal of 
integrating the gecekondu people into the urban community transformed 
following the elections. Instead of a ‘Culture Bridge’, a new bridge between the 
different blocks of the Park Valley Gated Houses was constructed (See Figure 
16). It connected the affluent residents living in the prestigious Park Valley 
Terrace Houses to the rest of the valley. Far from connecting people from 
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different socio-economic groups, this new bridge highlighted the privilege of 
the affluent groups in the prestigious houses.       
The second phase was approved in 1992 and completed in 2003 and the model 
for the transformation of gecekondu houses to modern apartments in that 
phase was the same. However, the project had lost its economic feasibility 
during the implementation of the first phase because the gecekondu settlers 
individually took the municipality to the court, and as they won the case, the 
expropriation values were increased. In order to increase the revenues of the 
project, land earmarked for municipal services such as parks was re-
designated as residential land and construction density increased. As a result, 
while the total population in the project area was 9,809 in 1996, it increased by 
183.5% after the completion of the project’s first and second implementation 
zones (Dundar, 2003 cited in Kahraman, 2008, p. 115).      
 
Figure 16: The Bridge connecting the Park Valley Terrace Houses (on the right) and Park 
Valley Apartments (higher blocks on the left behind the leafage). (Photo: Author, 
18.06.2014). 
As a result of construction of more luxurious residential buildings, real estate 
values in the area increased considerably. This led to the displacement of the 
gecekondu dwellers. In 2002, the title holder gecekondu dwellers constituted 
only 38% of the apartment residents in the DVP area as most of them sold or 
rented their house, and moved to other neighbourhoods where land prices 
were lower and low-income groups lived (Turker-Devecigil, 2003 cited in 
Uzun, 2005, pp. 189-190).    
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At the same time as the phases in the northern part of the project area were 
redeveloped, construction of gecekondu houses continued in the southern 
parts of the valley. The total numbers of gecekondu houses in the fourth and 
fifth phases increased from 515 in 1993 to 1,119 in 2001 (Muhurdaroglu, 
2005, p. 109). The redevelopment project in fourth and fifth phases of Dikmen 
Valley was announced unilaterally in 2006 by the greater municipality. The 
gecekondu dwellers holding title deeds were offered to be relocated in the 
valley whereas those lacking title deeds were offered to be relocated to 
Doğukent, which was an empty zone located at 4.5 km away from the valley, 
and asked to pay 16,000 TL (approximately 7,000 sterling pounds) in advance.      
The gecekondu dwellers from the latter group were not willing to be resettled 
away from the valley. On the other hand, the dwellers lacking title deeds were 
suspicious about political activism against the state within the context of the 
historical context referred above. Nevertheless, differing from the earlier 
phases of the project, a leftist organisation, the People’s Houses11 (hereafter 
PH) was politically active and organised in the adjacent Ilker neighbourhood.12 
A few household came forward and contacted with the PH to be informed 
about gentrification. Gradually, the gecekondu people started to come together 
to discuss what the project brought for their neighbourhood and what they 
could do about it. Under the active role of the PH, activist gecekondu people 
also undertook home visits, to explain to people why they should not sign the 
contracts, and encouraging them to support the resistance so that they could 
more effectively demand fairer conditions of replacement.          
As will be examined in detail in Chapter 7, it was not a smooth process of 
mobilisation. Local communities within the gecekondu neighbourhood were 
divided according to ethnicity, religion, hometown origins and political views. 
Nevertheless, the threat posed by state-led gentrification was so severe that 
the gecekondu people — most of whom did not hold legal title deeds — were 
mobilised on the basis of the right to shelter. This movement has become a 
leading example of effective mobilisation of legally vulnerable gecekondu 
                                                          
11 It is a radical leftist civil society organisation, whose activism particularly concentrates on 
struggles for the right to housing, education, and health.   
12 It used to be a gecekondu area as well, and the gecekondu houses were transformed into two- 
or four-storey apartment buildings with partial first-floor commercial uses by market-led 
rehabilitation plans prepared by the Cankaya district municipality and implemented by small-
scale constructors before the Dikmen Valley Project. 
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dwellers as they succeeded in altering the terms of their inclusion in the 
process.     
Conclusion    
This chapter made a reading of the formation of the spaces of citizenship in 
Turkey in relation to the changes in the state citizenship agendas. The 
discussions in this chapter demonstrated that the normative construction of 
citizenship had been central in terms of refashioning class inequalities 
throughout the urbanisation process in Turkey. In connecting the political 
processes and agendas to urbanisation processes in Turkey, this chapter 
demonstrated that class cannot be analysed as an abstract relationship 
between capital and labour, in agreement with the cultural analyses of 
gentrification. Nevertheless, through attending to the symbolic struggles over 
‘who can properly live in the city’ alongside the material processes of 
appropriation of urban lands, the chapter also revealed that class conflict 
operates in symbolic — as well as economic – terms and that these are not 
limited to individualised practices of reconstituting middle class distinction, as 
they ‘legitimised’ material inequalities and thus created political effects.     
Drawing on secondary sources on the formation of the state citizenship 
agenda, I explored the dynamic processes through which citizenship was 
officially configured in Turkey as a status bestowed by the state and how these 
impacted on the urbanisation processes. I argued that with a duty-based, 
passive configuration of citizenship and emphasis on preservation of the 
bestowed citizen rights rather than nurturing or actually using them, political 
participation was rendered unnecessary and the potential to transform the 
insurgent practices of avoiding the state authority in the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods into collective rights-based claims and struggle has become 
captivated.  
Within this context, the fact that socially and spatially marginalised gecekondu 
communities were given share from the rental gains provided by neoliberal 
urban redevelopment revealed that political concerns regarding prevention of 
political activism against the state have been strategically important in terms 
of shaping the cities in Turkey. This contrasts with the emphasis on the 
economic and financial motives of profit maximisation in the discussions on 
neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanisation (as referred in Chapter 2) and 
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proves the necessity to analyse the politics and political actors involved in the 
urbanisation processes. The next chapter examines the state-led gentrification 
process in Turkey in the 2000s onwards from this perspective and attends to 
complicated ways the gecekondu communities are drawn into and excluded 
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Chapter 5: Promoting the State Citizenship 
Agenda through Space (2004-2015) 
      
Haydar (59): If we defend our rights here, struggle for our own 
lands, and you proclaim us terrorist, then we are terrorists!  
Ibo (34): As you grow up, you see that the city is expanding, the 
buildings around are rising, your friends and many others are 
moving from the neighbourhood to those buildings. So, you 
think of yourself, ‘this place does not belong to me’; ‘they are 
going to take it from me one day’. If it were for me, I would not 
undertake something like that (the struggle for right to 
shelter), I would think that ‘this land is not mine’ and leave. 
(My translation13) 
Haydar and Ibo were a father and a son living in the gecekondu neighbourhood 
in Dikmen Valley. Haydar was a retired municipality worker, who had been 
active in the unionist struggles, and Ibo worked as electrician in a private 
company with no trade union membership. There was a noticeable difference 
in the narratives of these two men from succeeding generations in terms of 
staking a claim on the land. While Haydar, who was one of the leading figures 
of the right to shelter struggle which was organised against gentrification in 
Dikmen Valley, is ready to pay the price of claiming his right, his son confessed 
that he would have rather left the neighbourhood in the beginning. The father 
was confident when making rights-based claims to the neighbourhood despite 
criminalisation, whereas the son felt uncomfortable about making claims to 
where he lived. This discontinuity in the narratives and feeling structures of 
Haydar and Ibo correspond with the profoundly changing approach of the 
state towards informal settlements in Turkey from populist tolerance to zero 
tolerance. This was manifested from 2004 onwards following the introduction 
of the neoliberal urban transformation campaign across the country, 
particularly stigmatising and demolishing the gecekondu settlements all over 
Turkey.  
                                                          
13 Translations of all the quotations taken from the interviews, political speeches and 
newspapers news throughout the thesis are done by the author.   
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Within the context of the authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey, the active 
involvement of the state in the process of urban redevelopment has led many 
scholars to focus on the processes of state-led property transfer from the poor 
to the rich and marginalisation of the gecekondu settlers. In this chapter, I 
analyse the on-going processes of gentrification in Turkey and in Dikmen 
Valley. Moving from the argument that gentrification involves hidden rewards 
as well as hidden injuries (Paton, 2014), I focus on the ways the gecekondu 
dwellers are encouraged to participate in and benefit from the process at the 
same time as they are stigmatised.  
I attend to the authoritarian form neoliberalism has taken in Turkey, and 
reveal the centralised urban redevelopment regime. Under the light of the 
historical context provided in the former chapter, I analyse the implementation 
of neoliberal urban policies in relation to the political concerns particularly 
over the refashioning of the normative definition of ‘good’ citizens.  Drawing on 
the argument that neoliberalism is contextually embedded (cf. Chapter 2), I 
will demonstrate that the processes of inclusion differ in Turkey from 
advanced capitalist countries like the UK, where working class people are 
encouraged to participate in gentrification through market incentives and 
without being provided with the material sources to do so. Moving beyond the 
economic and financial considerations in gentrification research that centred 
on emphasis on neoliberalism, I will link the promises of inclusion in Turkey to 
the political considerations. In doing so, I will reveal how gentrification was 
used as a tool to discipline rights-based claims and struggles while rewarding 
obedient participation through symbolic inclusion into the ‘good citizenry’ as 
well as financial inclusion.  
In the first part of this chapter, I analyse public speeches of key public figures 
and the way gentrification in Turkey was promoted in the printed mainstream 
media in comparison to the previous urban policies and approaches to the 
gecekondu communities. I demonstrate that the informal settlements are 
specifically targeted by this process not only in order to include them into the 
formal urban land stock but also to discipline rights-based claims and struggles 
through simultaneous promises of inclusion and threats of violence, which is 
overlooked in the existing studies due to overemphasis on economic profits. In 
the second part of the chapter, I explore how the simultaneous processes of 
inclusion and exclusion took place in Dikmen Valley gecekondu neighbourhood 
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drawing on some visual material in the mainstream newspapers about the 
gentrification process in the valley, some secondary sources and some 
interviews with the gecekondu settlers living in the valley. I analyse how the 
local state promoted gentrification project in the valley to the gecekondu 
communities who mobilised their rights-based claims to where they lived. 
Using printed materials produced by the local state and speeches of local state 
actors, I demonstrate how territorial stigmatisation and inclusion constitute 
the opposite sides of the same coin in the promotion of the state citizenship 
agenda based on benevolence of the state and obedience of the subject-
citizens.                   
5.1. Centralisation of Urban Governance  
R. Tayyip Erdogan: If my house is unauthorised, seventy per 
cent of the citizens in Istanbul live in unauthorised houses. I am 
one of them. (Tezkan, 2011)    
A month before the local elections in March 1994, a news item about R. Tayyip 
Erdogan, who was one of the candidates for the Mayoralty of Istanbul, created 
a shocking effect. It came out that he had been living in an illegal building. He 
joined the main news bulletin on a private TV channel together with the other 
two candidates for the Mayoralty of Istanbul. The anchor person tried to drive 
him into a corner asking him questions about the latest news. Without 
hesitation, he accepted the truth of the news. Furthermore, he was talking 
about being among the majority living in illegal houses as if he was proud of it. 
This is interpreted by many as one of the reasons Erdogan garnered such 
popular support. Thus, the fact that Erdogan was elected in the local elections 
in 1994 as the Mayor of Istanbul came as no surprise.   
12 years later, this time as the Prime Minister of Turkey, he made a speech in 
the First Housing Congress organised by the Mass Housing Administration, 
where he said: 
Before, it was being said “how is it possible to demolish these (houses), to 
remove these all?” Now, they have all been demolished! Thus, if you are 
determined, if you insist and believe, then you will demolish… It was our 
greatest dream to annihilate the gecekondu order, which has surrounded our 
cities like a tumour. Now we are accomplishing it, and we have to accomplish 
it country-wide. (Övür, 2008) (Emphasis added).      
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The fact that the gecekondu people were illegal occupiers of public land had 
been ‘the elephant in the room’ in Turkish politics until the 2000s. Although 
the unplanned expansion of illegal settlements of rural migrants had disturbed 
the urban community from the beginning, none of the mainstream politicians 
had publicly named the gecekondu settlements as tumours or commenced 
comprehensive projects to demolish them, because of what Muhurdaroglu 
(2005) calls ‘embedded clientelism’. With this, he refers to the coalitions that 
are formed between the gecekondu leaders and the political party officials with 
electoral concerns on the basis of ethnicity and/or hometown (p. 109). 
Therefore, this speech by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan has symbolised a 
turning point in terms of urban policy in Turkey.    
As detailed in Chapter 4, in the absence of effective housing policies, the 
‘gecekondu order’ had been formed as a housing solution by rural migrants, 
who moved to the cities following the mechanisation in agriculture and 
correlative loss in rural jobs. The construction of gecekondu houses was 
initially tolerated by mainstream political authorities that failed to produce 
effective solutions to the housing shortage in cities with limited resources for 
urbanisation.14 Over time these settlements were officially recognised for 
political and economic motives. As part of neoliberalisation after the military 
coup in 1980, the gecekondu dwellers were made right-holders of the ‘illegally 
occupied’ land that would be redeveloped by improvement plans (Türker-
Devecigil, 2010, p. 215).  
During the 1980s, Turkey was being transformed into a consumer society, and 
the desire for wealth and appetite for consumption was enthusiastically stirred 
up through promoting material wealth and ideas of ‘striking it rich’. This 
propaganda for consumerism aimed at breaking the accumulated power of the 
labour unions and leftist movement, which had organised long-term strikes 
and occupation of factories throughout the 1970s (Bali, 2001). Within the 
context of the deteriorating economic conditions, individualist consumerism 
started to be seen as a target to achieve by the broader society, who now 
demanded their share from the developing prosperity in the country. Making 
                                                          
14 Turkish Republic was established in 1923 following two destructive wars namely the World 
War I (1914-1918), and the National Liberation War (1919-1923) against the imperialist 
powers, who wanted to colonise the country. The military elites, who established the republic 
aimed at creating a modern, secular nation state, however, with the limited resources of the 
young republic and the emergency target of industrialisation, urbanisation was left to the 
spontaneous solutions of the people.   
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easy money out of gecekondu housing was tolerated by the populist policies of 
the governing parties as these aimed at giving the gecekondu people the hope 
of becoming rich and prevented them from engaging with radical activism 
against the state (Erman, 2001, pp. 986-987).      
The Redevelopment Law of 1984 is argued to differ from the Gecekondu Law of 
1966. The latter aimed at improving the existing gecekondu houses while 
clearing out the uninhabitable ones and developing low-cost housing to 
prevent further gecekondu settlements. The Redevelopment Law on the other 
hand sought to clarify the land ownership structure in gecekondu areas and 
create a base for transforming gecekondu land into formal urban land stock by 
changing the current structure completely (Şenyapılı, 1996; Leitmann and 
Baharoglu, 1999 cited in Türker-Devecigil, 2010, pp. 215-216). With the 
Redevelopment Law, the already existing commercialisation of gecekondu 
housing was legalised, and gecekondu construction was implicitly encouraged 
as the people started to expect forthcoming amnesties. These individual 
expectations of rental gains absorbed the potential of social mobilisation 
against the worsening socio-economic conditions due to neoliberal policies.         
After the election of the neoliberal Justice and Development Party in the 
national elections in 2002, the populist urban regime was revised and replaced 
by a ‘zero tolerance approach to the legal ambiguities and the incompletely 
commoditised market structure that characterised the gecekondu areas’ 
(Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, p. 2). Urban transformation was adopted as a new 
local policy instrument in 2004, leading to a country-wide campaign carried 
out through state-led and/or state-financed large-scale projects. The 
government enacted a series of legal regulations to overcome the lack of a legal 
framework and limitations in financial resources. 78 laws and 10 by-laws, 
totally or partially concerning the production of the built environment were 
enacted from 2002 to late 2007.  
As opposed to the attempts at decentralisation of urban governance in the 
advanced capitalist countries which led to increasing emphases on values such 
as autonomy and subsidiarity15 for more democratic and participatory urban 
regimes, the neoliberal regime of urbanisation in Turkey involved 
                                                          
15 This meant the provision of public services by the units closest to the public. After the 
acceptance of The European Charter on Local Self-Government in 1985, this principle was 
adopted in the international documents and newly formed institutions (Parlak et al., 2008, p. 
30).            
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progressively centralising and non-participatory processes of rent 
appropriation (Kuyucu, 2014). The 2005 Municipalities Act was renewed 
granting finances to the greater and district municipalities to redevelop 
gecekondu areas. There were no specifications or requirements for 
participatory mechanisms permitting the inhabitants to take part in the 
preparation of the projects in the municipality law or in the official 
‘implementing principles’ of the projects, thus decisions were taken without 
any citizen participation or democratic procedure (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010 
cited in Kuyucu, 2014, p. 615).  
TOKI (the Mass Housing Administration), which was originally established in 
1984 in order to construct affordable houses for low-income people, also 
increased its political and financial power. This was an incremental process as 
the following time-frame revealed. TOKI was given legal powers  
✓ (2004) to determine right holders and the values of their houses,  
✓ (2005) to determine the gecekondu prevention areas and take-over of the 
land owned by the Treasury for free,  
✓ (2006) to be exempted from almost all expenses,  
✓ (2007) to approve and reject all plans developed for the boundaries of 
gecekondu rehabilitation zones, gecekondu refinement areas and gecekondu 
prevention areas within the limits of the local administrations  
✓ (2008) to carry out projects in any field without indicating any health and 
safety criteria about the transformation projects in relation to an earthquake  
(Source: Yılmaz, 2013).  
With these regulations, TOKI gradually transformed from a credit dispensing 
mechanism, which provides cheap housing credit to cooperatives, into an 
extremely powerful land broker and housing developer. With these 
regulations, as Batuman (2013) emphasises, the administration became 
exempt from almost all of the bureaucratic mechanisms. Kuyucu (2014, p. 616) 
also underlines that TOKI has become a prime example of a technocratic 
institution enabling the neoliberalisation of land and housing markets as it 
takes orders directly from the Department of the Prime Minister and is exempt 
from parliamentary oversight and auditing. The numbers of the houses 
produced by TOKI also reveals the centralised mode of urban redevelopment 
regime. TOKI had built 43,000 houses in the period 1984–2003; 500,000 
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houses between 2002 and 2011, and plans to have constructed 700,000 more 
by the year 2023 (TOKI, 2017).  
Simultaneously, a consumption-led recovery (Duman, 2013, p. 2) started to be 
implemented and the consumer credit markets were restructured to sell the 
houses produced at profitable prices for private investors. Through providing 
cheap consumer credits, the ability of low-income groups to consume was 
increased without a corresponding increase in people’s income (Akçay, 2017). 
The Law No. 5582, which was known as the Mortgage Law, was passed in 2007 
aimed at restructuring the housing finance sector, which had traditionally been 
weak and insufficiently institutionalised in Turkey (Gürlesel, 2006; Öncü, 1988 
cited in Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010):        
The primary mechanism of homeownership in Turkey has been traditionally 
using one’s own funds, borrowing from friends/relatives or gecekondu 
construction. Use of housing credits has been extraordinarily low (0.75 per 
cent of GNP in 2001) despite very high rates of homeownership (59 per cent 
in 2000). Such an underdeveloped financing mechanism is a serious 
impediment to a capitalist urban regime. The new law institutionalised the 
‘mortgage system’, which is expected to provide a major impetus to the 
housing finance sector. Although this is a big step towards neo-liberalisation, 
high inflation and interest rates exclude most lower-income citizens from 
participating in mortgage markets. Those unable to enter the private credit 
market can, however, obtain housing through TOKI (Mass Housing 
Administration), which provides state-subsidised credit to lower-income 
consumers (p. 1485).  
Following from that, a nation-wide campaign of homeownership through long-
term instalments ‘as if paying rent’ was introduced in order to realise the long-
lasting dream of the low-income people of owning a legal house.16 As a result of 
the credit boom in the 2000s, the aggregate consumer credit volume, covering 
consumer, mortgage and credit cards, increased from 111 billion TL 
(approximately 46.250 billion GBP) to 250 billion TL (approximately 89.285 
billion GBP) from June 2008 to June 2012 (Duman, 2013, p. 7). Alongside this 
financial inclusion, however, appropriate citizen behaviour, which is obedience 
to the state authority, was also promoted. In the following part, I will attend to 
how this process took place in Turkey and in Dikmen Valley from 2004 
onwards.        
                                                          
16 In 2008, more than 6,000 houses constructed by TOKI in different cities in Turkey were put 
up for sale with instalments as long as 180 months and without any prior condition to be given 
credits.             
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5.2. Promoting the Citizenship Agenda: Benevolent State and 
’Innocent Victims of Criminals‘ 
The threat of displacement by gentrification projects was targeted to be 
compensated by the provision of cheap housing credits. At the same time, a 
committed campaign about the intolerability of gecekondu neighbourhoods 
and the inevitability of their transformation to create civilised cities and 
citizens was also conducted. The first radical act was the enactment of the 
Criminal Act in 2004, which made the construction of illegal settlements 
punishable by imprisonment (from 1 to 5 years), for the first time in the 
history of Turkey. The previous punishment was either demolition or a civil 
penalty. The law also denied the responsibilities of public officials in tolerating 
gecekondu construction, as there was no punishment for them.   
In Turkey, the process whereby the gecekondu people lost their innocence 
dated back to the 1980s when the gecekondu houses started to be transformed 
into apartment buildings. As discussed in Chapter 4, the gecekondu dwellers 
have been considered as the ‘people’, the rural-based and uneducated but 
allegiant masses whereas citizenship was associated with the urbanite middle 
and upper income groups living in formal apartment buildings, which were 
considered to represent modern way of life. In the 1980s, the popular image of 
gecekondu people shifted from ‘the rural/innocent other’ to ’the undeserving 
rich other’. This referred to the wealth obtained from the legalisation of illegal 
gecekondu houses and transformation thereof into multi-storey apartment 
buildings (Erman, 2012, p. 300).     
The 1990s witnessed the criminalisation of the gecekondu people as ‘varosh’ 
and stigmatisation of their neighbourhoods as hotbeds of criminality. Yonucu 
and Gonen (2011) argue that the traditional division between ‘citizens’ versus 
‘people’ turned into ‘citizens’ versus ‘criminal’ in the 1990s onwards as the 
urban poor started to be represented as ‘dangerous others’ in the media as 
well as by the criminologists and urban planners. They assert that:   
The urban poor are increasingly seen as a ‘race apart’ and their particular 
culture as productive of ‘degeneracy’ and ‘criminality’ concentrated in their 
neighbourhoods in which they reside... The discourses they (criminologists 
and urban planners as well as the media) produce are aligned with the aim of 
reconstructing the metropoles of Turkey as “non-antagonistic”, financial, 
business and cultural centres attractive to foreign capital and global 
  
 
Page | 100 
investment, ‘secured’ and ‘freed’ from crime and/or urban poor (Yonucu and 
Gonen, 2011, p. 77).      
Within the context of the representation of the gecekondu areas as hotbeds of 
crime in the 2000s onwards, they evaluate the gentrification projects as 
projects of marginalisation, which push from the cities those who have been 
deemed redundant by neoliberal economy (p. 96). Thus, they interpret the 
main social costs of gentrification as the exclusion of the ‘surplus populations’. 
Elsewhere, Yonucu (2008) explores the impacts of the neoliberal shift in 
Turkey on a working class neighbourhood through focusing on the alteration 
of Zeytinburnu, which is one of the oldest gecekondu neighbourhoods in 
İstanbul. She details the transformation thereof into a dangerous ‘no go area’ 
from the 1980s onwards, in a way that created double exclusion for the people 
living there. She suggests that 1980s generated a new corporatist form of 
governance, which aimed at homogeneous social unity through assimilation of 
‘marginal’ identities into a secular, modern, middle class Turkish identity. More 
recently this has transformed again into a neoliberal type of governance that is 
more concerned with exclusion. She adds that what is more challenging in 
terms of marginalisation is that exclusion goes hand in hand with the 
production of desire to be included into the ‘normal Turkey’ that is to be 
respectable, which is defined on the basis of urban middle class norms and 
particularly the consumerism.          
Within the context of centralised process of appropriating urban lands, 
gentrification was mostly analysed in Turkey from a structuralist perspective 
of appropriating rent and emphasis was made on the exclusion of the 
gecekondu people. It is argued that under the Justice and Development Party 
government, populist urban policies, which had left the urban land 
incompletely commoditised, were replaced with a ‘neoliberal urban regime’ 
(Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008; Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010; Penbecioglu, 
2011). As a country with incomplete commodification of urban land and 
ambiguous forms of property structure, it is argued that the prime target of 
gentrification is to appropriate the high levels of urban rent (Kuyucu and 
Unsal, 2010; Muhurdaroglu, 2005; Balaban, 2008) as revealed by the active 
involvement of large-scale public actors like the TOKI. Within this context, it is 
argued that the political interest in the gecekondu inhabitants lost power as the 
focus shifted to opening up channels to certain capitalist fractions (Somalı, 
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2013, p. 63). Nevertheless, I will argue that this interest was not lost but rather 
changed its form.  
To begin with, it is the formal land use pattern that became surplus, rather 
than the gecekondu people. While explaining the contest over the ground rent 
indicated by the forced evictions, Davy and Pellissery (2013) wrote that a 
change in the land use pattern is expected, as soon as informal uses are no 
longer the ‘best’, that is, most profitable, uses of the land (p. 72). Thus, in 
contrast to the abovementioned arguments of ‘pushing the redundant from the 
city’ and double exclusion, the gecekondu people’s participation in the state-led 
gentrification projects was targeted. Moreover, the state actively set the 
conditions for their inclusion in such a way that would be enabling for the 
promotion of its citizenship agenda. Within this framework, the accounts on 
marginalisation and double exclusion overlook the complex ways the urban 
space was produced for the more obedient as well as the more affluent user in 
Turkey.   
As noted above, in Gentrification: A Working-Class Perspective (2014), Paton 
offers an analysis of gentrification through restating the connection between 
contemporary urban restructuring and working class communities with a 
focus on active, consumer-citizenship. She unfolds the material underpinnings 
of the working class disassociation with class focusing on the devaluation 
which occurs as part of regeneration which aims at realisation of potential 
value and profit (p. 3). From this perspective, she argues that gentrification 
targets people as well as places defined by their ‘lack’.  
Paton addresses the processes of dismantling of the social contract and 
previous notions of citizenship alongside the attempts to foster flexible 
accumulation regime. Accordingly, citizens are encouraged now to act 
responsibly by making decisions that support entrepreneurialism which is 
both morally correct and rational choice. Thus, she demonstrates that 
alongside attempts to redevelop urban space for the more affluent user, 
gentrification policies seek to cultivate aspiration and realign the traditional 
working class identities and behaviours to make them more congruent with 
post-industrial neoliberalism (p. 7). In doing so, she concludes, the process 
offers ‘hidden rewards’ as well as hidden injuries to the working class 
communities (pp. 53-54).  
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Her attentiveness to hidden rewards proves to be more useful than emphases 
on marginalisation and double exclusion when exploring the ways neoliberal 
urban regime was communicated with the gecekondu people in Turkey. 
Participation in gentrification projects not only meant displacement as it 
offered the gecekondu dwellers legal homeownership in modern apartment 
flats constructed by TOKI contrasted with the legally ambiguous and culturally 
inferior status of the gecekondu houses. As a result of the expansion of 
consumer credits and promotion of ‘becoming homeowner as if paying rents’, 
legal homeownership became probable for the low-income groups.   
Deniz Yıldırım (2009) refers to this financial inclusion within the context of 
Justice and Development Party’s populism. From a structuralist perspective, he 
argues that the financial inclusion of the groups marginalised by neoliberal 
policies of precarisation and de-unionisation of labour and oppression of social 
rights is part of ‘neoliberal populism’. It aims to compensate the injuries of 
these policies. The incomes attained from the transformation of gecekondu 
areas for instance are redistributed among the capitalist groups while the 
former residents in those areas are provided with cheap housing credits.   
What was still overlooked in his emphasis on financial inclusion, however, is 
the symbolic inclusion promoted through the process of gentrification. In his 
speech in 2006 — that was cited above — Erdoğan talked about the ‘promises’ 
of gentrification:    
We prepared the ground for the people (gecekondu residents) who were in 
fact undeserving, illegal occupiers of those places to be relocated in modern 
houses in a different place, and also by way of persuasion through paying 
them compensation for demolition despite the mistakes they have made. 
(Sabah, 2006; emphasis added) 
While he criminalised the gecekondu residents as the illegal occupier of the 
urban land, he simultaneously promoted participation to gentrification as a 
chance to be forgiven and be accepted as ‘good citizens’. Far from having lost 
his attention in gecekondu communities, he still spoke as the head of the 
benevolent state, which takes care of its citizens. Thus, he promised the 
gecekondu people inclusion into good citizenry in return for their obedient 
participation in the process. Gentrification projects were presented as a chance 
to correct their ‘enforced’ involvement in illegal occupation of land in the past 
and prove their ‘deservingness’ to become part of the ‘good citizenry’. 
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This exposed the ways gentrification, as an economic project, was integrated 
into the political process of promoting the citizenship agenda. The underlying 
logic of territorial stigmatisation and demolition of gecekondu neighbourhoods 
was not limited to the speculative gains offered by transforming incompletely 
capitalised urban lands into middle- or upper-class oriented ones and 
integration of the low-income groups into the housing market and neoliberal 
transaction markets. It also involved political goals of transforming the rural-
based, low-income groups into obedient citizens. In line with that, the state 
also criminalised any form of opposition as a terror act. Those who opposed 
the terms offered by the urban transformation projects were criminalised and 
subjected to punitive measures.   
A further justification for top-down implementation of large-scale projects 
without effective opposition came in 2011 with the Van earthquake which 
struck the South-eastern cities in Turkey with a moment magnitude of 7.2 and 
killed around 650 people. As Klein (2007) explores the policies followed after 
the Katrina hurricane in the USA and argues that disasters act as opportunities 
for capital accumulation, which she conceptualises as ‘disaster capitalism’. 
Congruently, the Van earthquake has led to the promotion of gentrification 
projects as solutions to disasters, weakening social reactions against the social 
costs of those projects. Thus, after the Van Earthquake, which also reminded 
the devastating Marmara Earthquake in 199917, the ‘natural’ disasters and 
particularly earthquakes started to be discussed in relation to the other 
‘naturalised disasters’ such as crime and ‘created a sense of urgency’ (Bartu-
Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 17) in implementing the gentrification projects.    
Within this context, Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, mentioned his 
ambition to solve the problem of illegal housing permanently even though this 
would lead them to election defeat:        
From now on, we are going to give our Ministry of Environment and Urban 
Planning full authority, if necessary, in terms of solving the problem of illegal 
housing and gecekondu in our cities. We are going to expropriate this type of 
buildings without taking the consent of the locals who do not demolish them, 
and demolish these buildings by ourselves. We are not going to take any 
                                                          
17 The Marmara Earthquake with a moment magnitude of 7.4 that struck North Western 
Turkey, killing around 17,000 people and leaving approximately half a million people homeless. 
This earthquake played a particularly important role in the production of the social consent for 
the large-scale urban transformation projects. 
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notice of whether we lose their political support or not. (Hurriyet, 2011; 
Emphasis added)  
This speech revealed the function of disasters in terms of legitimising the 
transforming urban governance in a more centralised and non-participatory 
way. Shortly after this speech, the Law on the Transformation of Areas under 
Disaster Risk (Law no. 6303), known as the Disaster Law, was enacted in 2012. 
Within the context of the sense of emergency, the only authority to determine 
‘risky areas’ to be renewed was appointed to be the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Environment. With this law, the already authoritarian form 
of urban governance and decision-making processes was consolidated. 
According to the public report prepared by the Chamber of City Planners 
(TMMOB):   
The Disaster Law introduces highly problematic provisions as it penalises 
any locals who object to the local administration's transformation plans. 
Another major problem is a provision of the law which states that individuals 
who refuse to leave their dwellings marked for demolition will be denied 
utility services, which is a major violation of right to property. The law also 
disregards the financial state of the poor, stating that infrastructure costs in a 
disaster-risk area should be paid for by those whose houses were 
demolished under the law. By leaving the last say to the Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning it cripples local participation. The law also 
runs the risk of causing the last remaining Treasury land plots in cities to be 
sold to private owners. It allows the transfer of all immobile public property 
including schools or hospitals in disaster-risk areas to the Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning. The Disaster Law is indeed a disaster for 
protected historic sites and grasslands, as it overrides all laws protecting 
“natural and cultural heritage”. (mimarist.org, 2012)     
Within the context of urgent implementation of large-scale projects without 
negotiation, gentrification started to be represented as ‘the’ solution to the all 
of the city’s ills from disasters like earthquakes to terrorism (Islam, 2010, p. 
60). Erdogan Bayraktar, the former head of TOKI, talked about gentrification as 
‘the only solution to more than one problem the cities face’ in a speech he 
made in 2013:         
Urban transformation decreases poverty; protects natural resources and 
creates healthy environments; prevents illegal organisations in the 
gecekondu neighbourhoods just as it leads to a drastic decrease in 
ghettoisation; economic recovery by increasing the potential of business and 
decreasing unemployment; and provides opportunities to live in more secure 
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and modern places with high quality conditions in peace and happiness. 
(ntv.com.tr, 2012)     
As he thought that criminality is embedded in gecekondu neighbourhoods, he 
promoted gentrification to erase crime from city space through demolishing 
those spaces that generate crime.     
Nevertheless, criminalisation is done carefully alongside the promise of 
inclusion. In the later parts of his aforementioned speech in 2006, Erdogan 
revealed the inclusionary aspect of gentrification:       
I cannot say this is Ankara just showing Cankaya.18 What is there behind 
Cankaya? We have to see this… Come let us expand this to the whole country. 
Let our whole nation enjoy these pleasures. But the nation should help us 
too; our citizens should have this consciousness. To say that ‘this land is 
mine’ after being settled there right away with the bricks carried in a horse 
carriage! No way! This is not a citizenship right! This is the abuse of the 
citizenship right! You must know this. (Baştakar, 2006; Emphasis added)    
Here, he referred to the claims of gecekondu residents to the land as an illegal 
act lacking the sense of citizenship to conform to the state’s policies, which are 
in the citizens’ interest. The aspiration to possess modern houses and enjoy 
higher standards was conceptualised as a path to become included in the 
‘deserving citizenry’.  
He also promoted the provision of cheap housing credits as part of the urban 
transformation projects: 
For all those years, our cities were bribed for political interest. We need to do 
what needs to be done all together... There are those who are trying to arouse 
pity: ‘The poor thing had only a house, and look, they demolished it!’… How 
come they are the poor thing! There is an illegal occupation there. The one 
you call the poor thing shall go, buy a house, which is sold in return for 
monthly 200 TL instalments! (Bastakar, 2006; Emphasis added) 
Thus, the ‘benevolent state’ was ready to forgive the gecekondu settlers’ past 
‘mistake’ and offer them better conditions, as opposed to the opposition 
parties, which Erdogan accused of benefiting from people’s poverty. In contrast 
to the UK context where the working class people are ‘invited to become part 
of the gentrification process without giving them the means to do so’ (Paton, 
2014, p. 53), the gecekondu settlers, including the ones who are directly 
                                                          
18 Cankaya is the most prestigious district in Ankara mostly populated by the urban middle and 
upper income groups. 
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targeted by the state-led gentrification projects, were provided with the means 
to participate and also benefit from the process. Through the simultaneity of  
provision of means to become included in the process and criminalisation, 
gentrification projects were used in the political attempt to discipline the 
rights-based claims and struggles against the state, which were associated with 
terror.  
Thus, taking a more nuanced approach to criminalisation, I argue that it was 
targeted selectively at the insurgent groups while the obedient ones were 
promised rewards. This revealed the fact that gentrification in Turkey involved 
disciplining measures towards social and political opposition. It has become a 
tool with which the government communicated its state citizenship agenda 
which was based on a configuration of obedience to the benevolent state.            
Indeed, in another speech made in 2013, Erdogan talked about the promises of 
gentrification as opposed to the criminality of opposition to it: 
My citizen, my Istanbulite brother has the right to reside and live in the best, 
healthiest, solidest houses without having any fear and worry. We cannot 
give consent anyone to live in jerry built houses like poultry sheds or shacks. 
However, they (the political parties supporting the insurgent gecekondu 
residents) are trying to impede this highly important transformation process 
with slogans of ‘don’t touch my house’, spreading lies and slanders, and 
provoking some neighbourhoods… The main opposition party and marginal 
leftist organisations and terrorist organisations that the party cooperates do 
not want this transformation for obvious reasons. Why? It is because they 
seize opportunity through people’s victimisation. They are exploiting 
poverty. First, they condemn my brother to poverty and then they try to 
abuse his feelings. They want to keep inhumane conditions of living in which 
they can raise militants, exploit people and do any kind of illegality… With the 
demolition of these buildings, a degenerated system is being terminated. 
(haberler.com, 2013; Emphasis added)              
These words revealed that gentrification was not only about the 
redevelopment of urban space. It was part of a broader process of disciplining 
the ‘criminal’ practices that were attached to what he called ‘the gecekondu 
order’. On the other hand, despite criminalising the gecekondu settlements, he 
did it in a careful way through separating the ‘militants’ supported by 
opposition groups and parties and the poor citizens who were ‘exploited’ by 
the former. Thus, he represented the gecekondu people as innocent victims of 
criminal groups. Calling the gecekondu people ‘his brother’, Erdogan promoted 
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the correspondence between what his benevolence is capable of providing and 
what his citizens (should) expect, thus invited the gecekondu people to 
participate in the process.                     
5.3. Separating ‘Innocent Valley People’ from ‘Terrorist Groups’ 
The people living in the gecekondu neighbourhood in the fifth phase of Dikmen 
Valley experienced the complex processes explored above. As noted above in 
Chapter 4, from the mid-1990s onwards, there were significant changes in the 
ways the project was implemented as a result of the changes in the local 
government. This was argued to have generated a shift in terms of the state’s 
approach to gecekondu communities and urban space. Muhurdaroglu (2005) 
evaluates this shift as the transformation from the rehabilitation project to a 
gentrification project referring to the increasing displacement of the gecekondu 
communities from the area (p. 108). Turker-Devecigil (2005) also argues that 
after the local elections, the approach of the local state to the Dikmen Valley 
shifted from ‘an urban area to be rehabilitated’ to ‘a value to be shared’.  
Her emphasis on such a radical change, however, disregards the continuity in 
the process that is the presence of profit-making purposes in the earlier stages 
of the project. Yet, it was apparent in the active involvement of the local state 
in the process. In line with the centralisation of urban governance, the greater 
municipality of Ankara prepared the Dikmen Valley Project and together with 
district municipalities established a joint stock company (Metropol Imar Co. 
Inc.) to carry out the redevelopment in the valley. Thus, it is more appropriate 
to argue that the profit-seeking motives became more manifest after the mid-
1990s.   
After the municipal change in 1994, large-scale private construction companies 
were also included in the process; however, Metropol Imar A.S. remained 
active in terms of planning, consulting and undertaking the processes of urban 
redevelopment in the municipally designated areas not only in the valley but in 
the whole city. In contrast to the involvement of the state when it was too risky 
or expensive for the private sector so as to provide financial resources and 
gradually leave the process to the market forces in advanced countries; in 
Turkey, the local and national state actors involved in the process have acted 
like private agents with profit-seeking motives. The reason for preparing a 
special project and using a public-private partnership model rather than 
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leaving the transformation process to the market forces through an 
improvement plan in Dikmen Valley was argued to aim ‘guaranteeing the gains 
of the municipality and that of the private firms who would take part in the 
redevelopment process’ (Muhurdaroglu, 2005, p. 131).     
The motive of appropriation of urban rents led to legal disputes between 
greater and district municipalities in the process of establishing the legal 
framework for urban transformation in Turkey. After the 1990s, the two local 
government units – Ankara Greater Municipality and Cankaya District 
Municipality (which has been under control of the main opposition party) – 
were contradicting each other on the basis of appropriating the rental gains. As 
a result of the subsequent delays in the implementation process of the project 
in Dikmen Valley, only three-fifths of the project was completed by the time I 
started my fieldwork in 2015. After the enactment of the new law of 
Metropolitan Municipalities (Law no. 5216) in 2004, by which, metropolitan 
municipalities gained planning authority at all scales, Dikmen Valley was 
immediately labelled as a municipal project area. Today, there is no single unit 
in the Cankaya District Municipality that takes part in the transformation 
process of the valley.    
Since then, the greater municipality had been actively involved not only in the 
implementation of the project but also in the promotion of gentrification, 
which was the national urban policy, and criminalisation of resistance to it. It is 
argued that local governments in Turkey have been regarded as extension and 
agents of the central government (Heper, 1988 cited in Goymen, 2006, p. 246) 
to promulgate the ruling ideas, norms and the ideology (Ersoy, 1999, p. 77). 
Through ambitiously promoting the ‘necessity’ of the project in the municipal 
weekly bulletins and the criminalisation of the groups struggling in the valley, 
the greater municipality of Ankara was mimicking the broader promotion of 
obedience.   
In 2006, the greater municipality unilaterally announced the 4th and 5th 
Phases of Dikmen Valley Urban Transformation Project, sending legal notice to 
the gecekondu people living in the neighbourhood to evacuate their houses and 
sign the agreement. When the project was announced there were 1,084 
households holding title deed and 1,200 households without it (Deniz, 2010, p. 
104 cited in Aykan, 2011, p. 29). For the title-deed holders, the contract offered 
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two options: they could either sell their land for a unit price which was well 
below the market value or get housing from the valley, provided by the 
municipality under certain financial terms. Title-holders with 400 m2 of land 
would be provided with a house of 100 m2. If the land of the household was 
less than 400 m2 — which was the case for most — then it would pay a certain 
amount to be determined according to the cost of the houses of 100 m2 to be 
built in the valley for each missing unit. They would also get a rent allowance 
of 250 TL for two years. For that, they had to relinquish their houses and leave 
the valley as soon as they sign the contract (Aykan, 2011, p. 30).   
The explanations that focus on the single logic of rent appropriation overlook 
the complex ways gentrification deals with multiplicity when reproducing the 
urban space for profit. The people without title deeds were not excluded unlike 
in the earlier phases, during which they were not accepted as right-holders in 
order to keep the construction density low in the valley, as it was to be 
transformed into a green area. As noted above, the people lacking title deeds 
were offered land from Dogukent project area (4.5 km away from Cankaya 
district, 11 km away from the city centre).  
However, there was no infrastructure or built environment in Dogukent, yet. 
Not even the parcellation of the land was completed, and nobody could get 
information about where the exact area to be settled was. Moreover, they had 
to pay the price of the parcel of land without the housing on it, 16,000 TL, 
which was a very high level for low-income people, over 120 months in equal 
instalments (Aykan, 2011, p. 30).  
Due to the uncertainties about the duration of the project and date of delivery 
of the promised houses, the low level of rent allowance and demolition costs, 
and high level of debts, the people were reluctant to sign the agreement with 
the local state. As noted above, politically active households came forward and 
initiated meetings to discuss what could be done against the project together. 
Progressively more people started to attend those meetings to be informed 
about the process.    
On the other hand, almost all of the title-deed holders signed the contract and 
left the valley by the end of 2006. Against the other people’s refusal to evacuate 
the valley, the greater municipality cooperated with the local leaders such as 
the elected heads of the neighbourhoods to convince the remaining people to 
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sign the contract. The pressure to demolish was very high; the municipality 
cars were touring the valley streets all day in a threatening manner.  
Moreover, the municipality sent demolition teams and 5,300 policemen to the 
neighbourhood on 1st February in 2007 early in the morning. Although there 
was no demolition that day, the clashes with the police lasted all day. In the 
period following, people in increasing numbers left the valley either with great 
hopes of becoming a legal homeowner in the prestigious valley area or because 
they were scared of the idea of disobeying the state and advised by the local 
leaders to leave.         
While realising the powers vested in itself the greater municipality effectively 
used its ‘power over time’ increasing anxiety in the community through 
continual delays in the project; hopes were raised and then lowered 
(Sakızlıoğlu, 2013). It cut off municipal services of transportation and stopped 
maintaining roads in Dikmen Valley, brought stray dogs to the neighbourhood, 
poured garbage and rubble onto the roads in the neighbourhood (See figure 
17), threatened the prominent figures in the struggle, and eventually sent 
socially unpopular groups such as Syrian asylum seekers and waste collectors 
to the neighbourhood in order to discourage people from living in the 
neighbourhood.  
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Along the lines of the shift in the state’s approach to the informal settlements, 
the greater municipality gave the people in the valley the message that with or 
without their support, the urban transformation project was going to be 
implemented. This indicated that gentrification-induced displacement was not 
only about being evicted from the neighbourhood and the succeeding loss of 
economic and social network, but also about the erosion of the claims to the 
right to use and appropriate the urban space, as reflected to the fragile claims 
of Ibo to his neighbourhood, referred to at the beginning of the chapter.     
Nevertheless, the process was more complex as gentrification also came with 
promises of inclusion to the deserving citizenry alongside with the punitive 
measures for noncompliance. As referred in the beginning of Introduction 
Chapter, in one of the weekly bulletins of the greater municipality of Ankara 
dated November, 2011, the local state explained the gentrification and struggle 
process in the valley. The collective right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley 
was represented in it as ‘an illegal struggle led by particular marginal groups 
waiting for an opportunity for their ideological protests and to create tension’. 
The gecekondu people living in the valley were separated from these struggling 
groups and portrayed as ‘poor people in Dikmen Valley’, ‘the citizens who were 
cheated with disinformation’, and ‘the people who are unfortunately used as 
puppets of conflicting ideological groups’. The leftist figures who were actively 
involved in the process were seen as ‘provocateurs’, who had been spreading 
terror in the valley with the support of other organisations and some political 
party members for years, despite not being right holders.  
Thus, the municipality refused to recognise people’s right to participate in the 
urban decision-making processes and associated their rights-based claims to 
the urban space with illegality and even terrorism. The gecekondu people in 
the valley were also ‘warned’ at the end of the article to use their last chance 
and follow the other gecekondu residents in different urban transformation 
project areas in Ankara, who had accepted the terms of the municipality. The 
bulletin reminded the valley people of the heavy legal penalties for preventing 
demolition. By using the threat of punishment and promises of obedience at 
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In the same bulletin, a second article with a more stigmatising and disciplining 
tone came in 2013. It was titled ‘Terror is once again active in Dikmen Valley’, 
and represented the opposition groups as militants, whose purpose was to 
provoke conflict, whereas the greater municipality had constantly come up 
with offers which represented its ‘good intentions’. It contained telephoto 
photographs of the clash between the valley people, who have sticks and 
stones in their hands and wear masks, and the subcontracted company 
workers, who were sent by the developer company to start demolishing the 
gecekondu houses in the valley. The titles in the different pages of the bulletin 
were ‘Terror is active once again in Dikmen Valley’ (see Figure 18), ‘Is this a 
place out in the sticks?’, and ‘Terrorist protest in the heart of the capital with 
stones, sticks and weapons’ (Emphasis added).  
According to the research participants, what happened was that a group of 
subcontracted workers of the construction company came to the 
neighbourhood with weapons attacking residents in their attempt to empty the 
valley so that the implementation of the project would start. People I spoke to 
in the valley told me that the workers were brought in by police buses, and 
were armed and fired shots towards them. The valley people responded with 
sticks, stones and weapons ‘to defend their houses’ (with the participants’ own 
words). In the municipal bulletin, those people were represented as terrorists 
who injured the policemen and the journalists whereas there was no mention 
of the subcontracted workers carrying weapons. This absence was to 
represent the struggling groups in the valley as innately unruly, and thus, 
legitimise the punitive measures for the sake of creating ideal that is ‘orderly’ 
city centres — as opposed to the disordered ‘places out in the sticks’ — 
through gentrification.    
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Figure 18: A picture from the municipality’s weekly bulletin with a title of ‘Terror of 
Gecekondu People DIKMEN WAR’ (Buyuksehir Ankara Bulletin, 19-26 March 2013) 
Besides, it was once again emphasised in the bulletin that although the 
gecekondu settlers had no rights on the land/house according to the law, the 
greater municipality of Ankara still offered them 200 m2 urban lands from 
Dogukent Boulevard. They were asked to pay 16.000 Turkish Liras but in 
instalments over 10 years. Alternatively, they were offered apartments from 
TOKI houses to be paid for in 15 years in two other parts of Ankara, both of 
which were tens of kilometres away from Dikmen Valley. Alongside 
increasingly punitive approaches to the right to shelter struggle, the 
municipality highlighted the generosity of the benevolent state, which was 
ready to reward obedient participation despite the absence of legal right.      
Moreover, in the bulletin, the Dogukent location was represented as one of the 
‘rising attraction centres in Ankara’. The gecekondu populations were targeted 
to be removed from the valuable inner-city lands, but the promotion of the 
peripheral lands as attraction centres highlighted their ‘deservingness’ to live 
in valuable lands. This ‘inducement’ echoes Paton’s emphasis on the promotion 
of participation through promoting entrepreneurialism. The people lacking 
title deeds and struggling for their right to affordable housing were 
encouraged to see the residential place as a source of investment rather than 
shelter, and think in ways that promote profit. By doing so, the rights-based 
language used by the struggling communities in the valley was trivialised.   
Conclusion    
This chapter analysed the promotion of gentrification in contemporary Turkey 
and the Dikmen Valley, focusing on the simultaneous presence of 
  
 
Page | 114 
criminalisation and promotion of participation in the process. As a lately 
industrialised country, the local and national state was actively involved in the 
process of urban redevelopment especially in 2004 onwards. This was 
commonly argued (by economic explanations of gentrification) to be related 
with the goal of appropriating the high levels of rent offered due to incomplete 
commodification of urban land. However, these accounts overlook the ways 
the gecekondu people were encouraged to participate in gentrification.  
Drawing on Paton’s approach to gentrification as a policy that targets people as 
well as places (2014), I argue that the gentrification process did not lead to 
exclusion of the gecekondu people from the inner-city and ‘normal Turkey’. On 
the contrary, these socially and spatially marginalised groups were made 
promises of inclusion and also given the means to participate and benefit in 
return for their voluntary participation in the state-led gentrification projects 
in line with the attempts to promote obedience to the benevolent state as part 
of the government’s gradually more authoritarian citizenship agenda.   
This chapter also demonstrated that the ways the gecekondu people were 
included in the process differed in Turkey due to the authoritarian form 
neoliberalism has taken. In addition to the promotion of consumerism and 
entrepreneurialism, gentrification acted as a disciplining tool in Turkey with 
which the state citizenship agenda was promoted. Focusing on the selectivity 
of criminalisation, I argued that it was used to separate the ‘innocent’ from the 
‘criminal’ and state’s benevolent face was shown to the former while the latter 
was subjected to punitive measures. As the promotion of benevolent state-
passive citizenship model trivialised and criminalised the rights-based 
struggles and claims, it can be said that social costs of inclusion in 
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Chapter 6: The Present Picture of Dikmen 
Valley: Heaven and Hell Separated by a 
Bridge 
 
Gülsen (gecekondu dweller): Our land is valuable 
but we are valueless, somehow!            
Hazal (owner-occupant in a prestigious gated 
house): Replacement in the same place is not right. 
Once you resettle them [the gecekondu dwellers] 
within the valley, they will not easily leave here… 
Instead, [the state should] give them a nice place with 
facilities and everything inside. If you throw them out, 
of course they will resist.  
Deniz (tenant in a gated community): Because it is 
a gated community, we don’t have much connection 
with the neighbourhood, the valley, the street, to be 
honest. You know shopping is now done in big 
supermarkets and so on. We have a more sheltered 
thing as it is gated... and it is very central. And, of 
course, the people in the apartment are highly 
educated.  
These quotations from three different participants living close to each other 
allude to the gap between the value of the land and that of the people 
occupying that land. Gülsen (40) was a gecekondu dweller lacking title deed 
and she had been struggling against displacement led by the gentrification 
project in the fifth phase of Dikmen Valley. Hazal (40) was an owner-occupant 
in the gentrified part of the valley in the luxurious terrace houses, which are 
close to the high-rise apartment blocks in which the former gecekondu 
dwellers were resettled. Deniz (34) was a white-collar worker, who lived as a 
tenant in a recently constructed gated community on Dikmen Street.  
Gülsen’s demand to be included as deserving to be resettled in the valley, 
Hazal’s confidence about her value and explicit intolerance about proximity 
with the ‘inferior’ other, and Deniz’s contentment  about living in isolation 
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from the outer world and non-educated others revealed the fact that at the 
same time as material boundaries of inclusion and exclusion were redrawn 
through gentrification, normative boundaries regarding ‘who can properly live 
in the city’ were also negotiated by  different actors involved in the process.  
First, I explain how gentrification was promoted as a social policy of 
transforming non-modern places and practices (like gecekondu buildings) into 
modern ones and creating modern cities based on analysis of the speeches of 
key political actors. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 16 middle class, 13 
upper class participants and elicitation of the photos sent by some of them, and 
also 19 current, 7 former gecekondu dwellers, I will explore how the dominant 
classes including the new middle classes and the affluent groups invested in 
cultural binaries to legitimise their claims to the inner-city, and de-legitimise 
the claims made by ‘non-modern’ groups namely the gecekondu people. 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, I will analyse dynamic 
processes whereby middle and upper class actors struggle to maintain and 
enhance their position in the social order and link these to the contestations 
over normative construction of citizenship. In doing so I will address the 
political function of these symbolic struggles in disempowering the gecekondu 
dwellers through de-politicisation of their rights-based claims, and legitimising 
the state-centric, non-participatory ways gentrification was implemented.            
6.1. Promises of Modernised Cities 
Within the context of state-led implementation of gentrification, the power of 
the changing cultural preferences of the so-called new middle classes in 
reshaping the city space is relatively limited in Turkey compared to the 
advanced capitalist countries in the Global North. Rather, as discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4 and 5, the centralised authorities were actively involved in 
reproducing the urban space in a non-participatory way to create more profit 
for themselves as well as the private investors. To disguise this and produce 
the consent of the affluent citizens, however, gentrification was promoted as 
re-urbanisation and modernisation. R. Tayyip Erdogan made a speech in 2013, 
when he was the prime minister, explaining the goals of the country-wide 
campaign of urban transformation:  
The cities that we will construct, the new houses, workplaces, living spaces 
will become the nucleus of the Turkey that we will erect. In a globalised 
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world, Turkey cannot have a place with deteriorating houses, temporary 
buildings, and un-aesthetic architecture that does not put our people in 
serenity. This we are changing (Hurriyet, 2013) (Emphasis added). 
Here, Erdogan presented gentrification as the door opening to the globalised 
world and a developed Turkey, which would offer peace to its people. On the 
other hand, the construction of places offering serenity and security, free from 
any stress or disturbances, would help disguise the injustices involved in the 
gentrification processes and the inhabitants of those places could thus be 
pacified. Integration to the globalised world, thus, necessitated establishing 
modernity and order on urban space.  
Gecekondu clearance and replacement thereof with ‘modern’ buildings was 
promoted as an essential part of this process. Due to their illegal, irregular, 
economically unproductive and un-aesthetic forms the gecekondu areas 
become no longer tolerable in the cities-to-be-modernised. Within the same 
context, the centralisation of authorities and their comprehensiveness is 
defended as a necessity for the pivotal yet delayed goal of slum clearance for 
the sake of creating modern cities. In the website of TOKI (Mass Housing 
Administration), it is argued that:     
Because the problem of slums and shanty settlements cannot be solved through 
the efforts of the local governments only, since 2003 TOKİ has been following 
a comprehensive policy toward supporting modern urbanisation in 
cooperation with local administrations, with the support of the central 
government… The areas of gecekondu houses and illegal housing, urban 
housing stock whose economic life is over constitutes a serious problem 
especially in the urban areas under disaster risk threatening both the 
wellbeing of the residents and the urban fabric. TOKİ not only transforms all 
these areas but also tries to prevent the formation of new slum areas by 
producing social housing the absence of which has delayed the solution for 
years. (Hurriyet, 2013) (Emphasis added).  
This reveals that although gentrification was centred on the single logic of rent 
extraction this was pursued and realised in multiple ways in interconnected 
spaces. At the same time as the gecekondu people were promised inclusion 
through obedient participation in gentrification projects, the promise of 
modernising the city and the citizens through demolishing non-modern places 
and transferring the residents living there to the ‘modern’ social houses 
constructed by TOKI in the peripheries targeted the inclusion of the dominant 
classes in the process. Through linking the target of modernising the cities with 
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gecekondu clearance, the active state intervention into the process was 
legitimised.  
As opposed to the initially rehabilitative approach of the Dikmen Valley project 
that aimed to integrate the gecekondu people into urban community through 
urban transformation, the state officials started to put more emphasis on 
gecekondu clearance and their replacement with higher-rise, luxurious 
apartments as an unavoidable necessity to create modern cities. This was 
noted earlier in the introduction chapter and chapter 5 referring to the 
promotion of the project in the weekly municipal bulletin.  
In the Dikmen Valley project area multiple groups were living through 
gentrification in different ways. As noted earlier, following the settlement of 
more affluent residents in the valley, housing prices increased, and some of the 
former gecekondu dwellers, who were resettled in the area, sold or rented their 
apartment flats and moved to lower-income neighbourhoods. The people who 
replaced them were usually white-collar workers who wanted to be close to 
the city centre. When I did my fieldwork, the gecekondu people constituted 
approximately half of the populations in the mixed buildings constructed in the 
valley, while the rest was occupied by the newcomers (See figure 19).  
 
Figure 19: The view of the valley from Dikmen neighbourhood. The affluent groups live in 
the low-rise houses in front whereas the two-colour higher-rise buildings behind them 
were occupied both by former gecekondu owners and the newcomers. The white, high-
rise blocks to the right are the prestigious Park Valley Houses constructed for the affluent 
groups. (Photo: Author, 04.07.2015) 
The participants who lived in these mixed apartments were white collar 
professionals. Most of them held a bachelor degree in the notable universities 
in big cities such as Ankara or Istanbul and a postgraduate degree abroad. As 
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children of low level public servants and teachers, who invested in their 
children’s’ education, they did not inherit any possessions from their parents. 
Four out of ten were homeowners, who had bought their houses in the 
beginning of 2000s, using either bank credits or savings – their own as well as 
those family members.   
On the other hand, the people who lived in the prestigious gated communities 
in and/or close to the valley area were owners and/or shareholders of 
construction companies, senior bureaucrats, engineers and doctors. They also 
held a bachelor degree in the notable universities in big cities and some of 
them had a Master’s degree in Turkey and/or from abroad. Most of them are 
children of senior bureaucrats, parliament members, company owners, or 
commercial men, so they inherited residential property and/or business from 
their parents. All of them were either owners of the house they lived in or 
could afford to purchase their apartment except for Nagehan, who used bank 
credits alongside her savings to purchase her house in the most prestigious 
Park Valley Terrace Houses.       
Around 500 gecekondu people were still living in the non-gentrified part of the 
valley when I did my fieldwork. The people I interviewed were working as 
cleaners, tea makers, doorkeepers as well as drivers and barbers. Some of 
them had their own stores like a kebab store or grocery store. Since the 
announcement of the urban transformation project in 2006, they had been 
watching the valley transform day by day in a way that did not welcome their 
presence as they were. Only 12 of them had legal title-deeds for their 
gecekondu houses. The majority of those lacking title deeds had become 
homeowners using bank credits as a precaution against forced eviction.  
I first visited the gecekondu neighbourhood in the valley on a rainy winter day. 
The rain water was flowing from the cracks at the edge of the neglected 
narrow road so I had to tiptoe in order not to get covered with mud. My 
partner took me there by car as there was no public transportation vehicle that 
went into the neighbourhood. The street that linked the adjacent Ilker district 
to the gecekondu neighbourhood formed a divide, and because there was a hill 
on the left, the neighbourhood was not seen from the outside. As we turned left 
from the junction, I saw one-layered gecekondu houses standing alongside each 
other modestly (see figure 20).   
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Figure 20: A view from the entrance of the gecekondu neighbourhood from the adjacent 
Ilker district (Photo: Author, 08.02.2015). 
The adjacent single-storey houses with front yards connected by narrow stairs 
(see Figure 21) and roads represented the organisation of space not for profit 
but for the needs of the people living there. The yards in front of the houses 
facilitated a production-oriented life involving feeding animals, growing fruits 
and vegetables, etc. These were people adjusting to city life after migrating 
from a village. Its informality and spontaneous construction was shaped by 
needs, and offered autonomy in terms of using the space more flexibly for the 
residents’ needs (See Figures 22 and 23). These areas served as children’s 
playground, a common area where women washed their carpets together as 
well as a platform for wedding ceremonies. 
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Figure 21: One of the stairs that connect gecekondu houses in the neighbourhood (Photo: 
Author: 15.09.2015). 
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Figure 23: The bower in the yard of one of the gecekondu houses (Photo: Author, 
14.07.2015). 
Because of the small-scale, needs-based, pedestrian-oriented features of the 
neighbourhood, my initial feelings when I went to the neighbourhood were 
that I travelled back in time. In comparison to the continuing gentrification 
projects and construction of high-rise, luxurious residential and commercial 
buildings all over Ankara, the gecekondu neighbourhood felt like a forgotten 
area, which was left to deteriorate. It stood in contrast to the surrounding 
milieu that included the huge campus of a private university (see Figure 24), 
the construction of a 50-storey prestigious mall (see Figure 25), and high-rise 
gated apartments connected by large roads, which were spaces of conspicuous 
consumption. It was this contrast between the deteriorating gecekondu 
neighbourhood and the well-ordered, luxurious places that was used to 
legitimise the unavoidability of its transformation, as was done in the 
municipal bulletin that was shown in the Introduction.     
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Figure 24: The gecekondu neighbourhood in Dikmen Valley and the construction of the 
campus of a private university (Photo: Author, 19.07.2015).     
 
Figure 25: One-storey gecekondu houses side-by-side the high-rise gated apartments and 
the construction of 50-storey shopping mall on the right (Photo: Author, 15.09.2015) 
6.2. Anxiety about the Proximity of the ‘Uncivilised Other’   
Shortly before I started my fieldwork, a new bridge was constructed at the end 
of the third phase of the project area. It separated the gentrified parts of the 
valley from the deteriorating, non-gentrified parts. This contrast was 
expressed by Berkay, a young adult who lived in the prestigious Park Valley 
Houses: ‘There is a bridge (the Iron Bridge). One side is hell, let’s say, and the 
other has turned into heaven’. He added that as the Dikmen Valley project 
progressed, those places he called hell would improve as well. The metaphor of 
hell revealed the intolerability of the presence of the gecekondu houses in the 
city as well as the unavoidability of gentrification that could turn hell into 
heaven for Berkay. 
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In the eyes of the affluent users of the city space the gecekondu houses 
constituted a bad image that did not suit modern city. Serra19  talked about 
them as ‘jerry-built constructions made by the people in very poor conditions’. 
She added that ‘I mean you can’t even name it as “construction”. They 
definitely create visual pollution in a city.’ Osman, who was a builder himself, 
hesitated to call them houses or even village houses as they were very poorly 
constructed and occupied by people living in very bad conditions. So, the visual 
pollution was sourced by the fact that the presence of gecekondu 
neighbourhoods was exposing poverty and irregularity. On the other hand, 
they revealed the absence of a developed state with sufficient sources of 
housing, thus they contrasted with the image of a modern city.       
Ela (40), a senior public servant, agreed with Berkay in terms of the 
incompatibility of the gecekondu houses in the city centre saying that ‘In the 
centre of Ankara, in Dikmen, a gecekondu neighbourhood can no longer be 
present, right? There are many gecekondu type houses there, of course, those 
will be transformed’. She was talking about gecekondu clearance as a necessity 
to create a modern capital city. These neighbourhoods represented the past as 
they had served the housing needs of the rural migrants, who migrated to the 
cities because they offered more opportunities compared to the villages and 
smaller towns.  
She thought that the cities no longer had to host large rural populations, so 
provision of houses and expansion of cities must be stopped at some point. 
Serra also believed that there was no other formula than transforming the 
gecekondu houses into apartment buildings. Like Ela, she also thought that 
policies supporting reverse migration should be implemented through the 
expulsion of rural migrants from the city centre, as the rural-based migration 
was the reason for the degeneration of cities. Thus, when they talked about 
gentrification, they were referring to the transformation of not only places but 
also people living there and their culture, in line with the promise of 
modernising the cities through gentrification. The reference to modernisation 
revealed the simultaneity of the symbolic struggles regarding ‘who can 
properly live in the city’ to the material processes of rent extraction and 
redistribution.  
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One of the sources of the incomplete modernisation of the cities was imagined 
by most of the affluent participants as the so-called ‘gecekondu culture’, which 
was inappropriate for a modern, civilised city. As explained in more detail in 
the historical chapter, the urban elites initially tolerated the presence of the 
gecekondu people in the city with the expectation that they would urbanise and 
modernise over time. They thought of themselves as civilised, modern people 
serving as a model for the rural migrants. In the discussions below, I observed 
how these views were entrenched in my interviews with the middle and upper 
class residents of the valley.  
The cultural binaries between modern/non-modern were reflected in the 
words of Leman, who was a retired high-school teacher. The first thing Leman 
(60) emphasised while introducing herself and the village where she was born 
was her pride to be from that place where the proportion of literacy was a 
hundred per cent. As a retired teacher, she said that she devoted herself to 
educating low-income children, who had nobody else but her. While talking 
about the wife of the doorkeeper20 of her apartment, she represented herself 
and her neighbours as role models:   
I think we made a great contribution to her, because she came from a village, 
she could not even speak Turkish properly when she first came. When we 
came together with the other women in the common room of the apartment, 
I suppose she learns a lot of things just listening to us. (03.04.2015)               
                                                          
20 Doorkeepers are, like the gecekondu people, rural migrant men, who live with their family in 
the ground or bottom floor of the traditional apartment buildings and serve the middle class 
dwellers.   
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Figure 26: The apartment building constructed for the former gecekondu owners living in 
the valley before the project Note the laundry hanging from the balcony (Photo: Author, 
18.06.2014). 
When I showed her photos from the valley explaining which groups lived 
where, she said that the houses where the former gecekondu people resided 
were recognisable as they hung out the laundry in the balconies (see Figure 
26). She continued saying:   
These are the remnants of the gecekondu culture; they offend the eye. We dry 
the laundry in our drying racks inside the house. In our time, there must be 
nobody left without a drying rack in houses of that kind anyway. (03.04.2015) 
(Emphasis added)      
She thought that living in ‘houses of that kind’ that is modern apartment 
buildings necessitated compliance to shared rules. Traditional 4- or 5-storey 
apartment buildings were constructed at a time when the prices of inner-city 
urban land increased to such an extent that made single ownership on land 
unaffordable for the middle classes. As a result, they came together and paid to 
small-scale constructors who took legal permission for construction of multi-
storey apartments, which allowed plural ownership on the land. As opposed to 
the autonomy provided by the detached gecekondu houses, the apartments 
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imposed rules to which the residents needed to conform in order to live 
together in the privately owned flats in a shared building.  
Thus, Leman was frustrated by the fact that the gecekondu culture had not yet 
fully melted away so far. The absence of fulfilment of this expectation created 
discomfort in the valley where the affluent groups, the white-collar 
professionals and former gecekondu dwellers lived close to each other. Within 
the same context, the young affluent residents, who were more individualised, 
took no responsibility for the other members of the society and consented to 
the state-led modernisation.   
The affluent residents living in the gated communities represented the Dikmen 
Valley project as a successful example of urban transformation. They liked 
living in the valley as it was both in the inner city and at the same time isolated 
from the chaos, rush and visual pollution associated with it (see figure 27). Yet, 
the physical proximity of the ’other’ that threatened the symbolic boundaries 
between the ’civilised’ and the ’backward’ was an important concern.    
 
Figure 27: The view of the valley from the balcony of Hulya’s house in the prestigious Park 
Valley Terrace Houses (Photo: Author, 21.09.2015).      
Exposure to the ‘gecekondu culture’ created discomfort which was expressed 
more manifestly by the middle class residents living in the apartment buildings 
where former gecekondu dwellers were resettled. Nil and Latif were a couple 
who used to live in an apartment building where they were neighbours with 
former gecekondu dwellers, whom they thought were insistent on maintaining 
their culture. Nil told me that:  
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Here there is a well-organised community life, at least. [The former] It was a 
proper house for us but irritated us because of the milieu, the people living in 
the apartment, the street and everything… When we came here, we said 
“Well, civilisation!”. That’s what matters! (07.07.2015)             
Civilisation here referred to the compliance to the shared rules and middle-
class norms in the apartment. Tulin was an older woman also living in a mixed 
gated community. She felt very disappointed when she found out that the 
former gecekondu owners also lived there after she moved. She told me she 
missed her previous apartment where she lived with the ‘well-mannered, 
cultured people who made her happy’. She also complained that the former 
gecekondu owners did not comply with the middle class manners but on the 
contrary imposed their own rules as they still shook the carpet out from the 
window or spoke loudly at night in the shared garden. Both women attributed 
a ‘culture of noncompliance’ to the gecekondu people and blamed them for 
insisting on their lower class, rural habits and refusing to change, in a way that 
fixed them in time while Tulin et al. maintained themselves as modern, 
civilised people.  
Proximity to the formal gecekondu dwellers also disturbed some of the 
participants who lived in the prestigious apartments. Hazal (40) was living in 
the terrace houses, which were opposite the mixed buildings where the former 
gecekondu dwellers were resettled. She criticised the Dikmen Valley project on 
the basis of the resettlement of the gecekondu people in the valley saying that: 
‘Is that right? Here, there is such life. I am never saying this to mean disdain 
but life here is this sort, but life there is a completely different sort.’             
Azra was a young English teacher educated in the most notable private schools 
in Ankara and had a master’s degree in the UK. She was living at her parents’ 
house in a gated community adjacent to the bridge which Berkay said 
separated heaven from hell. She told me that her parents purchased that house 
both to live in it and as investment because they expected that the land values 
would increase over time as the project continued. However, she mentioned 
the contradictions they had to face as the project was delayed:  
On the bridge, now there are the gecekondu people, the waste collectors, the 
tents, and the Syrians etc… I mean, on the one hand you think that you are 
living in a civilised house, but on the other, you live among the very poor and 
stuff. (06.10.2015) (Emphasis added)       
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The groups, who were outside of civility, were not even worthy of classification 
as ’people’. 
The residents of prestigious gated communities were notably more worried 
about their security, particularly with reference to proximity of the former 
gecekondu dwellers. Serra told me that she did not feel secure despite the 
security personnel in the entrance and the cameras. She talked for ten minutes 
about the extra precautions she took against theft like adding fences to her 
garden.  
What worried them was not only robbery. Hazal thought that there was a 
manifest ‘security deficiency’ in the valley referring to the proximity of the 
former gecekondu dwellers living in the mixed buildings. The young adults 
living in the terrace houses and Park Valley Houses complained about the 
young adult male groups, who parked their car near their houses and drank 
beer while watching the view of the valley (See Figures 28 and 29). Berkay also 
liked living in Dikmen Valley very much as it was in the inner city and at the 
same time completely isolated from the outside world. He made the same 
complaint as Hazal, saying that there was only one problem about the valley:   
Before the valley was constructed, those areas were all gecekondu areas. The 
people who lived there at the time, their children, and their nephews and so 
on… Probably it is because they used to this area very much, in the evenings, 
they still come to the valley and spend time in their cars… They park their 
cars, and sit for hours until morning… And it gets incredibly crowded on the 
side of our building. This has started to be a very disturbing situation. There 
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Figure 28: Young male adults sitting on mobile chairs listening to the music from the car 
parked in front of the Park Valley Houses (Photo: Author, 21.09.2015). 
Indeed, Berkay could not understand how come those groups sat there all day 
without getting bored. Thus, he said that it could only be their habits, and 
continued: 
Normally, police walk around everywhere, cleanse, I mean do not usually 
allow people to listen to very loud music or drink alcohol on the streets, to 
disturb other people but for some reason they never come to our 
neighbourhood, never! (Emphasis added)  
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Figure 29: A photo sent by Gozde (29) representing the things she did not like about 
Dikmen Valley. 
His expectation of police intervention and ‘cleansing’ of the streets of groups 
who ‘disturb other people’ was echoed in other interviews in the participants’ 
perception of gecekondu neighbourhoods as antagonistic places. Azra, whose 
father was born into a gecekondu neighbourhood, explained it referring to the 
physical organisation of the gecekondu neighbourhoods in a ‘hierarchical, 
irregular way where you could not know what to expect as someone could hide 
there or show up at any moment’. She contrasted the apartment building with 
such places in terms of order saying that the presence of rules in the apartment 
about where to park your car or where to enter the building made her more 
comfortable. Her words echoed the state’s promotion of replacement of 
gecekondu neighbourhoods with well-ordered places in the municipal bulletin.    
As opposed to Azra who referred to the spatial organisation of gecekondu 
neighbourhoods, Leman referred to the lower standards the gecekondu people 
were subjected to. Nevertheless, rather than critically reflecting upon the 
political and economic processes that led to such inequalities, she added that 
those neighbourhoods became places where ‘terror incidences happen and 
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terrorists grow’ because it was impossible for the people to reach the 
standards of life that they saw in the city.   
To the extent that these middle and upper class residents expected the 
expansion of middle class values and norms to the urban space and 
punishment of those who do not comply with them, the ways they invested in 
the cultural binary between civility/non-civility cannot be analysed as 
individualised ways of reconstituting their class distinction, as was done in the 
cultural analyses of the class impact of gentrification (cf. Chapter 2). Their 
symbolic power over deciding ‘who can properly live in the city’, that is the 
power to ‘legitimise their world-view’ (Bourdieu, 1979), generated political 
effects, as the way they enacted citizenship as ‘civility’ corresponded to the 
official configuration of citizenship as ‘obedient’. Thus the maintenance of 
social images of the gecekondu settlers as ‘uncivilised/non-modern’ legitimised 
not only the demolition of gecekondu neighbourhoods but also the 
configuration of (housing) rights as granted by the benevolent state in return 
for obedience. I will come back to this in the last part of this chapter when I 
analyse the middle and upper class participants’ responses to gecekondu 
settlers’ political activism.   
6.3. Demands of Homogeneity and Isolation   
Within the context provided above, what concerned the majority of the upper 
class and some middle class participants was the smooth and urgent 
implementation of the projects in gecekondu areas. Yet, despite the alliance 
between the state actors and the affluent residents living in gated 
communities, the simultaneous promises of inclusion made to the obedient 
gecekondu dwellers through state-led gentrification generated anxiety among 
the affluent residents. Their residential choices of based on imagined shared 
class similarities revealed their concerns and disappointment driven by the 
inclusion of ‘the non-modern other’.   
In the gated communities, there seemed to be a latent agreement about 
keeping one’s distance. Nilgun was a woman living in Upper Dikmen area in a 
recently constructed gated community. She compared the previous apartment 
she lived with that recent one and said:      
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There we could call our neighbour at night for him to take us to the hospital. 
Here, there are no such neighbour relations, no such warmth but relatively 
more distant relations… But I have good neighbours here, too. We are not 
close though, there is distance. But on the other hand nobody disturbs each 
other here with their noise or anything. There is a civilised life here because 
you are together with the people who somehow had the same views of life. 
(25.07.2015) (Emphasis added)          
Aynur echoed Nilgun saying that:         
But I sense such feeling of security in the gated community that I live now… 
In the former apartment, I mean, there are all kinds of people. Here, for 
instance, in this gated community, everybody has a shared view in terms of 
security, life standards, etc. (02.07.2015)                         
The alleged homogeneity of values served as a compensation for the close and 
co-operative neighbour relations that were experienced in the previous 
decades. Despite having spent their childhood in different cities and 
neighbourhoods, regardless of the class, age, gender differences, almost all of 
the residents of gated apartments I interviewed told me stories about past 
trust-based, close neighbour relations as the people living in the same 
apartment building were like an extended family and the boundaries between 
public and private space were blurred. In contrast, their current home had now 
become a ‘highly-protected castle of individuals, which made you hesitate even 
to knock on the people’s doors for fear of disturbing them’ in the words of Ela, 
who lived in a 13-storey gated apartment. Nevertheless, only Habibe and 
Kenan, who were both over 60, were frustrated by the loss of close neighbour 
relations.  
Their demands for isolation and homogeneity conformed to the imaginary 
ideals of the ‘ideal neighbourhood’ that was promoted through gentrification. 
Gated, gentrified places offer a more orderly relation to the space as opposed 
to the flexibility of the gecekondu neighbourhood in terms of the possibility of 
uses of space. Most of the people who lived in the gentrified part had not ever 
used the walk ways, parks or cafes in the valley. The orderly parks and 
ornamental pools rather offered a visually appealing background for the low-
income young couples, who were getting engaged and/or married and looking 
for a cheap place to take photos before the ceremony. Two residents of the 
gentrified area told me that when they needed to go even a short distance, like 
the market or the opposite block to visit their friends who lived there, they 
used their cars as they felt lazy to walk. Their sense of belonging was limited to 
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their home and their friends’ network in different places rather than the 
neighbourhood in which they lived. Not surprisingly, when I asked them 
whether they felt attached to where they lived, most of them responded saying 
that they loved their home.      
This was also manifested in the photos of the things they liked that they sent 
me. These were usually of their garden or landscapes of the valley taken from 
their balcony. What many of the participants liked very much about living in 
the valley was the spaciousness and the view of the sky and the valley. As many 
said, living in the city centre and isolated from the things associated with inner 
city namely the density of construction, noise, traffic jam at the same time was 
the best thing about living in the valley. Berkay said that what he liked very 
much about his house was that it was ‘extremely central and at the same time 
completely isolated from the outside world’. The photo Ceylan21 sent me 
(Figure 30) represented this with the view of the spacious valley, as a result of 
which she did not have to see another building when she opened her windows. 
As an example of the things she liked about living in the valley, Nagehan sent 
me a photo of the view taken from her balcony. Her photo also demonstrated 
the spacious landscape with ornament pools, walking paths, grasses and high-
rise apartment buildings (Figure 31).  
                                                          
21 Ceylan was a forty one year old resident in one of the high-rise apartment buildings that were 
constructed for the resettlement of the former gecekondu dwellers in the valley.  
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Figure 30: Photo sent by Ceylan (40) who lived in a high-rise apartment, in which the 
former gecekondu dwellers were resettled in Dikmen Valley. 
Deniz also preferred sending me photos from the garden of the gated 
community where she lived (Figure 32), which mirrored her demands of 
isolation referred to in the beginning of the chapter. The photo demonstrated 
fancy apartment buildings surrounding an empty basketball ground. The 
photos reflected a more individualised way of relating to the city space. The 
photos were visually appealing in terms of order — the design of buildings, 
trees and parks and ostentation — yet they lacked the story of the people living 
in, using and appropriating those places.  
  
 
Page | 136 
 
Figure 31: A photo sent by Nagehan (46), from her balcony. 
 
Figure 32: A photo sent by Deniz (36) who lived in a gated community in Dikmen district, 
close to Dikmen Valley. 
Michel de Certeau (1984) refers to the ‘territorialisation’ and ‘appropriation’ of 
space through every day ritualised use of space arguing that the repeated use 
of urban space formed the basis of a sense of belonging. For de Certeau, 
attachments to place are built on the basis of accumulated knowledge, memory 
and intimate corporal experiences, and these are gained mainly walking 
through urban space. These often high-rise gated apartments within well-
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organised and maintained gardens and parks in the valley impose a more 
distant relationship with space as the photos revealed.  
In contrast to the middle and upper class participants, the gecekondu dwellers I 
interviewed — including those who had moved to apartment buildings years 
ago — had a very strong sense of attachment and also ownership to their home 
and neighbourhood as they had appropriated these places through repeatedly 
using them for their needs. What was perceived as ‘hell’ by Berkay meant for 
the gecekondu residents the place where they have spent their adulthood, 
raised their children, and built close neighbour relations and collectively 
overcame the challenges of adjusting to the city. The older adults told me the 
stories of moving to an unknown city, occupying the land with the help of their 
relatives or fellowmen, purchasing the construction materials with debt or 
scavenging materials from demolished houses in the first and second phases of 
the valley, and constructing the gecekondu houses in one night. Thus, they had 
a concrete sense of belonging to the space and made strong claims to it 
although they did not have legal (thus legitimate) documents proving 
ownership. In their eyes, what made them rights-holders on these spaces was 
the time and labour spent transforming a vacant land into a home.  
In line with the neoliberal logic of reproducing the urban space for the more 
affluent users, the demolition of gecekondu neighbourhoods was promoted as 
an unavoidable condition for modernising the cities. The participants living in 
the gecekondu neighbourhood were conscious that the times were changing as 
the city changed in such a way that was less welcoming for them and their 
cultural practices. Just like the young adult, Ibo, in chapter 5, every day they 
witnessed the construction of progressively higher-rise and more luxurious 
residential and commercial buildings around their neighbourhood. That way, 
they became subjected to the symbolic violence of gentrification, as it 
legitimised the inegalitarian social relations through reproducing the city for 
the more affluent user. What the valley people were trying to figure out was 
’why now?’ after all those years of tolerance. Mustafa was an adult in his fifties, 
who had struggled actively against the implementation of the gentrification 
project. He explained the changes in urban policy and the duplicity of the state 
towards them, which created resentment. He said if the state did not tolerate 
them, they would never be able to construct gecekondu neighbourhoods:     
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We did not come here (the city), but you encouraged us to come! You 
tolerated us when we constructed these houses and then collected taxes and 
bills of electricity and water. In the election times, you treated us as citizens, 
you took my vote. Now, how come all of a sudden, I have become an illegal 
occupier after inhabiting here for 25 years! (01.09.2015)     
Osman (29), who was a construction company owner and an owner-occupant 
in the most prestigious apartments in the valley, explained the reason saying 
that ‘if this man built his gecekondu house in another place, not here, and the 
value of that land had not increased over time, would we call him an illegal 
occupier in that case?’. He also explicitly stated that the reason why the state 
promoted purchasing newly constructed homes to the low-income groups was 
to increase the profits offered to construction companies involved. He then 
added that the main question we should deal with was why these people 
moved to the cities from their villages as the cities were no longer able to 
satisfy the needs of so many people. Thus, despite the fact that he 
acknowledged the underlying motivations of rent-maximisation in the 
devaluation and criminalisation of the gecekondu people, what concerned him 
like Ela and Serra was not redistributive questions but prevention of rural-
urban migration. The shared emphasis on ‘sending them back’ revealed that in 
the eyes of these upper class residents the gecekondu settlers, who were either 
pitied or hated, were not qualified as people who can properly live in the city.      
6.4. Unclear Boundaries of Winners and Victims of Gentrification         
Far from thinking of going back to the rural areas from where they or their 
forbears originally came, against the threat of expulsion, almost all of the 
gecekondu people in the valley had purchased apartment flats using bank 
credits since the announcement of the project, as noted in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Although they became legal owners of apartment flats elsewhere, it cannot be 
simply said that they were profiteers of gentrification as they lost the place to 
which they constructed themselves and felt attached. Despite the deterioration 
in the physical conditions and the image of the neighbourhood, it was not an 
easy decision for some of them to leave the valley and move to their new 
homes.  
Mustafa was one of them. He had also purchased a house in another low-
income neighbourhood yet he still lived in the valley with his wife and two 
children. His wife, Ayse, told me that even when they went somewhere else like 
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their hometown, they did not want to stay there for long. She added that ‘when 
we come here, it’s peaceful’. The high-rise apartments associated with ‘civility’ 
and promoted as the ideal neighbourhood in publicity materials — like in the 
weekly municipal bulletins — was as undesirable as displacement.       
Moreover, they were still not accepted as equally worthy citizens. Mahir (25) 
was a former squatter dweller, who had moved to a four-storey apartment 
block in a middle class neighbourhood next to the grocery store owned by his 
family. He also told me that he used to know almost everyone in the gecekondu 
neighbourhood but he did not know the person living next to him in the 
apartment. He was frustrated to see that his neighbours ignored him when 
they met in the apartment. He thought that the ‘decent’, ‘highly educated’, 
‘modern’ residents of the Hosdere district associated neighbourly conduct with 
backwardness. Thus, the gecekondu stigma remained also after he moved to 
the ‘ideal space of citizenship’.  
Ulku (70) was a former gecekondu dweller who lived in one of the mixed 
buildings in the valley since 1998, and she told me that in her apartment she 
observed an enduring struggle between the former gecekondu dwellers and 
the newcomers. The newcomers looked down on the former gecekondu 
dwellers, and once she witnessed a verbal fight between the two. One of the 
newcomers went to the house of a former gecekondu dweller and argued with 
the parents because their children were making noise on the balcony. Ulku 
heard a woman yelling ‘gecekonducu’22 in front of the door of one of the 
gecekondu dwellers, which ‘made her feel very angry’ and want to get involved 
in the argument to send her away. She told me that some of the newcomers did 
not even want to ride the elevator in order to avoid encountering the 
gecekondu people. 
                                                          
22 Gecekonducu literally means the person who makes gecekondu but it is an insulting way of 
calling the gecekondu people as it also blames them for making profit out of gecekondu.   
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Figure 33: The view of the valley from across, Hosdere neighbourhood. The high-rise 
white blocks on the right were constructed for the gecekondu owners. When I did my 
fieldwork, they were resided by mixed groups. The houses on the left are the Park Valley 
Terrace Houses, which are the most prestigious buildings with best views of the valley. 
(Photo: Author, 03.04.2015). 
On the other hand, more than half of the middle class participants I 
interviewed were still tenants. In 2015 September, the price of a medium-size 
apartment flat in the Park Valley Terrace Houses (See Figure 33) in the valley 
was above 1 million Turkish Liras (220.000 sterling pounds), at least twice as 
expensive compared to the apartments where the white collar professionals 
lived. Ceylan (40) was a white-collar worker living in one of the mixed 
apartments. She purchased her house in 2004 using her own savings and her 
grandmother’s as well as bank credits. Although she was thinking about 
moving to a new, larger house in the city centre, she could only see those 
houses in the websites of property agencies. She said that ‘Ours are houses of 
normal citizens’ in comparison to the extremely expensive prestigious 
apartments in the valley area. So, she was conscious of the fact that the city 
space was becoming less affordable even for the ‘normal’ citizens, by which she 
meant white collar workers and professionals like her — as well as socially 
marginalised groups.  
Like Ceylan, many middle class participants were attentive to the fact that the 
housing prices in the city centre were gradually inflating in a speculative way. 
Aynur (52) was a senior white-collar worker, who had purchased a house in a 
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more recently constructed gated apartment in the third phase of the valley. She 
told me that she initially wanted to buy a house from the Park Valley Houses 
but she gave up due to the ‘snob attitude’ of the estate agents. She said that it 
was more expensive than her current house but one of the rooms was dark in 
daytime as there were no windows. Yet, she added that the estate agents 
thought they could sell it at that price because of its central location and 
prestige. She thought that with such attitude the developers exploited her need 
of housing for more profit. Within the same context, most of the white-collar 
participants expressed concerns about purchasing new and high-quality 
houses in the inner city areas. 
The affluent participants, who could afford to purchase the houses in the inner 
city, were receiving gains from speculation. Osman (29) lived in the Park Valley 
Terrace Houses, which he thought were the best apartments in the valley 
viewing both sides of the valley. He said that it ended up as a good investment 
as the housing prices increased one and a half time since 2011 when he 
purchased his house. He regretted that he had not purchased his house earlier 
when the terrace houses were constructed as their gains were higher. Hakan 
(65) lived in the prestigious Park Oran Houses, which were constructed after 
demolishing the lodgings of the parliament members, said that he purchased 
the house he lived in both to live in a prestigious residence and as an 
investment. He added that the price was 700.000 TL (which was 
approximately 250.000 GBP) when he bought the house in 2012 before the 
construction was finished, and it became 2.000.000 TL (which was 
approximately 444.000 GBP) when I interviewed with him in 2015.     
Zukin (1987) argues that the motives of the gentrifiers who participated in the 
back-to-the-city movement in the 1970s in North America, were 
heterogeneous. They were motivated by an economic rationality as a result of 
the involvement of larger corporations, speculation and the possibility of 
higher rents in the process as well as social reproduction as inner city offered 
proximity to the services, information, and cultural and artistic activities. She 
adds that the speculative goal of the gentrifiers’ property investments 
outweighed their aesthetic hallmark in terms of its social effect. The quotations 
from the white-collar workers in Dikmen Valley revealed that far from being 
the main agents and supporters of gentrification, they were blocked by the 
reduced opportunities for being able to afford to buy homes in the city centre.        
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On the other hand, although most of the gecekondu dwellers had become legal 
homeowners — mostly in low-income neighbourhoods — they were still not 
regarded as proper citizens for living in the city centre. As the narratives of the 
different groups of affluent citizens made clear, the gecekondu people became 
the absolute other of what was understood as modern. The affluent groups 
thus demanded to live in ‘civilised’ places in the city centre together with — 
but isolated from — ‘civilised’ people, who would respect their privacy. These 
discussions on material and symbolic processes demonstrated the blurring 
boundaries between who benefits from gentrification. 
6.5. Denial of the Political Agency of Gecekondu People  
The gecekondu represented a blurring between not only public and private but 
also formality and informality. The ‘informal’ housing settlements in 
developing countries encompassed activities operating outside of the legal 
framework defined by the state: they lacked tenure security of land and 
buildings, were constructed in a do-it-yourself manner, and lacked municipal 
services, all of which were claimed to imply non-monetary relationships in 
housing production (Pamuk, 1992, p. 140).  
Given that modernism and civility were understood by multiple groups in 
Turkey in terms of compliance with rules, the ambiguous status of gecekondu 
neighbourhoods represented manifest disobedience to the state authority. 
Demolishing the gecekondu neighbourhoods thus meant annihilating spaces of 
noncompliance to the rules of the state. This confirmed the legitimacy of the 
state as the authority to set the rules of civility within the context of the state-
centrism.  
Within this framework, the affluent participants agreed that the high-rise TOKI 
blocks constructed in the peripheral areas to resettle the gecekondu dwellers 
constituted a much more orderly and thus better view than the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods. The most popular example in the interviews was the TOKI 
blocks constructed on the main highway connecting the city to the airport (See 
figure 34). Osman thought that the former image of the airport highway full of 
gecekondu houses on the both sides of the road was damaging the prestige of 
Turkey as that road was used by the high-level bureaucrats when they visited 
the capital city. Tulin (63), a shop owner in a prestigious shopping mall, was 
also ashamed of the previous image of the airport way when ‘everywhere you 
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turned your head was full of gecekondu’. In these narratives, order and 
compliance to rules was discussed with reference to modernism.   
 
Figure 34: The TOKI blocks constructed on the airport highway for the former gecekondu 
dwellers living in the area (Source: Anonymous). 
The middle class participants and two of the affluent participants, both of who 
were above the age 60, acknowledged that the state’s inadequate housing 
policies ‘forced’ people to construct gecekondu houses illegally on public land. 
The common argument was that if there was enough supply of social housing, 
low-income people would not have to build gecekondu houses and live in lower 
standards. Moreover, by tolerating gecekondu construction instead of 
provision of the social right to housing, the state forced people to live 
parasitically, Aynur thought.   
In the narratives of most of the middle class participants, gecekondu 
neighbourhoods were represented as places of the poor, not the criminal. 
When I quoted the Mayor’s words about the criminal groups living in Dikmen 
Valley, Bora, who lived in a mixed building in the valley, was very surprised as 
he said that he never associated gecekondu neighbourhoods with such groups. 
Kivanc, a young public servant living in a high-rise apartment close to the 
bridge in the valley, also told me that crime did not decline after the project 
was implemented. He said that the housebreaking incidences that had taken 
place every year in his apartment building continued.     
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They supported the demolition of gecekondu neighbourhoods and transfer of 
the inhabitants into apartment buildings for the sake of the gecekondu people 
themselves as those buildings were equipped with better standards and higher 
quality infrastructure compared to the inferior conditions in the informal 
settlements. Kivanc had lived adjacently to the gecekondu neighbourhood 
when he first moved to the valley. He said that he was never disturbed by 
living close to the gecekondu neighbourhood. He supported gecekondu 
clearance for the sake of a planned urbanisation and the provision of better 
living standards for the residents. He said that the people lived under very 
unhealthy and dangerous conditions there due to bad infrastructure yet he 
also acknowledged the potential difficulties in adjusting to living in an 
apartment building after one-story houses with gardens. Deniz, another public 
servant who was a tenant in a gated community, also thought that TOKI blocks 
looked like ghettos where they enclosed people, even though she supported 
gecekondu clearance.  
Thus, most of the middle class participants living in modest gated and non-
gated buildings acknowledged the social costs of gentrification referring to the 
displacement and social isolation involved. They saw the gecekondu areas as 
unhealthy and disorderly but they did not necessarily establish a link between 
these qualities and the culture of the gecekondu people. They were conscious 
about what was going on beneath the surface as they also referred to corrupt 
and rent-seeking motives of the public and private actors involved — 
particularly the TOKI and the pro-government construction companies — and 
the potential rental gains offered by transforming the gecekondu areas.  
Yet, they still supported gecekondu clearance and construction of TOKI houses 
as the latter looked more orderly, thus, ‘felt more developed’ (Bora). They 
thought that the transformation was for the betterment of the gecekondu 
people themselves as it would bring them better and healthier standards. In 
that, they reproduced themselves as ‘highly educated, politically conscious 
citizens’ who could analyse the complex processes whereas the gecekondu 
people were ‘poorly educated, low income citizens’, who might not 
comprehend what was best for them and the rest of the city.  
The more affluent citizens living in the prestigious gated apartments 
predominantly represented the gecekondu people in a manifestly criminalising 
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way as the ‘illegal occupier/disobedient other’. Leman, an owner-occupier in a 
moderate gated apartment close to Dikmen Valley, told me that she used to feel 
very sorry before when she saw the demolition news on TV but she got ‘very 
angry’ when she saw that those people started to ‘claim rights’ on the state’s 
land that they had occupied unjustly. Although she acknowledged the earlier 
provision of title deeds by the state, she still saw those claims as illegitimate.  
It was difficult for them to understand why the gecekondu people did not 
support urban transformation projects which offered them legal 
homeownership in new apartment buildings, which actually they did not 
deserve. The right to shelter struggle in the valley was explained by Nilgun in 
terms of the ‘protest culture’ of gecekondu people. She said that in such 
neighbourhoods, protest was part of their culture; they wanted to keep their 
neighbourhood as it was without knowing why. In this way, she not only 
neglected the experiences of displacement and indebtedness but also 
trivialised gecekondu people’s rights-based claims to be recognised as equally 
worthy citizens. 
Some of the affluent participants thought that the gecekondu people were 
greedy as they linked the struggles for the right to shelter to the motive of 
getting a bigger share of the increased urban land values. Osman, for instance, 
thought that the current gecekondu settlers living in Dikmen Valley were 
‘awakened’ as they had the rationality that the longer you wait, the more 
luxurious construction is made and the higher the price of the land becomes.  
Hakan and Berkay also thought that the ones who opposed the projects wanted 
two or three houses in return for their gecekondu house/land instead of just 
one. Hulya said that struggling was part of the ‘politics of exploiting the state’. 
In contrast to Aynur, who addressed inadequate state policies in terms of 
forcing the gecekondu residents to become parasitic, Hulya put the blame on 
the latter.  
By more affluent residents, the gecekondu dwellers were not seen as right-
bearing individuals with the power to claim their rights. As the ‘undeserving’, 
or ‘criminal’ other, they were expected to obey the terms offered the state 
when implementing the projects. For Nilgun, for instance, what the struggling 
gecekondu communities did was ‘talk back to the state’ for giving them a 
smaller share from the rental gains offered by the projects. Hakan, an owner of 
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a constructor company and an owner-occupier in a prestigious gated 
community was heavily concerned about the smooth progress of gentrification. 
He demanded more urgent and top-down implementation of gentrification:      
There is this gecekondu dweller; he resists the urban transformation project 
and refuses to leave the house. But, is that your own property? OK, you 
constructed this but a highway will be constructed on that land now. He 
applies to the court, and there is no decision in five years! The state must 
enact a law, if there needs to be a highway on that land, the state should have 
no pity. Take your money! It’s less than the value! What’s less? The land is not 
yours, it belongs to the state! Nothing can be done against the state! 
(12.09.2015) (Emphasis added).       
His words represented the state as the main and the only actor that can set the 
codes of urbanisation and criminalised the rights-based claims to substantive 
citizenship. He added that, as illegal occupiers, the gecekondu people had no 
right to claim and the state could even cut off their electricity and water if it 
wanted. Nagehan supported gentrification as long as the state was ‘just when 
providing housing rights to its citizens and did not give the gecekondu people 
new houses for free in return for illegally occupied land. Thus, the 
authoritarian promotion of obedient participation in urban transformation 
projects and punitive measures against any form of opposition were legitimate 
in the eyes of Hakan.  
On the other hand, for some participants urban transformation was not a 
question worthy of attention whether or not the process was done in a just 
way so long as the gecekondu people were transferred to the peripheral areas 
from the city centre. Despite saying that the act of illegally occupying the land 
was tyrannical, Berkay thought that we needed to be ‘merciful’. The solution he 
proposed was to transfer the right-holder gecekondu people from the inner-
city project areas:  
If you want, more luxurious, higher-quality apartments might still be 
constructed there as well. Maybe, they can be given title-deeds in other 
places… I mean, places in the peripheries of the city. They can be sent there 
instead of keeping them here. Maybe then, it will be more proper. 
(11.08.2015)   
Hazal agreed with him saying that the transfer of the gecekondu people from 
the project area should not be left to their personal initiatives; as they ‘of 
course would not want to leave such a place’ like the valley. She emphasised 
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that the state should ‘comply with’ the wishes of the gecekondu people. She 
suggested that it should construct places with facilities like schools in it, and 
people should be informed beforehand, and ‘convinced’ to move, as forced 
eviction would only lead them to resist and delay the implementation of the 
projects. Thus, she gave consent for the inclusion of the gecekondu people in 
the process in a way that reserved the city centre for the more affluent users.        
Lust but not least, Ela, who worked as an adviser in the Presidency, saw the 
provision of new houses for cheap in return for ‘illegally occupied’ gecekondu 
house/land as social aid which was totally unproblematic saying that, ‘among 
thousands of the new houses constructed, a single house will be given to them; 
so be it’. Calling the gecekondu settlers who benefitted from the projects as 
‘poor people to whom the state should show mercy’, she added that the gains 
made by the gecekondu people lacking title deeds were, and should be, 
tolerable bearing in mind the huge benefits of the large-scale constructors and 
the municipalities involved. Although she did not blame or criminalise the 
gecekondu settlers unlike the abovementioned participants, she echoed their 
narratives as she overlooked the rights-based struggles and thus 
conceptualised the struggling gecekondu communities as de-politicised groups 
lacking the power to influence the political processes and decisions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the symbolic struggles over ‘who can properly live in 
the city’ by the middle and upper class groups who lived through gentrification 
in and/or close to Dikmen Valley in relation to the changing property 
structures throughout gentrification. This chapter argues that in line with the 
embedded state-centrism in the modernisation process in Turkey, state-led, 
non-participatory gentrification process promised the modern city that the 
urban middle and upper class citizens had dreamed of. Clearance of non-
modern gecekondu neighbourhoods from the city centre was attached to this 
promise in a way that legitimised the former groups’ claims to modernism.  
Through enacting citizenship as civility, which was defined on the basis of 
order, they consented to the demolition of non-modern gecekondu areas and 
transfer of the residents to ‘modern’ apartment buildings constructed in the 
peripheral areas by TOKI. In so doing, however, these groups also consented to 
the authoritarian and non-participatory redevelopment of urban space, which 
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reinforced an understanding of citizenship not only as bestowed by the state in 
return for obedience but also criminalising rights-based claims. The focus on 
the symbolic power of the dominant groups revealed that the middle and 
upper class groups not only participate in gentrification as consumers of the 
gentrified houses but also as political actors, whose mundane class practices 
generate political impacts.  
Thus, by taking political processes and motives into account this chapter 
demonstrates that inclusion in gentrification was promised on the basis of 
allegiance as well as consumption power. This revealed that the relation of the 
affluent groups to the contemporary gentrification in Turkey cannot be 
understood solely with reference to middle-class take back of the city following 
the processes of de-industrialisation and successive expansion of white-collar 
jobs. Far from being the main agents and supporters of gentrification process, 
the middle class participants in my study were financially threatened by the 
speculative urban redevelopment. By relating this to the provision of the 
obedient gecekondu settlers with cheap credits to become home owners, this 
chapter revealed the ways state-led gentrification complicated class dynamics. 
The next chapter will explore the ways struggling gecekondu communities in 
Dikmen Valley contested the complex processes of inclusion and exclusion 
throughout gentrification and enacted their own understanding of citizenship 
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Chapter 7: From a Struggle of Rights to a 
Demand of Deservingness 
 
In this chapter, I explore the Right to Shelter Struggle in Dikmen Valley, which 
has been a leading example in Turkey as a resistance against gentrification-led 
displacement by the gecekondu people lacking title deeds. The accounts on its 
initial phases as well as the leftist-oriented news media emphasise that the 
struggle brought a heterogeneous gecekondu population together against 
exclusion. These, however, overlook the complex ways the gecekondu people 
negotiated with complex processes of inclusion and exclusion through 
gentrification.  
Drawing upon the differences between what I had read about the valley and 
the data I collected through 26 in-depth interviews I conducted with 7 former 
and 19 current gecekondu dwellers, the group interviews and random chats as 
well as the participant observations in the gecekondu neighbourhood 
throughout my fieldwork from January to October 2015, I offer an analysis of 
the right to shelter struggle as a long-term, dynamic process during which 
multiple actors interact in a changing field. Analysing these interactions, I aim 
to reveal the inner tensions and contradictions generated through the complex 
combination of promises of gentrification and its disciplining efforts.       
I offer a temporal analysis of the Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle to 
elaborate these complexities. I first shed light upon the fragile ground of 
political activism against the state referring to the projections of the embedded 
state-centrism when approaching the gecekondu populations. Then, I focus on 
the transformative character of the Dikmen Valley struggle, which was beyond 
effective mobilisation. Drawing upon Isin’s concept of the ‘right to claim rights’ 
(2009), I elaborate the emergence of the traditionally obedient gecekondu 
people as claim makers. Finally, I detect the different challenges to the right 
making potential of the struggle.  
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7.1. Fragile Ground of Political Activism   
The Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter Struggle, with over 9 years standing, has 
acquired a symbolic importance beyond its own boundaries, for its ability to 
mobilise a heterogeneous and vulnerable population. While the process of 
mobilisation drew much attention in the academic studies, in the leftist-
oriented news media, it has been regarded as the symbol of the struggle for the 
right to shelter in Turkey. Thus, before I started my fieldwork, I was excited 
about going to the neighbourhood and meeting the struggling communities 
there.  
I got access to the neighbourhood through two different members of the PH, 
who had been active in the struggle from the beginning. My first visit to the 
neighbourhood was in February 2015 when my partner took me there by car, 
as the neighbourhood was denied public transport facilities after they started 
political activism against the project. As I travelled to the Right to Shelter 
Bureau where the members of the PH were waiting for me, I saw people 
walking in groups, presumably to the bureau to attend the weekly meeting. I 
could see that as we passed by they were examining the stranger’s car. I got 
out of the car where two women, who were informed by my gatekeeper, were 
waiting for me. The younger one was a member of the PH whereas the other 
one was not. As I walked with them to the bureau, the former immediately 
asked me where I knew the gatekeeper from — who was also a member of the 
PH — to understand whether I had any affiliation with the PH.  
The older woman (Begum) — whom I also interviewed a few weeks later — 
also asked me which city and village I was from. This is a question asked 
usually by rural-origin people in order to understand whether the person is 
Alevi or Sunni.23 In Turkey, the population of the villages is homogenous in 
terms of religious sect and ethnic origin. This is also relevant for some 
neighbourhoods of the cities where both Alevi and Sunni people live.  
My first impression was different than I had expected as I thought I was going 
to find a ‘united’ neighbourhood based on what I had read. However, as 
opposed to the earlier observations of a non-hierarchical mobilisation without 
leadership (Aykan, 2011), the leading presence of the PH in the neighbourhood 
                                                          
23 Sunnism is the orthodox sect, and Alevism is the main heterodox sect among the Muslim 
population in Turkey.  
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was explicit, as will be discussed below. When we arrived at the bureau, I 
noticed the red poster hanging on top of the bureau (see figure 35) saying that 
‘we have constructed with pains, won't give up to rentiers’. It indicated 
politicisation and collective disapproval of rent-seeking urban redevelopment. 
Before long, I was going to discover that this no longer represented the truth.     
 
Figure 35: People waiting for the weekly meeting to start in the garden of the Right to 
Shelter Bureau. Note the orange poster above the door saying 'We have constructed with 
pains, won't give up to rentiers'. (Photo: Author: 26.07.2015). 
The right to shelter bureau was opened in 2006 when the valley people 
transformed an empty gecekondu house situated in the centre of the 
neighbourhood into a place to discuss what to do about the gentrification 
project. This was in response to the opening of a bureau by the municipality in 
the adjacent Yildiz neighbourhood — which the valley people called ‘the 
demolition bureau’ — to invite the people to accept the terms of the project 
and sign the contract. Later, a container house was put next to this, where 
hardbound and online documents such as legal reports and books regarding 
the gentrification project in the valley were stored. Since then, the right to 
shelter bureau had been the centre where the valley people were informed 
about the process in weekly meetings and provided with consultancy about 
what to do by the representative figures of the struggle.      
We arrived at the bureau and the younger woman introduced me to Tarik, the 
representative of the struggle, and told him that I wanted to do fieldwork in 
  
 
Page | 152 
the neighbourhood. Tarik was a member of the PH, who had been living in the 
valley for decades. After welcoming me in a distanced manner, he also asked 
me questions about who I was. The university I graduated from, the Middle 
East Technical University, was famous for its radical activism, thus, the name 
enabled me to create a positive impression. He was a revolutionary leftist, who 
went to jail for his activism throughout the 1970s. As part of such activism the 
gecekondu neighbourhood in the Dikmen Valley was established as noted 
earlier.  
His leftism was still anti-imperialist and orthodox Marxist as he evaluated 
gentrification in Turkey with respect to the single logic of accumulation of 
global capital. He asked me questions about what I understood from 
gentrification. I felt that during our discussion for 15-20 minutes he tested 
whether my approach was critical enough to do research about the Dikmen 
Valley, thus whether I could be trusted. I emphasised that I had a critical 
approach to gentrification, and I wanted to analyse it from below focusing on 
the lay experiences. After our conversation, before leaving the bureau to attend 
the weekly meeting held in the adjacent gecekondu house, he told me gently 
‘you can come whenever you want’. By doing so, he announced my permission 
to do my research in the neighbourhood.         
That day, I attended the weekly meeting for the first time. I was surprised to 
see that there were about 30 participants, who sat around the stove and 
listened to the speech of Tarik quietly and concernedly. Based on what I had 
read, I expected to see people collectively setting out the topics and discussing 
them in the meetings in a way that reproduced their claim-making potential 
and solidarity. However, the people seemed to be there to be informed about 
the process which was led by Tarik and a few other activist figures. Tarik also 
complained about people’s reluctance to attend the meetings and actively 
monitor the process.  
Another surprising thing for me was that I met two sisters of primary school 
age before the meeting. The first question they asked me was if I was a 
member of the PH, and the second one was if I went to Cem house.24 This made 
me think that the children were accustomed to seeing strangers from 
particular groups in the neighbourhood. On the one hand, being asked such 
                                                          
24 Cem house is the place of worship in the Alevi Islam, the main heterodox sect in Islam. Thus, 
it was a question about my religious sect.  
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questions revealed the significance of the issue of trust in strangers —
undoubtedly due to the long-lasting conflicts with the local state and high level 
of stigmatisation and criminalisation of the neighbourhood. On the other, the 
fact that trust was attached to belonging to particular religious and political 
groups implied a strongly polarised world view in direct contrast to the 
representation of the struggle as having mobilised people and overwhelmed 
cultural and political divisions.   
The process of mobilising a collective struggle had been challenging. 
Traditionally, gecekondu people, as the ‘others’ of the civilised, urbanite 
citizens, tended to vote for the mainstream political parties so as to be 
integrated to the mainstream society, a decidedly conservative political 
strategy grounded in inclusion not rebellion. Except for engaging with radical 
leftist activists in the 1970s, gecekondu neighbourhoods were famous for their 
allegiance to the local and national governments, in return for which they 
received state tolerance of informality. In particular, they were bribed with a 
share from the transformation of gecekondu houses into apartment buildings 
through amnesty laws to deter political activism against the state (Erman, 
2001, pp. 986-987).     
Thus, the valley people were initially sceptical of the idea of insurgence against 
the state and hesitated to be involved in a resistance movement, although they 
were unwilling to leave their houses. Then, a couple of households, who had 
been involved in political activism, came forward and turned one of the 
gecekondu houses in the centre of the neighbourhood into the Right to Shelter 
Bureau. People initially hesitated to go there but over time they started to go to 
the meetings to be informed about the process. Thus, the mobilisation was 
spontaneous rather than being a movement led by revolutionary subjects.  
Activism was not a smooth process for the leading activists whom I 
interviewed, either. They told me about the doors shut in their faces, and the 
insults and humiliation they were subjected to when they went to the houses 
to talk to the people. One of them was Aysel (45), who worked as a tea maker 
in a private company. She was telling me about the initial processes when the 
bureau was established, saying that: 
We have never become part of a political organisation before; we have no 
idea! … I mean how do we rebel against the state? We have that mentality, 
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you know. Then we said ‘Ok, let’s do it’! You know, you venture upon 
something, but what will happen? Is there a hole in front of you? Will you 
fall? Will you die? Let’s do it! We went from house to house, distributed 
leaflets, spoke to the people… I mean we were telling them in our own way, 
what could we tell them? Because, I had no knowledge about it! I mean I was 
saying to myself when I went to bed at night ‘can we really do it; can we rebel 
against the state?’ (01.02.2015)  
She described herself as ‘an ordinary person, who is just concerned about 
welcoming her husband from work and providing a good future for her 
children’. This definition echoed the de-politicised, thus non-threatening 
behaviours of the gecekondu populations, which had been desired by the state 
and rewarded with inclusion into the urban space.  
Because of the embedded state-centrism and the traditional contract between 
the state officials and gecekondu populations based on tolerance in return for 
allegiance, political activism was constructed on a fragile ground from the very 
beginning. However, in 2006 urban transformation project in the fourth and 
fifth phases of the valley was announced unilaterally by the greater 
municipality without any prior information or negotiation. Written notices 
were sent to dwellers lacking title deeds to sign the contract and evacuate their 
houses in 15 days. This indicated an unexpected change in the traditional 
contract based on tolerance and loyalty. Despite their hesitance, the sudden 
withdrawal of the state tolerance led the gecekondu dwellers in the valley, 
most of who lacked legal title-deeds as well as another place to go, to 
participate in some way in political activism or at least maintain staying in 
their houses although they were not necessarily involved in activism.                    
When the project was announced there were 1,084 households holding title 
deeds and 1,200 households lacking it (Deniz, 2010, p. 104 cited in Aykan, 
2011, p. 29). The former was offered either to be relocated in apartment 
houses in the valley or sell their houses at a price much cheaper than the 
market value. In contrast to the early phases of the project — which excluded 
those lacking title deeds with environmental concerns in order to keep the 
construction density in the valley low — were included in the project, which 
was due to the political concerns of promoting obedience as well as economic 
concerns to include low-income people into the housing market. They were 
offered to be relocated to the Doğukent area, which was at the time an empty 
land 30 km away from the valley. They were also asked to pay 16,000 Turkish 
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Liras in advance for the apartment houses that were promised to be 
constructed on that land.    
The gecekondu settlers who lacked title deeds claimed that they were as 
legitimate right-holders on the land as those holding title deeds and demanded 
to be offered the same conditions. This claim was based upon the long-lasting 
efforts and suffering caused by having to endure living in the absence of 
services in low-quality houses that they had constructed overnight. They 
blamed the state’s inability to provide affordable shelter for low-income 
groups. They saw themselves equal to the holders of title deeds on the basis of 
sense of belonging and ownership, in contrasts to the official interpretations 
based on legality. So, they continued to stay in the valley.  
In response to that, the municipality sent demolition teams with more than 
5,000 anti-riot forces to the neighbourhood on the 1st February, 2007 to 
demolish 7 gecekondu houses, in which the municipality claimed the leading 
figures of the resistance movement lived. The clashes and violent attacks with 
pepper gas and water cannon lasted in different parts of the neighbourhood 
throughout the day, and 14 people were taken into custody. Although the 
demolitions were not carried out that day, the valley people were given the 
message about the insistence of the local state on implementing the project.  
Most of the people who did not hold title deeds felt weak vis-à-vis such 
powerful and violent state actors due to fear of forced displacement. 
Nevertheless, state violence was responded in diverse ways. Hundreds of 
households gradually moved from the neighbourhood following the 1st 
February attack whereas on the other hand initial inhibitions about 
engagement in political activism weakened for some. Gulsen (40) was one of 
them. She started attending the weekly meetings as well as the protests 
outside the neighbourhood secretly from her husband, who did not want his 
family to be associated with the radical activists in case the municipality made 
any offers in the future. Nevertheless, Gulsen referred to the proverb ‘the 
finger cut by the state does not hurt’25, and added that ‘but it does; you suffer 
great hardship’. This revealed her readiness to defy the local state for her right 
to shelter as well as embedded gender hierarchies in her family.    
                                                          
25 A proverb meaning that the rule of law is always for justice even when it involves violence. So 
long as the law maker is the state, people have tended to obey the existing order even though 
they disapprove.  
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7.2. Becoming Right-Claimers  
By the end of 2006, almost all of the title-deed holders signed the contracts and 
left the valley. Around 3,000 people without title deeds and 25-30 households 
with it and very few tenants were on the other hand involved in the resistance 
movement (Aykan, 2011, p. 47). Their struggle to be included in the process on 
equal terms with the ones holding title deeds and relocated in the valley 
created an impact beyond the boundaries of the valley. This was because of the 
fact that they were claiming rights to the space they illegally occupied without 
having a legal title deed. The gecekondu dwellers without title deeds expressed 
their will to participate in the gentrification process as right-claimers.   
Engin Isin (2009) analyses the struggles of sans-papiers demanding their right 
to stay in Paris and the right to regularised status. He draws upon Arendt’s 
conceptualisation of being political as the ‘capacity to act’ (Arendt, 1969: 179 
cited in Isin, 2009, p. 380), which is defined as ‘to actualise a rupture in the 
given, to enact the unexpected and unpredictable’ (Sartre, 1957, p. 613; 
Arendt, 1958, p. 178 cited in Isin, 2009, p. 380). He argues that the importance 
of sans-papiers is not that they simply pointed to the injustice of their situation 
and sought their ‘human rights’. Rather, they enacted themselves as citizens by 
usurping the right to claim rights (p. 381, Emphasis added). Through this 
example, Isin develops the concept of ‘activist citizenship’ as that which makes 
a break, a ‘rupture’ in the public sphere. Because of this rupture-making 
potential, this kind of activism is different from other democratic processes, 
such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting (p. 380).         
Drawing on his emphasis on ‘acts that make a break in the given’, I evaluate the 
right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley as an act of citizenship. The Dikmen 
Valley struggle is important not only because of what it did, that is the effective 
mobilisation of a highly heterogeneous group of people — as underlined in the 
existing literature — but also because of how it did it, in other words, what 
people have become throughout the mobilisation process. Hereby I offer an 
analysis of struggle from two interconnected aspects: as a practice that enacts 
the gecekondu settlers mostly lacking title deeds as right claimers and, by so 
doing, refashioning citizenship in a way that challenges the understanding of 
‘granted rights’ embedded in the political culture of Turkey and promoted 
throughout gentrification. From this perspective, the right to shelter struggle 
in Dikmen Valley was a struggle in which the people lacking legal title deeds 
  
 
Page | 157 
demanded to be included in the redistribution of urban lands among different 
urban actors and they did it through claiming their right to become parts of the 
decision-making process about the urban space. By actually appropriating 
their right to claim rights despite the absence of legal title deeds, they enabled 
themselves as claim-making citizens.  
This is pioneering within the context of Turkey, where the potential of 
‘ordinary people’ (in Aysel’s words) for making and mobilising around rights-
based claims had been eroded by the state-centric, duty-based configuration of 
citizenship and populist tolerance of informality, in particular. The act of 
refusing to leave the land which they did not legally possess defied the 
traditional compliance of the gecekondu settlers, who had been governed by 
the ruling politicians as ‘apolitical’ subjects. In doing that, the rebellious groups 
in the valley claimed not only the right to shelter but also to be recognised as 
equally capable and worthy to participate in the urban decision-making 
processes as opposed to the official promotion of obedient participation in 
state-led projects. 
The act of claim-making through the right to shelter struggle helped the 
gecekondu people compensate for the ‘hidden injuries’, which had created 
‘ambivalence about their right to be angry at social hierarchies’ (Sennett and 
Cobb, 1993, p. 79). As opposed to the on-going criminalisation of rights-based 
claims and the promotion of obedient citizenship, the power and solidarity 
derived from collective right claiming promised them ‘activist citizenship’.   
This targeted the traditional gap between the formal and substantive aspects 
of their citizenship. Holston and Appadurai (1996, p. 190) explain this gap, 
arguing that it is growing within the context of globalisation:    
If the formal refers to membership in the nation-state and the substantive to 
the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess 
and exercise, much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following 
problem: although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in 
practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent 
of its formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is 
increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive 
citizenship. That it is not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who 
have formal membership in the state but who are excluded in fact or law 
from enjoying the rights of citizenship and participating effectively in its 
organization.     
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This indicates the class aspect hidden by the promise of formal equality by 
citizenship. There has always been a disjunction between the formal and 
substantive aspect of citizenship of the gecekondu residents, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4 within the context of the historical development of the 
citizenship regime in Turkey. The rural migrants’ right to housing was denied 
due to the absence of social housing. Their solution was based on insurgence 
against state authority as they illegally occupied urban land and constructed 
their gecekondu houses overnight. They strategically supported the 
mainstream governments that tolerated their illegal occupation and 
maintenance of rural way of living in the city, as discussed in detail in Chapter 
4. Despite being formal members of the state, the fact that their presence in the 
city depended on state’s populist tolerance disguised the state’s incapacity to 
meet the housing requirements of its citizens and blocked their access to the 
means to exercise and claim rights as they were concerned with maintaining 
the political support.  
By enacting themselves as rights claimers, therefore, the actors in the Dikmen 
Valley right to shelter struggle created a rupture in the long-lasting consensus 
between the state officials and the gecekondu people about the disjunction 
between the latter’s formal and substantive citizenship. Through making 
rights-based claims to redistribution and recognition as opposed to the 
traditional tendencies of gecekondu people towards integration into 
mainstream politics, the valley people imagined themselves as citizens, who 
were not only formal members of the state with constitutional rights but also 
with the capacity to claim their rights.  
Within this context, Haydar, one of the leading figures in the right to shelter 
struggle, likened their 9-year struggle to a university in which they learnt how 
to become citizens through embracing their right to claim rights:              
Haydar: Since we established the right to shelter bureau, big things have 
changed. We have discovered that we are persons, we are citizens. (Emphasis 
added)     
Oznur: Were you not citizens before?    
Haydar: Really, citizen, I mean, let’s say this. The elected head of the 
neighbourhood, when he said ‘come, countryman’… there was clientelism. 
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There was religious sectarianism. There were also localisms. You are from 
Kars, from Sivas, from Yozgat, from Malatya, from Corum.26 There were these 
kinds of things.      
Oznur: And these divisions were separating you?  
Haydar: Yes, they were.  
Oznur: So, Alevi people did not interact much with Sunni people, for 
instance? 
Haydar: No, they did not, really! But after the 1st February, we have become 
united, constituted a great unity. We believed in each other. When we started 
the struggle, we really believed in each other. (20.03.2015)     
The valley had originally been organised based on homogenous blocks by a 
political community tied through customs, and religious and ethnic identities, 
who had limited or no interaction with one another. The shared threat of 
displacement led those heterogeneous groups not only to act in solidarity — as 
emphasised in the existing studies — but also and more importantly to view 
themselves and each other as ‘holders of right claims’.  
I had a chance to talk to two former gecekondu owner women who were 
resettled in the high-rise apartment buildings in the 2nd and 3rd phases of the 
project area. Both of them told me they were very grateful to the local state for 
making them legal homeowners in the valley, which they could have never 
imagined if the urban transformation project had not taken place. One of them, 
Ülkü, was a retired nurse at early 80s, who thought that God rewarded her for 
her hard work after long years of suffering in a gecekondu house.  
She also mentioned that the implementation of the project took 4 years, during 
which some of her neighbours started to think that they were deceived by fake 
promises of replacement in the valley, and denounced the local state officials. 
She carefully distinguished herself from those people because she knew that 
she had no right to the land which she occupied without paying any rent 
thanks to the state tolerance. She thought that the on-going struggle in the 
valley was in vain, as the state would do whatever it wanted eventually. She 
                                                          
26 These are the names of the Central and Eastern Anatolian cities in Turkey. The people used to 
live in the villages of these cities before they migrated to Ankara in the 1970s onwards. They 
settled in Dikmen valley together with their country folk, constituting homogenous blocks of 
people based on hometown in the neighbourhood.  
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suggested that they should be ‘smart’ and accept the terms offered by the local 
state, given that their claim to the land was, in her view, illegitimate. Thus, 
watching her gecekondu house become a modern apartment with the greatest 
view of the valley – in her opinion – and becoming a homeowner there had 
reinforced Ulku’s notion of rights as bestowed from above. She thought that as 
long as the citizens remained loyal to the state they would be rewarded.    
In contrast to Ülkü’s supposedly civilised obedience, the actors of the right to 
shelter struggle created a rupture in her equation through integrating claim-
making with citizenship and daring to denounce the state for ineffective 
housing policies. The neighbourhood became a new site of struggle as they 
collectively dealt with maintenance issues and providing security through 
keeping watch and reporting anything suspicious to the bureau. Begum also 
told me that they also attained multiple representatives from the PH members, 
who were responsible of the different areas in the neighbourhood.  
Moreover, to reclaim the sense of belonging and establish solidarity beyond 
the neighbourhood, the bureau organised annual valley festivals, concerts, film 
screenings and workshops in the neighbourhood, invited domestic and foreign 
researchers and artists, and attended academic seminars and meetings of 
other right to shelter struggles in different parts of Turkey to share their 
experiences and build solidarity. Within the context of their call for justice, the 
bureau members effectively collaborated with lawyers, academics, and 
chambers of architects and urban planners to get assistance on legal issues to 
take the ‘unlawful’ decisions and practices of the local state to the court. The 
PH with its long-lasting experience of struggle for rights was very influential in 
terms of building solidarity beyond the neighbourhood and providing 
necessary information and resources for the valley people to embrace the right 
to shelter struggle (Aykan, 2011, p. 52).      
Becoming rights claimers also turned the inside of the home to a new site of 
contestation. Women in particular stuck heart and soul to the right to shelter 
struggle, in contrast to often more cautious approach of men regarding 
widening the extent of right-claims. Almost everybody including the men with 
whom I spoke agreed that if it were not for the women of the valley, the 
struggle would have ended earlier. Gülsen, a married woman at her forties, 
said that she started to feel stronger and more self-confident after becoming 
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part of the right to shelter struggle as opposed to her initial fear of becoming 
associated with political activism. Aysel, another married woman, similarly 
told me that she was grateful to the right to shelter struggle for teaching her 
how to claim and struggle for rights:      
It was very useful for us, really. I mean I couldn’t otherwise defend myself 
like this when friends (researchers) came to speak to me. I couldn’t even 
speak maybe. I mean I couldn’t express myself… I, for example, wouldn’t dare 
to say something to my husband when something unjust happened, maybe I 
wouldn’t be able to pursue my rights. I have realised all these, the rights of 
women, the struggle for rights. Maybe, I would just do what I have learnt 
from my family. Maybe, if there was a conversation in public, I would not 
speak when I disagree, or at least hesitate to speak. But now, I speak straight 
away, claim my right. (01.02.2015)   
Thus, claiming their right to shelter in public space, as these women recalled, 
enabled them to start questioning and to challenge their patriarchal 
subordination. Likewise, mobilisation of right to shelter struggle encouraged a 
process whereby the gecekondu settlers mostly lacking legal title deeds felt 
empowered to question and denounce the populist urban policies and on-
going citizenship regime, which had together managed class inequalities in 
such a way that they would not become a subject of activism against the state. 
As a result, their right to shelter struggle created a broader impact beyond the 
borders of the valley.  
7.3. Detaching the Claims to Citizenship from Claims to Right to 
Shelter    
When I arrived in the neighbourhood in 2015, what I saw was very different 
from what should be expected of such rupture-making struggle. Out of more 
than 3,000 participants, only around 500 residents were left, and 200 of them 
were not involved in political activism against the state although they 
remained in the neighbourhood. To shed light upon how the claim-making 
potential of the right to shelter struggle eroded over time, temporality needs to 
be integrated into the analysis of the struggle to capture the dynamism and 
complexity of the process, which cannot be reduced to a single experience of a 
united community.   
The analyses of the right to shelter struggle from the perspective of the process 
of mobilisation of a heterogeneous population on the basis of rights (Deniz, 
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2009; Aykan, 2011; Ozen et al., 2012) and from a legal perspective as a struggle 
of uncertified gecekondu possessors to be eligible stakeholder (Karaguney, 
2009) overlook the rupture-making potential of claiming rights. While the 
former accounts, as witnesses of the earlier phases of the movement, 
emphasise the success of mobilisation they overlook the inner tensions and 
contradictions. The latter, on the other hand, judges the claims of the 
struggling gecekondu dwellers as illegitimate due to the absence of legal title 
deeds.  
The right to shelter struggle is viewed by the leading figures of the PH as an 
extension of working class struggle and reincarnation of revolutionary 
movements of the 1970s. Tarik, for instance, conceptualised the gecekondu 
dwellers lacking title deeds as an ‘exploited class’ and the right to shelter 
struggle as a class struggle against the exploitation of global capitalism. 
However, the picture was much more complicated because of the complexities 
brought by the changes in the neoliberal housing market through the 
expansion of consumer and particularly housing credits.  
Tok and Oğuz (2011, p. 13) argue that gentrification encourages home 
ownership to create active, responsible home owners. In line with this, they 
address the processes through which the housing and credit markets in Turkey 
were restructured through a series of legal regulations. Accordingly, the people 
living in gecekondu houses without holding a title deed were encouraged to 
become legal homeowners in the social housing estates constructed by the 
Mass Housing Administration (which also provided cheap housing 
credit/loans). As noted above in Chapter 5, the ruling Justice and Development 
Party government made legal regulations aiming to restructure the housing 
finance sector, which had traditionally been weak.    
Within the context of the criminalisation of rights-based struggles and 
promotion of legal homeownership as a path of inclusion to ‘deserving 
citizenship’, people were forced to think more seriously about finding a place 
to go in case of forced eviction, which would no longer be unexpected. As a 
result, many valley people used bank credits with long-term instalments to 
purchase legal houses to secure themselves in case of any forced eviction. 
When I did my fieldwork, there were less than 10 households who had not 
purchased apartment houses in other low-income neighbourhoods or TOKI 
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estates in the peripheries in Ankara. Some households, especially larger 
families with 3 or 4 people working, had bought more than one house and 
rented them to pay their credit debt with the income. Thus, they were still 
living in their gecekondu house to which they felt attached and viewed as a 
house rather than a commodity.   
Some people, on the other hand, had moved to those apartment houses 
because of the increasing deterioration in the valley and criminalisation of the 
struggle. Yet, they had not demolished their gecekondu house with 
expectations of future rental gains in case an agreement would be signed with 
the municipality. As the settled residents in the neighbourhood and some PH 
members told me, from time to time, those people, who had moved outside, 
were visiting the bureau to check whether there was any news about the 
project. Moreover, when the news about the recommencement of the 
negotiations with the municipality spread in May 2015 onwards, the number 
of the participants in the weekly meetings started to increase. 
Purchasing legal apartment house/s provided the gecekondu people without 
title deeds with security against the threat of forced eviction. There were men 
who talked about economic gains as the main achievements of the struggle. 
Eren (29) said for instance that his family was ‘grateful to the mayor for being 
so cruel in the beginning that they realised that they had to take precautions’. 
What he referred to as precautions was to purchase apartment houses with 
bank credits. Kartal was a man at his late fifties, who moved in 2011 to the 
apartment house he had bought. He was also thankful to the struggle because 
through delaying the implementation of the project, it extended the duration in 
which he stayed in his gecekondu house, and as he did not pay any rent enabled 
him to make savings — with which he bought an apartment house.   
On the other hand, the indebtedness fragmented them as each one of them 
became concerned with the repayment of their debt. As a result, the 
valorisation and strength derived from collective right claims started to erode. 
That is why Kartal referred to the ‘profit’ he made rather than the ‘rights’ they 
claimed as the gains of the struggling process. Henceforth, they were no longer 
gecekondu people without title deeds who make rights-based claims to be 
included in the decision-making processes about where they live. As financial 
inclusion made people ‘”monetary conservatives” who were more concerned 
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with inflation than wealth distribution’ (Watson, 2008), people started to make 
calculations of their profit. Financial inclusion thus changed the gecekondu 
people’s relationship to the space and weakened the claims to ownership of 
the land/house on the basis of ‘enduring efforts to make a vacant land a 
liveable place in the absence of welfare services’, which Holston (1998) 
describes as insurgent citizenship. More importantly, their voluntary 
involvement in credit markets undermined the rupture-making capacity of 
their rights-based claims as successful participation in market transactions 
was recognised as the condition for inclusion. 
The on-going deterioration of the neighbourhood in the absence of municipal 
services also generated erosion in people’s place attachment. Delaying the 
implementation of the project and staying in the neighbourhood did not help 
the feelings of displacement as people had to live among the ruins of the 
demolished houses that were abandoned by their neighbours in a gradually 
deteriorating neighbourhood as a result of withdrawal of municipal services 
(See Figure 36). Displacement was there in the sense of ‘feelings of loss 
connected with a home that might be imminently lost and the cherished place 
around it’ (Atkinson, 2015, p. 373). Ismail told me that he loved the vitality in 
the neighbourhood when people used to sit together in the evenings in the 
yards in front of the gecekondu houses, chatting and playing games while 
drinking tea. But after they left, the neighbourhood ‘felt like dead’. Thus, he had 
also moved to an apartment house in the adjacent Ilker neighbourhood in 
2011.      
In the interviews, most of the participants were keener to talk about their 
memories in the neighbourhood before the struggle started. Begum (55), a 
prominent figure in the struggle told me during a group interview with her, her 
husband and her son that she was thankful to the Mayor for being so brutal 
against their struggle. She added that his effective criminalisation and 
continuous police attacks made the people unite against a shared threat and 
the struggling process brought her together with the neighbours that she had 
not known before. However, weeks later, during a spontaneous walk I took 
together with her in the neighbourhood without a voice recorder and without 
anybody from her family and neighbours, she told me that she missed the 
times before the struggle started when she was happier with the limited 
number of neighbours she knew back then.  
  
 
Page | 165 
 
Figure 36: Wastes of recyclers and ruins of abandoned houses in the gecekondu 
neighbourhood (Photo: Ela, 9-year old resident of the valley, 22.03.2015). 
As gradually more people abandoned the neighbourhood, already existing 
deterioration led by disinvestment intensified. Just as the claim maker valley 
people without title deeds became legal homeowners worried about economic 
gains and losses, the neighbourhood was no longer the place they had 
constructed and maintained together.        
This process of abandoning the neighbourhood gained momentum particularly 
after 2011 following the increasing criminalisation of gecekondu by the local 
and national state and the enactment in 2012 of Law no. 6303, known as the 
Disaster Law (see chapter 5). As part of that law, Dikmen Valley was declared a 
risky area that needed to be renewed in order to eliminate the risk of disaster. 
As this law further delegitimised opposing gentrification, the bureau took a 
step back and withdrew the demand for resettlement in the valley. The Mayor 
of Ankara offered to sell them the TOKI houses which were recently 
constructed in the Dogukent area to be paid back in unfixed instalments in 15 
years; and this was refused because of the lack of fixity of repayment scheme.  
The negotiations took place under the shadow of increased violence 
afterwards. A group of subcontracted workers of a private construction 
company attacked the neighbourhood with weapons, to which the valley 
people responded with sticks, stones and weapons (as referred in Chapter 5). 
After that attack, the bureau brought back the demand to be resettled within 
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the valley; however, the re-radicalisation of the struggle’s claims was not 
embraced this time by the valley people this time.  
Following the gradual weakening of collective mobilisation due to various 
reasons referred above, the PH with its long-lasting experience of political 
struggle attempted to become more influential in the neighbourhood. This was 
in direct contrast to the struggle’s initial principle of ‘no politics’ that is 
preventing any political party or organisation from being active in the 
movement as the population was very heterogeneous in terms of political 
ideology. Aykan (2011) referred to a presentation made by members of the PH 
explaining its principles of struggle:       
People’s Houses aimed in principle that the leading outsiders should merge 
into the local movement; enable people to become aware that they are 
subjects and citizens and a part of a collectivity with power and rights; 
encourage those real agents to participate, take part in all kind of processes 
and support them with their knowledge and organizational resources; but 
not standing out and creating a hierarchical order (Aykan, 2011, p. 45).  
While I conducted my fieldwork, in contrast, the newspaper of the PH was 
being sold after some of the weekly meetings. Two of the three people, who 
represented the valley in the negotiations with the local state, were members 
of the PH. On one occasion, the bureau attempted to collect 100 Turkish Liras 
(approximately 24 sterling pounds) from the people to take low-income 
children to a concert organised by the PH as well as for the file costs of the 
lawsuits the bureau brought about the urban transformation decision in the 
valley. Some people were disturbed by this and one woman refused to pay 
money for the activity of the PH starting a verbal fight criticising the bureau for 
not being accountable as she did not know how the money collected so far by 
the bureau was used. The bureau then announced that the people who did not 
give money would not be included in the negotiation process.   
I interviewed a family whose members had been among the people who 
initiated the process of struggle, but later withdrew their support. Orhan (50), 
the father counted many names of the people who had started the struggle but 
were then ejected by the PH for holding different views to those of the 
organisation:   
We did not want the PH here in our struggle from the beginning. We said that 
‘my brother, the only shared grievance in this neighbourhood is the claim to 
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the ownership of our gecekondu houses. Except for this, we are out.’ But, as 
we entered into the process, we found ourselves in the whole propaganda of 
the PH. (17.08.2015)  
His son, Eren (29), continued saying that: 
We entered into the process for the right to shelter. But then somehow we 
were in the protest meeting for right to free health or education. OK, health is 
my problem, education is as well. But I am already conscious of it. I can 
support the struggle for those individually. But, what is the purpose of me 
standing behind the PH banner or flag? (17.08.2015)    
As they told me especially from 2012 onwards, the PH came forward in the 
struggle trying to incorporate the right to shelter struggle in the valley in its 
anti-capitalist struggle. The ‘right to shelter’ was replaced with the ‘right to life’ 
which also involved the rights to health, education and environment. These 
constituted the main themes in the PH’s agenda of rights-based struggle. This 
shift was a step backwards as the citizenship-enabling claim to the political 
right to shelter was replaced with an abstract (human) right to life. By 
attempting to integrate the right to shelter struggle into its anti-capitalist class 
struggle, the PH failed to recognise the former’s transformative right-claiming 
potential. This corresponded to the process whereby the PH became more 
dominant in the right to shelter struggle in the valley contrary to the 
disturbances of the non-members.      
As the PH became more influential, the emphasis started to be put on 
attendance at collective protest meetings as well as weekly meetings. In those 
protests, the PH started to be more openly expressing its opposition not only 
to the mayor but also the ruling JDP government. It did this particularly 
through emphasising the on-going corruption of the local and national actors 
of urban transformation. For instance, in a protest meeting in 2014 in front of 
the Ankara Greater Municipality building, the valley people carried a banner 
saying ‘Apparently the issue was not “urban transformation”, but to fill the 
“shoe boxes”’ (see Figure 37). This was referring to the corruption scandal in 
December 2013 that involved several key people from the ruling Justice and 
Development Party. Those detained in this scandal involved officials from 
TOKİ, the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning as well as sons of 
parliament members and manager of a state-owned bank Halkbank. 4.5 million 
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Figure 37: The valley people hold a banner which says ‘Apparently the issue was not 
urban transformation but to fill the shoe boxes’. (Source: sendika.org, 2014). 
In another protest meeting in 2013, the valley people were holding a banner 
which said ‘Neither villa, nor palace, we demand a place to live’. Here ‘a place 
to live’ symbolised a moral claim vis-à-vis the extremely luxurious White 
Palace of the President Erdoğan, which was illegally built on public land. One of 
the activists, Gulsen (44) compared her gecekondu house to the White Palace 
saying that ‘my illegal gecekondu house is worth 40-50 million Turkish liras 
whereas the illegal palace of the President is trillions’.     
In turning attention to the political corruption, the PH overlooked the 
reluctance of the gecekondu people to be associated with a radical political 
association within the context of growing criminalisation of rights-based 
struggles. One of the reasons people had been moving from the valley when 
they became legal homeowners was to save their children from being 
blacklisted due to residing in a neighbourhood famous for hostility to the 
government. By attempting to turn the valley into one of the symbols of radical 
political activism against the government, the PH encouraged the valley people 
to abandon the neighbourhood.   
More importantly, the source of legitimacy of the struggle shifted from 
claiming the denied right to shelter by the gecekondu people lacking title deeds 
to a morally legitimised claim for their share of the urban rental gains as 
opposed to the corrupt redistribution of land by the municipalities. Thus, the 
empowering potential of the right to shelter struggle was lost as the strength 
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derived from collective rights claims eroded in the intangibility of moral 
claims, which ended up pacifying the vigorous crowd.  
Within this context, distrust in the efficacy of political activism against the state 
was felt in the interviews. The participants referred to the brutality of the 
municipality towards them when they talked about why they resisted the 
project. Thus, they attempted to legitimise their ‘misbehaviour’ (rebellion) by 
blaming the state actors for the violence. Through an emphasis on struggle as 
necessity against an immoral enemy they were representing themselves less on 
the basis of their capacity to make right claims but more on the tolerability of 
their illegality as compared to the corruption and violence involved in the 
whole process. Within this context, the rights-based claims to equal citizenship 
turned into a demand to be recognised as ‘deserving’ citizens.        
The leading figures of the struggle were also using the language of 
deservingness vis-à-vis the people who had not supported the struggle. During 
the time from February to October 2015 when I did my fieldwork, the number 
of the people who attended the weekly meetings had increased. The PH 
strategically involved those people, who had abandoned the valley but not 
demolished their houses, in the negotiation process with the municipality, in 
order to increase their negotiating power. This, however, created frustration 
among the activist people and weakened their desire to be more engaged in 
the long-lasting right to shelter struggle as the people who had left the valley 
would also benefit from the acquisitions of their struggle without paying same 
prices. During the weekly meetings, the activist residents were speaking 
sarcastically and sometimes arguing with the people from the non-activist 
group. In daily conversations, I heard many of them complain that they saw 
faces they had never seen in the 9-year process. This encounter facilitated the 
division of the community into the deserving and the undeserving, thus 
reinforced the language of ‘deservingness’ as opposed to rights.   
The tensions between the two groups came to the surface in one of the weekly 
meetings when I witnessed a physical fight between two men, one of whom 
had been active in the struggle and the other had not. When the latter asked 
the former a question about the process, he was criticised for not being around 
for two years. The two men started to punch each other during the meeting 
and the people hardly broke up the fight. What was more interesting for me 
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was to realise that some of the activist people and PH members were very 
nervous about the fact that I saw the fight. In contrast to the warm ways they 
had treated me for months, I felt like an outsider again, all of a sudden. Two PH 
members politely but openly expressed their concern about my presence 
saying that ‘Are you still here? You have seen many faces of us!’ This was a 
confession of the deceptiveness of the image of the struggle by the PH as if it 
was free from contradiction. 
In these ways, as the PH became more influential in imposing its own 
understanding and agenda of political activism on the right to shelter struggle 
in the Dikmen Valley, and within the context of increasing deterioration of the 
neighbourhood and criminalisation of political activism, the struggle lost its 
transformative potential. This reached a critical point where the main target of 
the struggle was reduced to getting their share from the re-appropriating of 
urban land in the valley, and legitimising themselves as officially recognised 
citizens through getting their terms officially accepted by the municipality.   
7.4. Arrival of the Syrians: The Encounter with the ‘Obedient’ 
Migrants     
Another factor challenging the rights-claiming potential of the struggle was the 
arrival of socially unpopular groups such as the Syrian asylum seekers and 
waste recyclers at the neighbourhood. The Syrians came from 2011 onwards 
and settled in the abandoned houses in the valley through covering the 
deteriorated roof and walls with plastic or canvas blankets (See Figures 38 and 
39). While local and national state officials criminalised the gecekondu housing 
and the struggling communities in Dikmen Valley, the Syrians represented the 
obedient migrants. Their settlement in tents as well as semi-demolished 
gecekondu houses in the valley was tolerated by the local authorities.   
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Figure 38: The abandoned houses, whose deteriorated parts were covered with things 
like tent canvas by Syrians (Photo: Author, 08.02.2015). 
 
Figure 39: More abandoned houses taken over by Syrians (Photo: Ela, 9-year old 
gecekondu resident of the valley, 22.03.2015). 
The other new residents in the valley were the waste recyclers27, who were 
Turkish and Kurdish citizens who had migrated from the South Eastern and 
Eastern region of Turkey, as the gecekondu settlers told me. Haydar explained 
that these were very large families, who came to big cities such as Ankara and 
Istanbul, where all the family members including the children worked as 
recyclers for a certain period, and went back to their hometown with the 
savings they made. The right to shelter bureau had welcomed these two 
groups who were socially marginalised, just like themselves, to settle in in 
their neighbourhood and tried to appease the valley people about their 
                                                          
27 These groups probably strategically chose Dikmen Valley gecekondu area as they knew that 
leftist groups, who would not refuse the presence of other marginalised groups in their 
neighbourhood, resided there.            
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presence. However, there were only a few people who did not complain about 
the arrival of the Syrians and the waste recyclers.  
What stood out in the narratives of the gecekondu people about the Syrians 
was the emphasis on the fact that they had no interaction with them. They 
referred to the harmlessness of the Syrians, as poor people living quietly and 
inoffensively and thought that they could develop solidarity with their 
displacement from their homes. However, the arrival of the Syrians coincided 
with the times when the neighbourhood started to decline as gradually more 
people abandoned, and thus, reminded the gecekondu people of their growing 
precarity and their diminishing control over the place they live.  
As for the waste recyclers, the narratives were more openly opposed to their 
presence because they were polluting the neighbourhood through simply 
doing their job. As they collected a huge amount of different types of waste and 
kept it outside of their houses on the streets (See Figure 40), they worsened 
the decline of the neighbourhood. Seeing that mess in contrast to the former 
tidiness of the neighbourhood when everyone took care of the maintenance 
and cleaning of their own gardens and streets intensified their feelings of 
displacement even before they were physically displaced.   
 
Figure 40: The plastic bottles and papers collected by recyclers (Photo: Author, 
24.05.2015). 
The waste recyclers knew that they had to stay in that gecekondu 
neighbourhood, which provided them with free and spacious accommodation 
to be able to continue doing their job. They could be more unrestrained 
compared to the struggling communities in terms of defending the 
neighbourhood against the police. At night and sometimes during the day, they 
  
 
Page | 173 
lit open fire outdoors as if they wanted to declare to the people that they were 
there to stay. One of the PH members, Baris, told me that they took the waste 
recyclers to a protest meeting once but they could hardly control them as they 
attempted to use guns against the police. After that, they gave up cooperating 
with the waste recyclers in order not to damage the legitimacy of their peaceful 
struggle.  
Syrians, on the other hand, lived in big groups in tents or deteriorated 
gecekondu houses and moved to different places at different times of the year. 
Ibo once explained their initial view of the Syrians in the neighbourhood 
saying that ‘we know that they are here, but we don’t see them’. They were 
mostly settled in the peripheries of the neighbourhood, so I passed by those 
houses every week as I went to the bureau. Nevertheless, I did not see them 
most of the times. Even when they were outside of their houses, they seemed 
to be dealing with their own business without interacting with others. While 
taking walks with my participants, I also observed that they did not know or 
greet the Syrians when we encountered them on the road.     
As undocumented migrants, the Syrians seemed more hesitant in terms of 
staking a claim on the space. As I observed throughout my fieldwork, they did 
not interact with the struggling communities except for those in the bureau; 
they sometimes visited in order to ask for guidance about legal issues or to 
celebrate a religious holiday. The participants told me that the Syrians knew 
that their presence in the neighbourhood was owing to the approval of the 
bureau and the struggling communities. Nevertheless, what drew my attention 
during my 9-month fieldwork in the neighbourhood was that the Syrians were 
also developing a sense of belonging to the place. Initially they were 
disregarding me as I passed by in the car every week, but through the end of 
my fieldwork, I realised that they were standing on the side of the road and 
looking at me in the eye. They were not as hesitant to make their presence 
manifest and avoid encounter with me and my partner as earlier. In the 
summer, I also saw a wedding ceremony of Syrian families (about 150-200 
people) celebrated on a vacant land close to the bureau playing loud music.  
Watching the socially unwanted groups settle in their neighbourhood was on 
the other hand nurturing the erosion of feelings of belonging by the long 
settled gecekondu communities. The valley people thought that the local state 
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encouraged the Syrians and waste recyclers to settle in the valley in order to 
discourage the activist citizens from staying in the neighbourhood. Although 
the PH strategically welcomed their presence leading the valley to become 
home for different groups of marginalised people; relations among these 
groups were not free from tension. These groups tended to understand and 
relate to each other in class ways. Similar to the narratives of the affluent 
groups about the gecekondu people, many squatter settlers I spoke emphasised 
that there were clear boundaries between them and those groups in cultural 
terms. They talked about the ‘uncleanliness’, ‘rudeness’, and ‘brutality’ of the 
waste recyclers. There was a popular story about a waste recycler man who 
killed his wife shortly before I started my fieldwork because she hit their dog.  
What was more interesting was that some participants talked about the 
‘parasitic’ lives of the waste recyclers. Once, a former gecekondu dweller told 
me that they lived in the neighbourhood without paying any electricity bills. He 
said that ‘we pay their bills as they use it illegally’. So, he echoed the narratives 
of the affluent groups, who regarded the gecekondu settlers like himself as the 
‘undeserving rich other’ on the basis of their illegal occupation of public land.  
Within the same context, many participants also mentioned the fact that after 
the Syrians and waste recyclers arrived, incidents of robbery increased in the 
neighbourhood. Kardelen (46) talked about Syrians and waste recyclers as 
‘dangerous’ groups and was frustrated to see that she and her fellow 
gecekondu residents were the ones who were being treated as illegal by the 
greater municipality:       
Currently there is no order in the neighbourhood. When we go back to bed at 
nights, we don’t feel secure. For instance, if we get into trouble, we call the 
police, but even the police don’t come... They left us to our fate here. 
(22.02.2015)  
Ethnic differences were also emphasised when they referred to the Syrians. 
The arrival of the Syrians in the valley and the state’s tolerance towards their 
presence in the neighbourhood as well as elsewhere became a turning point in 
the right to shelter struggle. As opposed to the critique of the disjunction 
between formal and substantive citizenship, some participants emphasised 
their formal/national membership to the state while claiming their rights. 
Aysel, a leading figure in the struggle, was very angry at the double-standard of 
the state towards its citizens and strangers. She said:   
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I pay money to private courses, and all the other things to get my child 
educated. He (referring to the rich Syrians) comes from a foreign country, 
occupies my country, and I am oppressed and see violence by the state in my 
own country, think about it! If that is the case, I will struggle to the end. 
(01.02.2015) (Emphasis added)      
The encounter with the Syrians created regressive demands for 
territorial/national citizenship. Whilst Aysel (45) was an illegal occupier of 
urban land in the eyes of the affluent groups, she perceived the Syrian groups 
as ‘illegal occupiers of the territorial land’, thus reproduced the legitimacy of 
the formal membership in claiming rights. During a group interview, Hanim, 
who was a widow with three children, similarly expressed her anger about the 
Mayor of Ankara, as he ‘allowed foreigners to become residents in Turkey 
while trying to take their houses from them’.  
Like Aysel, Kardelen also referred to her nationality when claiming her rights:  
Oznur: Erdogan says that ‘we are going to demolish the gecekondu areas, 
which have surrounded our cities like a tumour!’ The mayor Gokcek says that 
‘there are ideological groups in Dikmen Valley; these are terrorists, raiders’. 
Kardelen: They are the ones who are raiders! Look at his palace!  
Oznur: The urban elites, on the other hand, say that these areas are visual 
pollution. It seems like different groups cooperate in terms of demanding the 
demolition of gecekondu areas.  
Kardelen: OK, let them demolish but where will these Turkish people go? 
Where will the Turkish citizens go? (22.02.2015) (Emphasis added)    
Kardelen’s emphasis on her Turkish identity contrasted with the rights-based 
configuration of citizenship. The source of legitimacy of her right claim had 
shifted to her nationality rather than the right to claim right, which revealed 
that the promise of the initial stages of the struggle was being eroded.  
Conclusion  
This chapter focused on the contradictions and inner tensions throughout the 
Dikmen Valley Right to Shelter struggle. These aspects I have focused on here 
have been largely overlooked by previous studies as they were witnesses of 
the earlier phases of the struggle. Inspired by the differences between what I 
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had read and what I saw in the field, I offered an analysis of the right to shelter 
struggle as a process. I focus on the multiple ways the valley people negotiated 
with the complex processes of inclusion and marginalisation. The discussions 
in this chapter demonstrate the needs to interrogate collective mobilisation as 
a process that changes in relation to the broader political and economic 
processes and to avoid romanticising the voice of the communities resisting 
gentrification.  
I argue that the right to shelter struggle of the gecekondu people lacking title 
deeds is important not only because it mobilised a heterogeneous population, 
as emphasised in earlier accounts, but also it empowered them as right 
claimers and enabled them to enact and mobilise citizenship as activism as 
opposed to the official configurations thereof centred on obedience . Based on 
my intentions to reveal inner tensions rather than looking for heroes in the 
struggling communities, I also attend to the fact that political activism in the 
valley was constructed on a fragile ground from the beginning, and analysed 
the challenges it faced vis-à-vis the state-centrism which was being 
consolidated through disciplining efforts of gentrification.  
The most important challenge that fragmented the community was the 
promotion of financial inclusion to gentrification as legal homeowners. As the 
people became property owners, they became more concerned with paying 
debts and gradually withdrew their rights-based claims as they tried to remain 
within legal limits. Because of this, they also withdrew their support from the 
increasingly explicit opposition of the PH against the government. On the other 
hand, the activism of the PH further absorbed the transformative, claim-
making potential of the struggle by shifting the source of legitimacy of the 
struggle from rights-based claims to a morally legitimised demand for 
redistribution. As a result, what I observed in the field was bargain with the 
local state for a payable debt and a demand of deservingness rather than a 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This research began with the question of how the class inequalities and 
relations are impacted by the state-led process of gentrification in Turkey. This 
was a central concern in studies on neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism as 
the country has been experiencing an intense process of state-led 
neoliberalisation since 1980 and especially from the early 2000s onwards. 
Nevertheless, the role of the state was analysed in these studies on the basis of 
an economic rationale that sees political actors as agents of economic 
processes of profit-maximisation. The main aim of the thesis was to move 
beyond these analyses centred on economic processes and their emphasis on 
displacement and socio-spatial segregation as the class impact of 
gentrification. Drawing on the argument that ‘gentrification involves hidden 
rewards as well as hidden injuries’ (Paton, 2014), the study attempted to 
extend the scholarship on gentrification.  
Focusing on the complexities of the process rather than examining a single 
underlying logic of profit maximisation required a refusal of clear boundaries 
between simultaneous, interrelated processes. To the extent that inclusion 
exists in a continuum with exclusion, rather than in opposition to it (Mezzadra 
and Nielson, 2013, p. 7), I analysed how different but connected actors were 
included in gentrification from the perspective of how it complicates social 
class dynamics. I analysed different actors involved in gentrification in relation 
to one another, namely: local and national state actors, the middle and upper 
class residents living in high-rise apartments and prestigious gated 
communities, and the former and current gecekondu settlers lacking title 
deeds, who lived through the gentrification process in Dikmen Valley. 
Despite bringing together different groups, the squatter settlers occupied a 
central place in my study. To move beyond the focus on displacement and 
socio-spatial segregation as the main class impact of gentrification, specifically, 
I focused on the ways and processes through which the squatter settlers, who 
are stigmatised and expelled by gentrification processes, were simultaneously 
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drawn into the state-led gentrification project in Dikmen Valley and how these 
were negotiated by them on the ground. Inspired by the focus on boundaries in 
relational ethnography and the studies of class relations in Turkey, which 
explored the boundary-making practices between middle class and working 
class women (cf. Chapter 2), I analysed how middle and upper class residents 
actively participated in symbolic struggles over refashioning the boundaries 
regarding who can properly live in the city. This was enlightening in terms of 
moving beyond both the focus on the reconstitution of middle class distinction 
and habitus in isolation in the cultural analyses as well as emphases on 
displacement based on an understanding of class as a polarised relationship 
between capital and labour.    
To extend the analyses on financial inclusion of low-income groups into 
neoliberal market, I focused on the political considerations and processes 
behind the active role of the state when drawing those groups into 
gentrification projects. To explore how these political processes operate 
alongside the economic concerns of profit maximisation, I used the lens of 
citizenship. Drawing on the conceptualisations of ‘state citizenship agendas’ 
(de Koning et al., 2015) and ‘spaces of citizenship’ (Painter and Philo, 1995), I 
connected the changes in the state citizenship agendas in Turkey to the 
economic changes driven by neoliberal urbanisation (cf. Chapter 5).  
This was important as I showed that the agency of the state was not limited to 
expanding the neoliberal market rule and deal with social and political 
oppositions driven by the social costs of neoliberalisation. Thus, through 
linking the two interrelated processes of remaking the physical boundaries of 
urban space and the normative boundaries of citizenship by state actors, this 
thesis revealed the hitherto overlooked role of political processes and in 
particular the state citizenship agendas in redrawing class boundaries 
throughout neoliberal urbanisation and more specifically gentrification. In 
other words, my research opened up a new area of scholarship investigating 
the implications of political processes and actors in gentrification in terms of 
generating a class shift.    
Connecting gentrification to political processes using a citizenship lens, the 
thesis demonstrated that gentrification has become an important tool in 
Turkey with which the ruling government promoted the official definition of 
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citizenship. In so doing, it moves beyond merely economic explanations of 
gentrification as the reproduction of urban space for the ‘more affluent user’ 
and argues that state-led gentrification in Turkey produces urban space also 
for the more obedient user. Thus, the thesis argues that through neoliberal 
urban redevelopment, the authoritarian citizenship regime that criminalises 
whoever opposes it was promoted. The thesis demonstrated that the state was 
successful in disciplining residents with promises and threats while 
implementing a neoliberal urban agenda.   
Secondly and relatedly, a focus on the political processes enabled me to 
analyse different class groups as political actors as well as potential consumers 
and investors. This necessitated attentiveness to the actors involved in 
gentrification as citizens whose political support and loyalty was targeted, as 
well as consumers whose aspirations to consume were to be encouraged. This 
enabled me to view the groups involved in gentrification as political agents 
who enact and mobilise their own interpretations and practices of citizenship. 
In so doing, I was able to emphasise the agency of different actors in terms of 
negotiating with the state citizenship and urban agenda. Moving from this, the 
thesis demonstrated that there were different competing configurations of 
citizenships that co-existed in Dikmen Valley namely citizenship as obedient, 
as civil and as act.  
Through analysing material and symbolic processes with the citizenship lens, 
the thesis argued that new class hierarchies have been established through 
state-led gentrification linked to changing citizenship regimes in ways that 
complicate class boundaries. The upper-class participants appeared to be the 
main supporters of not only gentrification but also its disciplining efforts. The 
affluent respondents living in prestigious gated communities gave consent to 
the implementation of large-scale gentrification projects in squatter areas in a 
top-down, non-participatory manner. This was not only because they were 
financially winners in speculative urban redevelopment but also because their 
shared understandings of citizenship as civil and compliant corresponded to 
the obedience promoted by the official citizenship agenda and the 
understanding of the benevolent state. On the other hand, many middle-class 
participants, who were more suspicious about the ways large-scale 
gentrification projects were implemented by state actors, were threatened by 
the inflating prices of inner-city land due to speculative urban redevelopment. 
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In contrast, the former and current gecekondu dwellers were invited and given 
the means not only to participate but also to benefit gentrification project 
through promises of symbolic and financial inclusion, albeit in return for 
obedient participation.      
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, I explored the ways shared 
understandings regarding citizenship became a source of symbolic power for 
upper and middle-class participants. The focus on the symbolic power of the 
affluent groups revealed how their claims to the inner-city were connected to 
the political processes and the changing citizenship regime, rather than being 
individualised class constitutive practices as argued by cultural analyses of 
gentrification (cf. Chapter 2). The upper and middle-class participants claimed 
to be holders of ‘proper’ claims to the city that were centred on shared 
understandings of citizenship as a status or privilege, not a right. They were 
expecting the gecekondu dwellers to be like Ulku (cf. Chapter 6), grateful to the 
state and content with what they are given instead of being engaged in 
participation in activism. Thus, the political activism that had encouraged the 
struggling gecekondu communities to make rights-based claims paradoxically 
consolidated their disqualification from substantive citizenship in the eyes of 
the affluent groups and some middle-class residents.    
Through focusing on the struggling squatter dwellers, the thesis demonstrated 
that the promotion of state citizenship agenda through state-led gentrification 
was contested. Despite the concentration of the ‘means of history-making 
power’ in the alliance between the upper classes and state actors, the 
gecekondu communities were not merely ‘utensils of history makers’ (Mills, 
1959, p. 181). I revealed this by giving particular attention to the gecekondu 
communities living in the valley, most of whom lacked legal title deeds, who 
mobilised against forced upheaval and redistribution of their land to the more 
affluent groups. It was ‘believing in one another’, to use Haydar’s words (cf. 
Chapter 7), rather than trusting in the populist state, that enabled them to 
discover newer means of history-making power.     
Drawing on Engin Isin’s conceptualisation of citizenship as acts, I analysed the 
right to shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley from the perspective of claims to 
citizenship with which they enacted themselves as right-claimers. This concept 
enabled me to shed light on the ways the gecekondu communities contested 
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and contributed to pushing the boundaries of inclusion beyond normative 
values such as civility and obedience to the basis of claiming rights. In order 
not to romanticise these acts, however, I focused on multiple and opposing 
perspectives and experiences of activism and also analysed the ethnographic 
data in comparison to the former studies on the mobilisation of the right to 
shelter struggle in Dikmen Valley.  
My attentiveness on inner tensions enabled me to shed light on the limits of 
the disruptive potential of citizenship acts in the face of the prolonged 
deterioration and criminalisation that eroded their solidarity. More 
importantly, the discussions on the inner tensions prompted by the arrival of 
Syrians in the gecekondu neighbourhood showed how this encouraged a turn 
to nativist rationale and configuration of rights guaranteed by belonging to a 
nation diminishing the empowering potential of a more engaged, rights-based 
configuration of citizenship.  
On October 2017, after 11 years (and two years after I finished my fieldwork), 
280 former and current gecekondu dwellers lacking title deeds bade in the 
local state tender and were given the right to purchase the ownership of the 
lands they occupied in return for 97.500.000 TL (which was equal to 
20.656.000 GBP at the time). For it was done through a tender offer, the act of 
citizenship in the valley did not generate a pathway for gecekondu dwellers 
lacking title deeds to legal ownership of the lands they occupied or inclusion in 
the political decision-making processes regarding those lands as legitimate 
stakeholders. This also revealed the importance of analysing the collective 
mobilisation in the valley and elsewhere as a dynamic process situated in a 
complex terrain of power relations.  
The agreement was made between the local state officials and 280 gecekondu 
people, most of whom had already purchased apartment houses that they 
could move to during the implementation of the project. The few households 
who did not purchase houses during the process of struggle, and the Syrians 
and waste recyclers, on the other hand, will have to move from the area. 
Although my research was mainly concerned with class, even the limited 
glance to the Syrians in a gentrifying area showed the importance of the role 
ethnicity and racism can play in the changes described in the thesis which 
constitute a fruitful avenue for future research. Yet, it is not known whether 
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the Syrians in the neighbourhood have developed a sense of belonging and will 
attempt to oppose displacement. Within the context of the complex processes 
that citizenship is taking on a turn to obedience and nationhood, future 
research might further assess the role racism and ethnicity can play in material 
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